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Abstract 
Fundamentally, what is of interest in this thesis is whether the currency union of the European 
region has actually delivered with respect to removing barriers to entry and hence creating a more 
open market.  Consequently, this should result in enhanced competition and therefore a decrease in 
market concentration and firm profitability. 
 
Significant research has been undertaken with respect to country and therefore macroeconomic 
impacts.  However firm and industry behaviour on a microeconomic level has been largely ignored.  
Most analysis to date focuses specifically on industries within countries and not across countries in 
general.  Furthermore, there has been no research to date that specifically investigates pre and post 
impacts of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
The determinants of market concentration and firm profitability are explored at length; leveraging 
the Cournot model.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is constructed across eight different 
market definitions, in order to capture the impact of the EMU on market structure.  The models 
generated for market concentration (i.e. HHI) and firm profitability (i.e. ROS, ROA and ROE) 
deploy panel data estimation techniques. 
 
According to the models estimated the creation of the EMU has resulted in a reduction in market 
concentration and firm profitability, consequently suggesting an increase in competition.  In light of 
recent events, policy makers need to be very careful when considering potentially breaking-up the 
EMU, as there may be direct negative consequences pertaining to the levels of competition across 
the European landscape. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Importance of research 
The optimal currency area (OCA) approach that was initiated by Mundell (1961) developed a set of 
criteria aimed at investigating whether a particular geographic zone would gain from adopting a 
single currency.  Most research investigates the impacts of currency unions on a macroeconomic 
level in terms of country effects.  However, industry and corporate behaviour has been largely 
ignored.  The primary objective of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe is the 
effective completion of a single currency market, where the benefits of the single market are 
presumed to be large.  The EMU has assisted in the development of an integrated capital market. 
This has provided obvious consumer benefits in convenience and price transparency for an 
increasingly mobile European population. 
 
The empirical literature on OCAs does not identify whether the EMU dominates costs or benefits at 
the microeconomic level.  The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of the introduction of 
the euro across the European Union (EU), in the context of competition.  Despite widespread 
research on market concentration within the area of industrial economics, there is little research that 
directly addresses the relationship between OCAs, market concentration and firm profitability.  
Hence, the research in this thesis seeks to quantify the competition benefits of the introduction of 
the euro. 
 
A fundamental reason for countries to participate in a currency union is the purported economic 
integration benefits resulting from country and industry diversity.  OCA theory suggests that when a 
region within a union is challenged with difficult economic conditions while another experiences a 
boom; risk transference can potentially smooth incomes across both regions.  Hence the currency 
stability offered by a monetary union is essential for the maintenance of free trade and an integrated 
market (Eichengreen 1996). 
 
In recent years and in most countries, monetary policy has replaced fiscal policy as the principle 
macroeconomic policy tool for the stabilisation of output and inflation (Goddard, Molyneux et al. 
2007).  However, it has been a difficult to quantify how monetary policy influences the economy.  
Hence, the models estimated in this thesis provide a framework in which to access the 
microeconomic benefits of a change in monetary regime – specifically the implementation of euro. 
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1.2 Contribution of the thesis 
Firstly, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact that the introduction of the euro has had on 
market structure and firm profitability across the EU and its member states.  The research 
undertaken provides a framework to discuss the benefits of EMU membership for potential 
incumbents, in the context of competition.  Furthermore, this also highlights the potential gains that 
will be forgone in relation to those members who may be currently considering disbanding the euro, 
in pursuit of monetary autonomy.  Due to the recent speculation relating to the PIIGS nations, the 
microeconomic implications must be given very serious consideration.1 
 
Secondly, structure-conduct-performance (SCP) studies in the field of Industrial Organisation (IO) 
generally consist of obtaining a measure of performance (through direct measurement rather than 
estimation) and several measures of market structure.  Typically, cross-industry observations are 
used to regress the performance measure on various measures of market structure; so as to explain 
the difference in market performance across industries.  However, SCP studies are often limited to 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for a particular year or time period and a specific industry. 
 
The models estimated in this thesis utilise panel data sets, which is extremely useful for policy 
analysis and hence program evaluation.  The analysis in this thesis allows for both cross-sectional 
and time series dimensions, across all firms operating in the countries participating in the EMU; and 
is not restricted to a particular industry.  When a random sample is drawn at each time period, 
pooling the resulting random sample provides an independently pooled cross-section.  Using an 
independently pooled cross-section delivers more precise estimators and powerful test statistics (see 
Hsiao 2003).  The panel models estimated provides insights into market concentration and 
profitability, which has typically been obtained using time series or cross sectional data throughout 
traditional SCP literature. 
 
Thirdly, firm, industry and country level characteristics have been consolidated into a single 
comprehensive dataset; based on the standard industry classification (SIC) codes and geographic 
location allocated to firms.  These two core demographics have enabled six different market 
definitions, which are used to calculate market share and the HHI.  Furthermore, industry growth 
and minimum efficient scale (MES) has also been calculated.  In addition, income statement, 
balance sheet and country macroeconomic variables have also been assigned at the micro firm level.  
 
                                                 
1 PIIGS refers to the following countries: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
A schema of the structure of this thesis is illustrated in Figure 1-1.  Chapter 2 provides the 
background motivation for the EMU in Europe, commencing with a brief history regarding the 
challenges faced by the EU in the 1980’s.  The ambitious objectives of the EMU are discussed, in 
particular the impact on competition across the member states.  The important transitory stages of 
the EMU are outlined, highlighting the unprecedented social, political and financial structure of the 
euro.  Comprehensive macroeconomic research has been undertaken on OCAs and international 
trade in relation to the euro.  From a microeconomic perspective, IO literature has extensively 
explored the impact of competition in markets, countries and regions; with the exception of the euro 
where there is very little research.  This is discussed briefly in context to the SCP paradigm, which 
is the empirical platform used to test the proposition held by this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 summarises the four key market structures that are typically leveraged to explain the 
differences in firm behaviour and corresponding levels of competition.  The Cournot oligopoly 
model is discussed in detail, providing a theoretical basis for which the equilibrium market structure 
(i.e. number of firms) can be identified.  The most commonly used measures of market structure are 
discussed at length; in terms of their theoretical basis, practical application and [legislative] use 
amongst anti-trust governing bodies.  The limited empirical literature on Europe is summarised in 
relation to competition, market structure and firm profitability across the region.  
 
Chapter 4 explores the impact that the introduction of the euro has had on market structure in the 
EU.  The extensive body of research pertaining to SCP theorem outlines an empirical model for 
explaining market structure.  The data sources and variables selected for inclusion in the model are 
outlined.  The descriptive statistics for the number of firms and cumulative market share (for the top 
ten firms) are provided, which illustrates four concentration curves.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, a proxy for market structure, is constructed across eight different market definitions; and is 
presented across three different time periods.  The estimation techniques are discussed and a market 
concentration model is constructed, which includes the following firm and industry level 
determinants: initial capital requirements (i.e. asset-to-sales ratio), lagged profitability, lagged 
industry [revenue] growth, minimum efficient scale; and country indicators measuring the economic 
wealth, stability and sustainability. The results are interpreted and concluding remarks are 
summarised.  
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Figure 1-1: Synoptic framework of thesis 
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Chapter 5 investigates the impact that the introduction of the euro has had on firm profitability in 
the EU.  SCP empirical literature has extensively explored determinants of firm profitability.  The 
data sources and variables selected for inclusion in the model is outlined.  A correlation matrix of 
profitability variables and the HHI is provided and discussed.  The mean profitability is also 
calculated and examined [by time period and geographic sector].  The estimation techniques are 
discussed and profitability model is proposed that includes the following firm and industry level 
determinants: initial capital requirements (i.e. asset-to-sales ratio), lagged HHI, industry [revenue] 
growth, minimum efficient scale and a country indicator measuring economic wealth (i.e. GDP per 
capita).  The results are interpreted and concluding remarks are summarised. 
 
Chapter 6 summarises the key findings of this thesis; and as a result policy implications are 
presented.  The policy inferences highlight that currency unions play an important role in enhancing 
competition through a reduction in market concentration and firm profitability.  Any changes to the 
membership of the participants of the euro will likely have a significant effect on the competitive 
landscape in Europe.  Finally, the limitations of this thesis are discussed; with a view to providing 
direction for further analysis in this topical, timely and important area of research. 
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CHAPTER 2: Europe and the Single Market 
2.1 Economic and Monetary Union 
In the early 1980’s, the EU was confronted with harsh economic challenges, in particular rising 
unemployment and poor competitiveness in high-tech activities.2  Trade between member states 
was being encumbered by numerous obstacles, which prevented the European economy profiting 
fully from its progressive integration (see Baimbridge and Whyman 2003).  As a result, the EU 
decided to create a large single market; where all barriers to free circulation of goods, services, 
capital flows and people were to be eliminated – by the end of 1992 (Pelkmans 1994; Apel 2005; 
Artis and Nixson 2007).  
 
The Single Market Programme (SMP) launched by the European Commission (1985) was designed 
to increase competition in European markets as an antidote to eurosclerosis.3  The economic 
aspiration of the SMP was to implement structural changes designed to generate growth and 
employment.  The SMP was aimed at improving the EU’s international competitiveness (see 
Badinger 2007), with a view that market efficiency and economic welfare would be enhanced (Peck 
1989; Neven 1990).  It was believed that stronger competition would encourage efficiency gains 
such as a drop in product prices and mark-ups (i.e. allocative efficiency gains) and increase 
productivity translating to a reduction in production costs (i.e. productive and dynamic efficiency 
gains).4  
 
Cecchini, Catinat et al. (1988) undertook a partnered study with Price Waterhouse funded by the 
European Commission (EC).5  This study was one of the first to comprehensively review the 
potential costs and benefits of a single market during the European transition.  The Cecchini report 
argued that the implementation of the SMP would likely result in an increase of competition.  Most 
of the benefits were expected to result from competitive forces that would be unleashed by 
integration; mainly due to increased efficiencies, coupled with lower costs, lower prices and 
increased product variety.  Basically, the removal of barriers due to the SMP was anticipated to 
affect both the structure of trade and production.  As stated by the European Commission (1996), 
“…the main channels through which these benefits were to be reaped throughout the economy were 
the exploitation of scale economies by firms, and increased competition”. 
                                                 
2 The EU was previously referred to as the European Community. 
3 Eurosclerosis refers to the perceived stagnation of the EU. Refer to Jovanovic (2004) for an overview. 
4 There are numerous studies that have analysed the relationship between competition and productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency.  For 
example, see Ahn (2002) and Funakoshi and Motohashi (2009) for a survey of the literature on these issues. 
5 The EC was previously referred to as The Commission of European Communities. 
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It was agreed by the EU member states that the full benefits of the internal market would be 
difficult to achieve with the relatively high business costs created by the existence of multiple 
currencies and unstable exchange rates.  Many economists and central bankers argued that national 
monetary autonomy was inconsistent with the EU objectives related to free trade, free capital 
movements and fixed exchange rates.  As a result, a plan was presented in 1989 to the European 
Council that was headed by the EC president Jacques Delors, on the establishment of an EMU. 
 
Under the proposed EMU, a single European Central Bank (ECB) would manage monetary policy 
for a single European currency, thereby abolishing national monies and creating an independent role 
for national central banks.  The Delors report (1989) provided a blueprint for the Maastricht treaty 
that in turn envisaged a three-stage path to the EMU as follows: 
i. Bring the twelve country members of the EU into the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM), whilst implementing tighter convergence monetary policies to secure the ERM; 
ii. Narrow the acceptable bands of the ERM and allow a new ECB to exercise more 
control over national monetary policies; and  
iii. Replace national monies with a common currency, hence placing the responsibility for 
European monetary policy within a ECB that will represent the best interests of all the 
participating countries. 
 
The first stage (1990 to 1994) coincided with the complete liberalisation of capital movements 
across Europe, as summarised in Table 2-1.  This involved the removal of obstacles to financial 
integration that included physical, technical and fiscal barriers to economic transactions in a free 
internal market (see Giddy 1994).  It was recommended that member states could only participate in 
the proposed monetary union if it was demonstrated that a high degree of lasting economic and 
fiscal convergence was evident.  This would be achieved through the fulfilment of four main 
economic criteria: (1) inflation, (2) long-term interest rates, (3) fiscal debt and deficit, and (4) 
exchange rates.  Furthermore, the Delors report advocated an independent central bank whose 
primary objective would be price stability. 
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Table 2-1: The three stages of Economic and Monetary Union 
STAGE ONE (1990 to 1994) STAGE TWO (1994 to 1999) STAGE THREE (1999 onwards) 
1 July 1990 1 January 1994 1 January 1999 
Complete freedom for capital transactions 
Increased cooperation 
Free use of the European Currency Unit 
(ECU), forerunner of the € 
Improvement of economic convergence 
Start of preparatory work for stage three 
Maastricht treaty (signed 7 Feb 1992; 
entry in force: 1 Nov 1993 
Establishment of the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) 
Ban on the granting of central bank credit 
to the public sector 
Increased coordination of monetary 
policies 
Strengthening of economic convergence 
National central banks become fully 
independent with price stability as their 
primary objective 
Preparatory work for stage three 
Irrevocable fixing of conversion rates 
Introduction of the euro in eleven member 
states 
Foundation of the euro-system and 
transfer of responsibility for the single 
monetary policy to the ECB 
Entry into effect of the intra-EU exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM II) 
Entry into force of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) 
Source: adapted from Mongelli (2010) 
 
In 1991, the EC drafted the Maastricht treaty, which was a 250-page document that defined the 
steps that must be taken to allow the transfer of a policy-making authority to a central body.  The 
Maastricht treaty required the approval of all twelve [country] members of the EU, either through a 
parliamentary vote or referendum.  Many parts of the treaty were controversial, as one might 
anticipate, with the transfer of sovereign economic powers to an untested and far-away EU 
institution.  The treaty did not only address monetary unification, but also raised the possibility for 
the centralisation of foreign, defence and social policies.  The Maastricht plan embodied a 
maximalist monetary goal (one single currency) and a minimalist fiscal goal (tax harmonisation 
through the common market together, with country control over national budget deficits and debt 
levels), as illustrated in Figure 2-1.6 
  
In 1992 the EU was born, however many countries negotiated the right to ‘opt out’ of certain key 
criteria – including the EU’s common monetary and defence institutions.  According to the Delors 
plan, countries were required to meet various economic targets prior to joining the EMU.  The 
convergence criteria included: (1) limiting annual deficit budgets to 3% of GDP, (2) limiting total 
public debt to 60% of GDP, (3) establishing consumer price inflation within 1.5% of the inflation of 
the three lowest EU countries, (4) establishing long term government bond yields within two 
percentage points of the three low inflation countries, and (5) maintaining exchange rates within the 
traditional ERM band without a devaluation for a period of two years.  At the time, this criterion 
was viewed as being too demanding because most countries were unable to meet it initially (see 
Levich 1998). 
                                                 
6 Refer to Jovanovic (2004) for a detailed discussion surrounding the Maastricht treaty. 
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Figure 2-1: Economic and Monetary Union flowchart 
 
 
Source: adapted from Swann (2000, p. 193) 
 
In 1994, the start of the second stage of the EMU commenced with the establishment of the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI), as shown in the middle panel of Table 2-1.  The two focal 
responsibilities of the EMI were to strengthen central bank cooperation and monetary policy 
coordination – this included the assessment of progress in the fields of economic and legal 
convergence; and to make preparations required for the formation of the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) – this was in order to enable execution of the single monetary policy and for 
the establishment of a single currency in the third stage. It was deemed important that the 
responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy in the EU remained in the domain of the national 
authorities.  During this time period (1994 to 1999), the transition to the euro was planned, the 
future governance of the euro area (i.e. the Stability and Growth Pact [SCP]) was defined, and 
economic convergence between the member states was an essential focus. 
 
The third and final stage of the EMU commenced with the introduction of the euro on the 1st 
January 1999, as shown in the third panel of Table 2-1.7  This included the establishment of the 
euro-system and the transfer of responsibility from the conduct of monetary policy to the ECB.8 
Eleven countries fulfilled the convergence criteria requirements to participate in the currency union, 
which included – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  The monetary union further extended its border on seven separate 
occasions; first to include Greece in 2001 and then to adopt six new EU member states – Slovenia 
in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011 and Latvia in 2014. 
                                                 
7 Simultaneously, with the launch of the euro, the intra-EU exchange rate mechanism for some member states not participating in the euro (ERM II) 
and the SGP came into force. 
8 The ECB and the national central banks together constitute the euro-system.  The main objective of the euro-system is to maintain price stability, 
which involves safeguarding the value of the euro – ensuring the highest level of integrity, competence, efficiency and transparency. 
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As shown in Figure 2-2, there are currently eighteen member states of the EU that have adopted the 
euro as their currency.  Furthermore, there are nine EU member states that do not currently use the 
single European currency: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK).  The EU will continue to expand as an increasing 
number of countries have expressed interest in membership.  There are presently five candidate 
countries for EU accession that include Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. 
 
Figure 2-2: Evolution of the euro area 
 
 
Source: the author 
 
In March 2000, the EU heads of state and government agreed on 10-year ambitious goal in Lisbon, 
Portugual.  The Lisbon agenda outlined a strategy to make the EU "the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion".  In particular, it was agreed that to achieve this 
ambition, an overall strategy should focus on three key areas: 
 Preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies for the 
information society and R&D, including advancing the process of structural reform for 
competitiveness and innovation – by completing the internal market; 
 Modernising the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion; 
and 
 Sustaining a healthy economic outlook and favourable growth prospects by applying an 
appropriate macroeconomic policy mix. 
Although some progress was made on innovating the European economy, the reform process was 
not fast enough and the ambitious targets were not achieved by 2010. 
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First and foremost, the transference to the EMU in Europe was a change in monetary regime.  When 
the monetary union was formed, the most common concern related to price stability.  Price stability 
facilitated by an independent central bank must have the authority to manage inflation expectations.  
Preceding a systematic, transparent and comprehensive monetary policy strategy, a credible ECB 
must be able to contribute to macroeconomic stability which inturn fosters growth and 
development.  Clearly, there are costs and benefits associated with countries participating in a 
currency union (see Grubel 2006).  Hence, the introduction of the euro is believed to provide 
multiple opportunities for EU citizens and consumers to benefit as summarised in Table 2-2. 
 
Of particular interest in this thesis, is the objective of bringing about a more competitive market for 
consumers.  The euro introduces price transparency to the single market.  Consumers are able to 
easily compare prices across borders and find the most advantageous price for a product, which is 
further enhanced by the accessibility of the internet.9  Hence, improved price transparency has the 
potential to increase competition between merchants and suppliers, whilst ensuring downward 
pressure on prices in the euro region. 
 
Table 2-2: Benefits of the EMU in Europe 
Group Benefits 
Consumer A more competitive market, stable prices, cheaper (including easier and safer) borrowing, lower travel costs, economic growth and jobs, and more public investment. 
Business Increased cross border and international trade, improved borrowing (including planning) and investment, and better access to capital. 
Economic stability and 
growth 
Sound and sustainable public finances, improved government budgeting, strengthened 
resistance to external shocks, and more economic cohesion. 
Single financial market 
Integration leading to a more efficient and effective flow of capital, improved competition 
for funds between borrowers and lenders, and reducing the costs of cross-border 
money transfers. 
Source: the EC website (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/why/index_en.htm) 
 
In a single market with a common currency, doing business across borders is cheaper for 
companies.10  This is because there is no need to include the risk of currency fluctuations in product 
pricing, nor are the exchange rate costs incurred.  Previously, these costs have been estimated at 
approximately €20 to €25 billion annually within the EU.  Today, these transaction costs have been 
eliminated in the euro area.  This encourages the release of capital to invest in expanding and 
growing business and employing more workers – ultimately benefiting constituents and their 
families (see Scitovsky 1956). 
                                                 
9 Product is used to describe a good or service throughout the thesis. 
10 This benefit would be greater the more open and extensive the trade connections between member states of the EMU: see Bordo and James (2010). 
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The European Commission (1988) assessed the potential economic effects of completing the SMP; 
including the impact of increased competition on costs, prices and market size.  The objective of 
this study was to develop a deeper understanding of the channels through which economic gains are 
realised, including an attempt to quantify the potential size of these gains.  Two years later, the 
European Commission (1990) further evaluated the potential costs and benefits of forming a EMU; 
focussing on the economic impacts relating to efficiency and growth, price stability, public finance, 
adjustments in the absence of exchange rates, and financial (services) integration.  Another study 
was also undertaken by the European Commission (1996) providing analysis up to 1992 – the year 
of completion of the SMP.  What is of importance to note is that all three studies were undertaken 
prior to the introduction of the euro; which was the final pillar in completing the EMU.  Therefore 
the contribution of this thesis is to analyse the effect of the euro in an ex-ante and ex-post fashion. 
 
Another important objective of the EMU was to create a single financial market.  Financial market 
integration can reduce the need for exchange rate adjustments (see Ingram 1962).  Financial 
integration can soften temporary adverse disturbances through capital inflows (such as a decrease of 
net foreign assets or borrowing from surplus areas), which can be transposed when the shock is 
over.  Even modest changes in interest rates would induce equilibrium capital movements across 
member states when a high degree of financial integration is present.  This would reduce differences 
in long-term interest rates that would not only ease the financing of external imbalances, but would 
also foster an efficient allocation of resources (Issing 2002).  Ultimately, financial market 
integration would foster competition (Agénor 2003). 
 
Over many years, a comprehesive collection of literature across a vast array of topics has been 
explored with regard to the EMU in Europe. 11  For example, Meade (1957) ponders whether it is 
possible for countries to combine free trade with full employment and balance of payments (BOP) 
equilibrium; bringing attention to the financial challenges involved pertaining to a European free-
trade area.  Jacquemin and Sapir (1991) argue that at the micro and macro level, a combined 
internal and external liberalisation framework is necessary to fully realise the [potential] post-1992 
welfare gains.  Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) advise that fiscal restraints of the Maastricht treaty 
are enforceable, however they could significantly diminish the stabilisation capacity of national 
budgets if vigorously enforced. 
 
                                                 
11 Collard and Dellas (2002); Coppel, Durand and Visco (2000); Fischer (2006); Flood and Rose (1995); Frisch (2003); Méon and Weill (2004); Rose 
and Svensson (1994); Bénassy-Quéré and Mojon (2001); Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon and Pisani-Ferry (1997); Hallett and Piscitelli (2002); Gropp and 
Moerman (2004) 
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Furthermore, Gali and Perotti (2003) do not find any empirical evidence to support the view that the 
Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) makes it difficult for governments of 
EMU member states to stabilise their economies with appropriate fiscal policy.  A number of 
researchers investigate the impact of the euro as an international currency and the implications for 
the foreign exchange market – highlighting the merits and defects of the euro as an international 
rival to the US dollar.12  Whereas, Feldstein (2000) explores the reason why cyclical 
unemployment, structural unemployment, and inflation may all be higher in the future as a result of 
the euro. 
 
In addition, Carré and Collard (2003) attempt to provide insight into the consequences of the 
transition of a EMU for individual welfare following specific shocks, through an extension of the 
model specified by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).  Benigno (2004) explores a framework that 
delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of consumers that can be used to evaluate 
monetary policy in the context of a currency union.  And lastly, European Commission (2008) 
investigate the determinants of output in Europe and the US, concluding that the EMU most likely 
has a small positive effect.  They find that differences in the accumulation of skills and labour input 
growth appear to explain much of the variation in performance across countries. 
 
There are however, three key research areas that have garnered significant attention: optimal 
currency areas (OCA), international trade, and financial market integration.  OCA theorem provides 
a systematic framework for deciding whether it makes sense for a group of countries to abandon 
their national currencies.  The OCA criterion in context to euro area has been extensively 
researched and is summarised in Section 2.2.  The impact on international trade by countries 
participating in a currency union has been comprehensively analysed and is discussed in Section 
2.3.  The impact of the EMU on financial integration is briefly discussed in Section 2.4.  It is 
important to note that most of the preceding research is undertaken from a ‘macro’ perspective; and 
the ‘micro’ implications across multiple industries has been quite frankly underwhelming. 
 
                                                 
12 Mundell (1998); Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon and Schor (1998); Eichengreen (1998); Hau, Killeen and Moore (2002a); Hau, Killeen and Moore (2002b) 
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2.2 Optimal currency areas [and the EU] 
An OCA can be defined as the optimum geographical area for a single currency, or several 
currencies, whose exchange rates are permanently pegged; also known as a monetary union.  
Hence, a monetary union is defined as a common currency that establishes a set of monetary 
arrangements for a group of member states in the form of international monetary cooperation; this 
includes the cooperation between central banks and a common central bank.13  Milton Friedman 
(1948) played an important role in the OCA narrative; in particular, his work pertaining to monetary 
integration in the early 1950’s (see Friedman 1953).  However, the classical case for a fiscal union 
accompanying a monetary union was truly pioneered by Robert Mundell (1961).  Further equally 
important proponents of OCA theorem include Ronald McKinnon (1963) and Peter Kenen (1969).14 
 
Mundell (1961) was the first economist to articulate that OCA theory concerns the use of flexible 
exchange rates based on regional currencies, not on national currencies.  ‘Optimum’ is where a 
single currency area within which monetary-fiscal policy and flexible external exchange rates can 
be used to provide the best solution to three key objectives: (a) full employment, (b) balanced 
international payments, and (c) stable internal average price level.15  Mundell (1973b) discussed the 
potential for a currency union across the European region almost three decades before the euro was 
introduced.16  After a flurry of research in the 1960’s, the subject of OCAs was in effect stagnant 
for approximately 20 years, until a renewed interest on the subject in the 1990’s – largely focussed 
on the EMU in Europe (for example, see Dowd and Greenaway 1993). 
 
OCAs are dependent upon specific country characteristics and can be dictated by diversity (for 
example, see Eichengreen and Bayoumi 1999).  This includes whether a country is undergoing a 
process of economic integration or disintegration, which implies differing needs and requirements 
(Frankel 1999).  Diversity of participating countries is extremely important – socially, economically 
and politically (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006).  The basic idea is that diversity translates into 
asymmetric shocks and that the exchange rate is very useful for dealing with these shocks (Taylor 
1995).  The theory of OCAs emphasizes that a single currency zone must have symmetry across 
shocks and structures. 
 
                                                 
13 See Bordo and James (2010). 
14 McKinnon (1993) provides an in depth historical perspective of the evolution of currency regimes globally pre-euro. 
15 As highlighted by McKinnon (1963). 
16 Also see Fleming (1971) for an earlier assessment of the European region. 
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Shocks include unexpected internal or external events that may impact the economy [e.g. global 
financial crisis].17  To create an issue for a monetary union, a shock must be large and asymmetric 
[i.e. shocks that do not affect all currency union members].  OCA theory recognises that the real 
economic cost of forgoing an exchange rate instrument arises in the presence of asymmetric shocks.  
If macroeconomic disturbances affect potential monetary partners differently, there may be no 
grounds to participate in a currency union (Vaubel 1978).  As a result, governments may prefer to 
retain the policy autonomy required for an independent response to idiosyncratic shocks (Kenen 
1995). Also, when countries are sufficiently different (i.e. diverse), symmetric shocks can produce 
similar affects to asymmetric shocks, as this is entirely dependent on how a country wishes to 
respond.  In other words, even symmetric shocks may have asymmetric effects. 
 
Considerable attention had been given to the incident of shocks, with early contributions from 
Weber (1990) and Cohen and Wyplosz (1989).  Extensive literature assesses the extent to which the 
euro area is subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which is defined as economic disturbances that are 
either initially different or affect regions in different ways (see Bordo and James 2010).  Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1992a; 1992b) found that shocks to eleven EU member states have been more 
asymmetrically distributed than shocks to the eight consensus regions of the USA.  Measured by the 
real exchange rate, Eichengreen (1997) further demonstrates that that asymmetric disturbances are 
more variable in Europe than in the USA.  Von Hagen and Neumann (1994) also support these 
findings.  In this paper, the conditions for a common currency in Europe are assessed using a 
comparison of the variability of real exchange rate shocks within Germany; including between 
Germany and a number of European countries. 
 
Corsetti, Pesenti et al. (1999) highlight that the creation of EMU ended the ‘initial’ policy debate on 
whether Europe could afford to give up exchange rate flexibility; due to the vulnerability of 
country-specific shocks.  Beine, Candelon et al. (2000) assess the composition of the European 
OCA on the basis of the degree of asymmetry of real shocks; in addition to defining a perfect OCA 
as a set of countries for which the short run fluctuations are perfectly synchronised.  De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeke (1993) investigate whether Europe is an optimal currency area using region data and 
conclude that the presumption of optimal currency theory holds.  Also, there is no evidence to 
suggest that asymmetric shocks occur less at the regional level [than the national level]. 
                                                 
17 Shocks can be classified into four categories as follows: economic, natural, social or health.  Economic shocks include business closures, mass 
layoffs and job losses, price increases and wages cuts.  Natural shocks include flood, drought, typhoon and cyclone, earthquake, volanic eruption 
and tsunami.  Social shocks include civit unrest, war, crime, evicton and violence.  Health shocks include serious illness (i.e. ebola), injury and 
death. 
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Historically, monetary unions have been created under two states of affairs: economic and political 
(as previously highlighted in Figure 2-1).   The economic aspect relates to the harmonisation of 
intra-group transactions; where a common currency was perceived to be a method in which to avoid 
the costs associated with currency competition and potential currency instability among member 
states.  The political aspect relates to the creation of a national state from a number of small 
political units; where monetary unification was part of the process of nation building that was 
combined with the creation of a fiscal union. 
 
Over the last half century, OCA theory has evolved such that an array of economic and political 
criteria has been developed (see Dellas and Tavlas 2009).  There is no black-and-white answer to 
the question of whether it is a good idea to adopt a common currency in a particular region. 
Technically speaking, the OCA literature does not (yet) provide a formal test by which the 
application of a hypothesis can be tested or rejected.  However what OCA theory attempts to do is 
propose a set of criteria by which to judge the costs and desirability of sharing the same currency.18  
The most noteworthy and prominent OCA criteria by which to assess the costs and benefits is 
summarised in Figure 2-3. 
  
When prices and wages are flexible between and within countries pondering a single currency, the 
transition towards adjustment following a shock is less likely to be connected with sustained 
unemployment in one country and/or inflation in another country (Mongelli 2010).  Hence, the need 
for exchange rate adjustments are diminished (Friedman 1953).  Alternatively, if wages and prices 
were rigid downwards, some measure of flexibility could be achieved through exchange rate 
adjustments (Haberler 1970; Barro and Gordon 1983; Carlin and Soskice 1990).  In a currency 
union, a cost may be incurred due to the loss of direct control over the exchange rate instrument. 
 
Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) state “…an exchange rate regime matters because prices and wages 
are sticky”.  However, wages would need to become more flexible in a EMU as unions and 
employees have to acknowledge that there will be no change in the exchange rate; to relieve them 
of the consequences of wage setting errors.  Recent studies have found only a slight increase in 
wage flexibility as a countries exchange rate commitment hardens (see Bordo and James 2010).  
Interestingly, the empirical evidence suggests that both wages and prices are sticky in the short run, 
indicating a costly adjustment to negative shocks, involving an increase in unemployment. 
 
                                                 
18 For varying assessments, see Buiter (2000); Demopoulos and Yannacopoulos (1999); Dibooglu and Horvath (1997); Schiavo (2008). 
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Figure 2-3: OCA criteria 
 
 
Source: the author 
 
2.2.1 Labour mobility 
In the absence of flexible wages and prices, an adjustment to a shock can be facilitated by labour 
factor mobility [i.e. migration].  Mundell (1961) proposed that the cost of sharing the same currency 
would be eliminated if the factors of production, capital and labour were fully mobile across 
borders.19  The labour mobility criterion stipulates that if the exchange rate cannot be adjusted, 
labour mobility could potentially alleviate the costs associated with an asymmetric shock.  For 
example, if one country has high unemployment whilst the other does not, then the migration of 
labour from the high unemployment region to the low unemployment region can reduce the 
fluctuations in unemployment in both countries.  As a result, the requirement for independent 
monetary policies in both countries would not be necessary. 
 
The Mundell criterion focuses on labour’s willingness to move in response to shocks.  If these 
mechanisms do not function efficiently and effectively, this would support the argument for a 
common fiscal authority or a formal fiscal arrangement i.e. fiscal federalism (Sala-i-Martin and 
Sachs 1991).  Resources would be transferred from the members facing positive shocks to the 
members facing negative shocks, or vice versa (see McKinnon 2000).  As highlighted by 
Eichengreen (1997, p. 51), an OCA is “…an economic unit composed of regions affected 
symmetrically by disturbances and between which labour and other factors of production flow 
freely”. 
 
                                                 
19 (1973a) later argued that in the case of free capital mobility, the exchange rate could become a target for speculative movements and a source of 
asymmetric shocks.  Therefore, an additional benefit of a currency union is to leave behind a flexible exchange rate.  As a result, a country may be 
attracted to joining a currency union despite under developed adjustment mechanisms.  In more recent published works (2004) affectionately refers 
to (1973a) as Mundell II, in contrast the Robert Mundell’s earlier paper that was published in 1961, which is now distinguished as Mundell I. 
 31 
OCAs are largely dependent on the synchronisation of business cycles in the set of countries that 
wish to partake in a currency union.  There is no requirement for independent monetary policies 
when business cycles are highly synchronised, as they are able to share the same currency unit at a 
minimum and shared cost.  Theoretically, when business cycles are not synchronised, the factors of 
mobility existing between countries will need to transfer from low growth regions to high growth 
regions, which removes the need for an independent monetary policy.  De Haan, Inklaar et al. 
(2008) undertake a survey of the empirical literature pertaining to business cycle synchronisation in 
the EMU.20  They conclude that business cycles in the euro area have gone through periods of both 
convergence and divergence.  
 
Eichengreen (1996) estimates bivariate autoregressions using data from 1968 to 1988 for output and 
prices.  Demand disturbances are restricted to affect only prices in the long run whilst allowing 
supply disturbances to have a long-run impact on both prices and output.  The results suggest that a 
EU core and EU periphery exist.  The EU core includes Austria, France, Denmark and the Benelux 
countries, which are highly correlated with Germany.  Two things to note are that Ireland is not 
included in the EU core and the longer the sample period; the correlation with Germany becomes 
less significant.  Further studies do find that disturbances to the members of the EU core are more 
highly correlated than those in the EU periphery. 
 
OCAs are those in which citizens move easily, typically in response to an economic incentive.  
However, labour mobility is also subject to non-economic incentives such as cultural differences 
(e.g. language, religion and traditions), strength of community (e.g. relationship with family and 
friends), and nationalism (i.e. commitment to country of origin).  It can be argued that these non-
economic incentives can actually be a barrier, by restricting flows of labour between many 
countries.  The real challenge with this key criterion is derived from the lack of labour mobility 
across Europe; given that it is conventionally assumed that labour is mobile.  
  
In response to disturbances, high-factor market integration within a group of associated countries 
can reduce the need to alter real factor prices and the nominal exchange rate between countries 
(Mundell 1961).  In times gone by, trade theory established that the mobility of factors of 
production enhances efficiency and welfare.  Such mobility is likely to be modest in the immediate 
                                                 
20 Altavilla (2004); Artis and Zhang (1997); Artis and Zhang (1999); Artis, Krolzig and Toro (2004); Hallett and Richter (2006); Inklaar and De Haan 
(2001); Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003); Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003); Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003); Mansour (2003); Massmann and 
Mitchell (2004); Sopraseuth (2003); Wynne and Koo (2000); Beine, Candelon and Hecq (2000); Beine, Candelon and Sekkat (2003); Camacho, 
Pérez-Quirós and Saiz (2006); Canova and Marrinan (1998); Croux, Forni and Reichlin (2001); Fatás (1997) 
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short-run and could present its effect over time.  The mobility of factors of production is restricted 
by the speed at which direct investment can be generated by one country; and consequently 
absorbed by another.  Likewise, due to significant costs (such as those for retraining and migration), 
labour mobility is likely to be low in the short term.  However mobility may increase in the medium 
to long run which would ease the adjustment to permanent shocks. 
 
Early proponents against a currency union in Europe argued that the conditions of a common 
currency were not met, especially because of the lack of labour mobility (see Meade 1957).21  
Those in support of a common currency believed that greater factor mobility would be induced as a 
result (see Scitovsky 1958).  Empirical evidence suggests that Europeans seldom move and 
therefore are far from fulfilling this criterion.  De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) find that pre-
euro, very low migration within the European countries is reported.  Bordo and James (2010) find 
that post-euro, intraregional mobility in the euro area is still low.  Decressin and Fatás (1995) 
demonstrate with European data that in the first three years following a macroeconomic 
disturbance, most of the reduction in regional labour demand is met by increased unemployment 
and reduced labour force participation.  Furthermore, the impact of migration becomes significant 
only after four years.  This suggests that Europe is not as well suited for a currency union due to the 
lesser responsiveness of migration to regional specific shocks. 
 
Further studies indicate that observed migration rates are lower in Europe than in the USA 
(Eichengreen 1997; Obstfeld and Peri 1998).  Obstfeld and Peri (1998) find that there is little 
migration in response to asymmetric shocks within European countries in contrast to the US. 
Blanchard, Katz et al. (1992) suggest that interstate immigration plays a major role in the 
adjustment to macroeconomic shocks for the US states; where the contribution of migration to the 
elimination of labour market disequilibria dominates that of wage flexibility and labour force 
participation.  Eichengreen (1993a) highlights that interregional mobility is much more sensitive to 
changes in wage differentials in the USA, when compared to the UK and Italy.   
 
International migration in the euro area is likely to be lower than the US given that language and 
culture add further barriers to labour mobility.  Another contributing factor (other than diversity) 
may be the challenges associated with transferring across from one welfare system to another (e.g. 
health and retirement); which is not an issue in the US.  Hence, this OCA criterion assumes the 
                                                 
21 Meade (1957) argued that a system of flexible exchange rates would be more effective in promoting balance of payments equilibrium and internal 
stability.   
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absorption of factor mobility in the low unemployment region, few barriers to mobility and the 
willingness of the unemployed to relocate. 
 
2.2.2 Trade openness 
McKinnon (1963) suggests that countries which are very open to trade and trade heavily with each 
other form an OCA; and is referred to as the trade openness criterion.  In a small open economy, the 
openness criterion is extremely important because most of the products manufactured and 
consumed are traded on international markets.  There is very little ability for the country to 
influence the price of a product on the international landscape.  Hence, prices pertaining to the local 
market are largely independent of local conditions.  Any change in the value of the currency tends 
to be reflected in domestic prices rather quickly.  Therefore, forgoing the exchange rate does not 
entail a significant loss; at least not for moderate shocks. 
 
One approach to measuring openness is through the share of economic activity that is dedicated to 
international trade.  An alternative approach to measuring openness can be observed by how 
domestic prices respond to exchange rate adjustments via the pass-through effect.22  The higher the 
degree of economic openness, the more likely the changes in the international prices of products; 
that are transmitted to the domestic cost of living (Sachs and Warner 1995).  According to Balwin 
and Wyplosz (2006), most EU economies qualify under the openness criterion, stating that “...they 
are very open and domestic prices tend to be dominated by the exchange rate”.  This observation 
applies very strongly to the smaller countries (e.g. Austria, Ireland and Netherlands), less so to the 
larger ones (e.g. Germany, France and UK), but certainly more than many other advanced countries 
(e.g. USA, Australia and Japan). 
 
2.2.3 Product diversification 
Kenen (1969) states that OCA participants ought to be well diversified and produce similar 
products.  The product diversification criterion is based on the idea that asymmetric shocks are less 
likely among countries that share simular production patterns and whose trade is diversified.  
Therefore, the countries whose production and exports are widely diversified [and of simular 
structure] are considered an OCA.  Product-specific shocks are likely to be either symmetric or of 
little aggregate consequence; thus lessening the need for frequent exchange rate adjustments.  The 
countries that are most likely to be affected by severe shocks are those that specialised in a narrow 
range of products. 
                                                 
22 See Campa and Goldberg (2002); Campa and Goldberg (2005); Campa and Goldberg (2008); Campa, Goldberg and González-Mínguez (2005) 
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High diversification in production and consumption (such as the ‘portfolio of jobs’), and 
corresponding in imports and exports, dilutes the possible impact of shocks specific to any 
particular sector (see Mongelli 2010).  Consequently, the requirement for changes in the terms of 
trade through the nominal exchange rate is reduced through diversification, which provides 
insulation against a variety of disturbances (Kenen 1969).  De Nardis, Goglio et al. (1996) find that 
regional specialisation in Europe is strongly diversified between 1978 to 1989; highlighting that 
cross-border regional diversification can cushion the net effects of differentiated sectoral shocks, 
reducing national instability. 
 
Amiti (1999) analyses whether specialisation has increased across the EU; and explores whether 
specialisation patterns are consistent with predictions of trade theory.  Evidence is presented of 
increasing specialisation in some member states between 1968 and 1990; and some industries have 
become more concentrated geographically.  This observed pattern of specialisation is broadly 
consistent with trade theory.  Specifically, those industries that have become more concentrated 
geographically are characterised by a high level of scale economies and intermediate-goods 
intensity.23  More recently, Siedschlag and Tondl (2011) find that deeper trade integration within 
the euro region has had a strong direct positive effect on the synchronisation of regional output 
growth. They discover that industrial specialisation and exchange rate volatility were sources of 
cyclical divergence.  However, industrial specialisation had an indirect positive effect on regional 
output growth synchronisation through its positive effect on trade integration. 
 
2.2.4 Fiscal transfer 
Under the fiscal transfer criterion, countries that agree to compensate each other for adverse shocks 
through managing temporary imbalances (in the form of direct payments) may be considered an 
OCA.24  Member states that are hit by a temporary adverse shock may receive fiscal transfers from 
more economically privileged currency union participants, as compensation for forgoing the 
exchange rate instrument for the common good of the region.  For example, assume that a particular 
region is affected by an asymmetric shock.  As a result of a negative disturbance, income declines 
simultaneously with tax payments, whilst welfare support (i.e. unemployment benefits) increases in 
direct response to an increase in unemployment.  These schemes are considered implicit due to the 
underlying redistributive mechanism resulting in the fiscal transfer between citizens.  Typically 
these transfers are automatic. 
                                                 
23 Also see Krieger-Boden, Morgenroth and Petrakos (2008) who undertake extensive empirical analysis of regional specialisation over twenty years 
in Europe. 
24 See Beetsma and Vermeylen (2005) for a review of the literature. 
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These types of fiscal transfer schemes are common and can be explicit, however they are more 
often implicit.  An example of an implicit transfer is the convergence of interest rates between 
member states of the EMU, during the first ten years of its existence.  The European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) could be considered a precursor to a ‘transfer union’ between the EMU 
participants, which is a permanent rescue mechanism for distressed EMU members (Heinen 2011).  
In contrast, explicit transfer systems used to alleviate business tax competition have been managed 
by Germany and Switzerland (Lindblom, Sjögren et al. 2014).  As highlighted by Balwin and 
Wyplosz (2006), Europe does not satisfy the fiscal transfer criterion. 
 
Countries partaking in a supranational fiscal transfer system in order to redistribute monies to a 
member country that is affected by an adverse asymmetric shock would also be assisted in the 
adjustment to such shocks (Kenen 1969).  As a result, the member states may require less nominal 
exchange rate adjustments.  Importantly, this would require an significant degree of political 
integration and willingness to undertake such risk sharing (Mongelli 2010). 
 
2.2.5 Homogeneity of preferences 
The homogeneity of preferences criterion requires currency union members to share a wide 
consensus on the manner in which to deal with shocks.  Symmetric shocks are not an issue if each 
country responds in the same way.  This assumes that all member states agree on how to deal with 
each and every possible shock.  However in reality, there rarely ever exists a ‘best response’ to a 
shock.  Mundell (2000a) states that currency unions are “…like alliances. If there is no hegemon, 
they will work only if there are important shared goals and a sense of purpose”.   There will always 
be trade offs, which will result in opposing interests of member states – whom will be represented 
by political parties, trade unions and lobbyists.  There is no reason for the final outcome to be the 
same across all member states due to national preferences that are not homogenous.  As a result, 
EMU participants that do not share the same preferences over such trade-offs would most likely 
want the common central bank to pursue different policies (Alesina, Angeloni et al. 2005). 
 
For example, external imbalances can arise from persistent differences in national inflation rates 
due to differences in social preferences (i.e. inflation aversion), economic policies, structural 
developments and labour markets (see Blanchard, Muet et al. 1993).  When inflation rates between 
countries are low and simular over time, terms of trade will also remain fairly stable (Fleming 
1971).  As a result, this will promote current account transactions and trade equilibrium, which 
reduces the requirement for nominal exchange rate adjustments.  Generally speaking, Europe 
appears to have a strong commitment to fulfilling the homogeneous preferences criterion in that the 
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ECB is strongly independent and constitutionally committed to price stability.  However, Balwin 
and Wyplosz (2006) argue that there still remains some heterogeneity among national preferences, 
and therefore stipulate that the criterion is only partly qualified. 
 
2.2.6 Solidarity 
The solidarity criterion considers deeper political ideology pertaining to nationalism (McDonnell 
2014).   When a currency union gives rise to conflicts of national interests, the member states must 
accept the costs in the name of a common destiny (Goodhart 2003).  This common destiny must 
outweigh nationalist tendencies that would otherwise call for uncompromising responses (Langford 
2013).  For example, even when shocks are symmetric, political discourse may not necessarily be in 
agreement in terms of a measured reaction.  Such disagreements may be more noticeable across 
member states if the shocks have an asymmetric effect (see Balwin and Wyplosz 2006). 
 
Interestingly, there are vast differences of opinion across the European region (see Lane 2006, p. 
64).  Many new member states are enthusiastic supporters of political integration (e.g. Estonia and 
Latvia), whilst the UK and the Nordic countries [including new members of the Baltic area] are 
strongly opposed.25   It is important to note that other than the euro, there are no other examples 
currency unions that have had such a willingness to share important aspects of the sovereignty.  As 
stated by Alesina and Barro (2002), “…recent global movements toward currency unions suggest 
that this symbolic role of currencies may be weakening”.  Although the national sentiment is 
extremely important to member states, it does not appear to dominate.  Therefore, it can be deduced 
that even though Europe does not rate very high on the nationalism criterion, it does not fail badly 
either (also see Alesina and Perotti 2004). 
 
2.2.7 OCA criteria and Europe 
A large number of researchers endeavour to review the aforementioned conditions of OCA theorem 
and the extent to which they are satisfied in Europe.26  Wyplosz (1997) and Frankel (1999) 
emphasizes the importance of the economic arguments behind the EMU and points to the 
‘impossible trilogy’ that includes the simultaneous existence of free capital mobility, monetary 
independence and a fixed exchange rate; as illustrated in Figure 2-4.  Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997) seek to operationalise the theory of OCA by constructing an index based on a particular 
                                                 
25 For an assessment of the UK perspective see Buiter (2000) and for a Nordic overview see Bergman, Hutchison and Cheung (1997). 
26 Canzoneri and Rogers (1990); Masson and Taylor (1992); Tavlas (1993); Bayoumi (1994); Eichengreen (1990); Horvath (2007); Eichengreen 
(1997); Horváth and Luboš (2002); Artis (2003); Sklias and Maris (2012); Van der Linden (2014) 
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empirical specification that summarises countries’ readiness for the EMU, as predicted by the core 
implications of that theory.  Demertzis, Hallett et al. (2000) also attempts to qualify whether the 
member states of the EU are an OCA.  And finally, McKinnon (2002) continues the debate in 
context to the European experience – almost four decades after his first paper on OCAs was 
published in 1963. 
Figure 2-4: The impossible trilogy 
 
 
Source: adapted from Frankel (1999, p. 7) 
 
Many researchers persist in re-assessing the OCA criteria with respect to the euro because the 
results continue to evolve over time (for example, see European Commission 2008).  The empirical 
literature argues that areas which do not qualify ex ante as OCAs may actually ex post become 
OCAs (Frankel and Rose 1997; Smith 2004).  Balwin and Wyplosz (2006) state that “...one view is 
that the OCA criteria are endogenous, that they will be increasingly fulfilled overtime as citizens 
and governments learn to live with a common currency”.  There has been extensive discussion by 
many economists around this proposition.27 
 
For example, Eichengreen (1992) suggests that integration is likely to support specialisation of 
participating countries.  A single currency market may result in participating countries becoming 
more specialised in production, such as in the US, hence increasing the level of idiosyncratic 
regional shocks and the cost of forsaking monetary autonomy (see Eichengreen 1996).  Krugman 
(1993) finds empirical evidence of specialisation patterns and business cycle convergence in the US 
(also see Imbs 2004).  Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) observe that trade specialisation plays a 
diminished role for trade among developed economies.  Hence, the majority of trade is observed 
within the same industries; implying increased business cycle correlation amongst countries.  
                                                 
27 Grubel (2005); De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005); Frankel and Rose (1998); De Grauwe and Mongelli (2004); Fidrmuc (2004); Schiavo (2008) 
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Hochreiter and Winckler (1995) and Fatás (1997) demonstrate that a common European business 
cycle has been emerging as predicted by the endogenity hyothesis of the OCA criteria.   
 
In addition, Frankel and Rose (1997; 1998) present evidence that ex post integration of goods and 
capital markets precede monetary unions.  They suggest that intra-industry rather than inter-industry 
receives the greatest boost as markets are deregulated and become more accessible; hence two-way 
trade across internal boarders will grow.  Babetskii (2005) also finds that demand and supply shock 
convergence exists between the EU member states.  This endorses the results presented by Frankel 
and Rose, which support the endogeneity argument: where trade links synchronise with business 
cycles (also see Rose 2001b).  Hence, countries are more likely to satisfy the OCA criteria ex post, 
as economic integration depends.  Furthermore, Schiavo (2008) explores the relationship between 
financial integration and output correlation.  Robust and consistent evidence suggests that monetary 
integration enhances capital market integration and hence results in closer business cycle 
synchronisation. 
 
As summarised in Table 2-3, most European countries satisfy two out of the three classical OCA 
criteria, specifically trade openness and product diversification.  In terms of the labour mobility and 
fiscal transfers, Europe does not fulfil either criterion.  The two political criteria pertaining to 
homogeneity of preferences and commonality of destiny are still unclear [i.e. the verdict is yet to be 
decided].28  Hence, the ‘scorecard’ highlights the reason why the implementation of the euro 
continues to remain controversial.  For this reason, supporters and opponents have been unable to 
present an irrefutable case pertaining to the euro. 
 
Table 2-3: OCA scorecard [for Europe] 
CRITERION QUALIFICATION SATIFY? 
Labour mobility (Mundell) Citizens to be able to move easily across borders Yes 
Product diversification (Kennen) Production and exports are widely diversified; and of a similar 
structure 
Yes 
Trade openness (McKinnon) Very open to trade and trade heavily with each other Yes 
Fiscal transfers Compensation policy and method of delivery in response to 
adverse shocks to be consistent 
No 
Homogeneity of preferences Citizens share similar views about the use of monetary policy Partly 
Solidarity Citizens share the same vision of a common destiny, forgoing a 
nationalistic sentiment. 
Undecided 
Source: the author 
 
                                                 
28 For a detailed review of OCA theory and evidence in relation to the EMU, see: Mongelli (2002); Mongelli (2005); Calmfors, Flam, Gottfries, 
Haaland Matlary, Jerneck, Lindahl, Nordh Berntsson, Rabinowicz and Vredin (2012); Beetsma and Vermeylen (2005). 
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The history of monetary unions clearly differentiates between the concept of national and 
multinational monetary unions.  A national monetary union implies a political and sovereign 
partnership.  Generally, the borders of the nation state are the borders of the monetary area. 
Furthermore, a national monetary union has a central bank that is the single monetary authority in 
existence for the region specified.  A multinational monetary union implies an international 
arrangement between independent countries based on permanently fixed exchange rates between 
member currencies.  Hence multinational currency unions arise when independent member states tie 
their monies together through perfectly fixed exchange rates. 
 
Due to the lack of meeting the OCA criteria, some commentators have expressed the view that the 
euro is politically motivated (Eichengreen 1993b; Feldstein 1997).29  It is suggested that France 
wants monetary integration to regain some control over Europe’s monetary policy.  Whereas 
Germany wants political integration in order to ensure an integrated foreign and security policy 
across the region (López-Córdova and Meissner 2003).  Bayoumi, Eichengreen et al. (1997) upon 
reviewing the literature prior to the launch of the euro, emphasise that it is extremely difficult to 
implement with the rigor required to estimate the benefits and costs of the EMU.  Hence, it is on 
political grounds rather than economic grounds, as part of a larger cross-issue bargain, that the euro 
would be implemented.  One thing is for certain, as stated by Lane (2006):“…the ultimate viability 
of the euro will be determined by politics”. 
 
An OCA in its original context weighs the benefits of adopting a single currency against the costs of 
abandoning independent monetary policy (Ishiyama 1975).  Traditional OCA theory suggests that a 
currency union is a trade off between microeconomic efficiency gains and the costs related to 
inefficient macroeconomic stabilisation.  OCA theory refers to the costs of participating in a 
currency union, whereas the benefits are generally taken for granted (Mundell 2000b).  It is 
assumed that the benefits of participation are obvious and hence, the literature focuses more heavily 
on identifying the precise costs (Tavlas 2004).  Neither the benefits nor the costs can be easily 
measured and the qualification of the OCA criteria is never completely satisfied or violated [i.e. in 
black-and-white terms, as Europe hovers in the grey area].30  Ultimately, the economic case for 
Europe is undecided; suggesting that the monetary union is politically motivated – perhaps not 
entirely, but most certainly too some degree.31 
                                                 
29 Knowingly, it was noted by Mundell (1961) that economic integration will lead to closer political integration. 
30 See Eichengreen (1996). 
31 Although recently (2012), the ‘godfather’ of OCA, has suggested that “…the flexible exchange rate experiment has been a failure” and has put 
forward the case for a single global currency. 
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2.3 Trade effect of currency unions 
One of the argued benefits of joining a currency union is the encouragement of trade (see European 
Commission 1990).  Micco, Stein et al. (2003, p. 317), state that“…adopting the euro involves costs 
and benefits.  The most commonly identified cost is the loss of monetary policy as a national 
stabilization tool.  The most commonly identified benefit is the increased trade an investment that a 
common currency might foster”.  A currency union can represent a serious government 
commitment to long-term integration, which may induce the private sector to engage in much more 
international trade.  It is cheaper to trade between two countries that use the same currency rather 
than two individual currencies (Alesina, Barro et al. 2002).  This is primarily due to the reduction or 
elimination of transaction costs and depends directly on the level of trade between the countries 
participating in the currency union. 
 
Goods, services and production factors have been moving freely across intra-EU borders since 1st 
January 1993 (see Badinger 2007).  This is in spite of remaining issues in coverage and 
implementation, the removal of barriers to trade and competition policy development (Gjersem 
2004; Høj, Jimenez et al. 2007).  Many empirical studies explore the impact of currency union’s on 
trade.  The two most common questions presented by researchers are: (1) how much does an 
increase in trade occur when a common currency is adopted; and (2) can an increase in trade be 
achieved in the absence of a currency union.  Andrew K. Rose in particular, has significantly 
contributed to the field of knowledge demonstrating an increase in trade due to currency union 
participation.32 
 
The first paper to study the impact of common currencies on trade was Rose (2000) across a sample 
of 186 countries.  Rose finds that even after taking a host of other considerations into account, 
countries that share a common currency engage in substantially higher trade.  Using a gravity 
model, Rose discovers that member states trade more intensively with each other than other country 
pairs.33  The estimates generated indicate that those countries with the same currency trade over 
three times as much with each other than countries with different currencies.  Although the 
estimates seem to be high, they do suggest that a monetary union has a significant and positive 
effect on economic prosperity; including the living standards for member states. 
 
                                                 
32 For individualistic research, refer to: Rose (2002a); Rose (2002b); Rose (2004); Rose (2000); Rose (2001a); Rose (2001b). 
33 A gravity equation is used to estimate the effect of currency union membership on trade, by comparing trade before and after the regime changed, 
whilst holding all other factors constant. 
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Pakko and Wall (2001) suggest that the evidence is much weaker than indicated by Rose’s 
estimates; concluding that the results are not robust, with respect to a general specification of time-
invariant determinants of trade volume.  In addition, Persson (2001) argues that the results 
generated by Rose may display bias due to the non-linear effects that may be present in the 
explanatory variables; combined with the non-random selection of country pairs.  The estimates 
generated by Persson [using an alternative methodology] suggest a much more modest expansion of 
trade, where the point estimates are positive but associated with more uncertainty.  Using a non-
parametric test, the trade flows between member states does not appear to be significantly different 
in size from other bilateral trade flows.  Rose (2001a) agrees with Persson’s assertion, however 
disagrees with the diagnosis of the problem; and as a result, increases the size of the dataset to 
confirm the results. 
 
Tenreyro (2001) and Melitz (2001) also raise the same concerns as Persson (2001), in relation to the 
endogenous selection method of countries applied.  They both highlight that Rose's high estimates 
is partly the result of selection bias.  However, after making a correction for this bias, the estimate 
still remains high.  Tenreyro further highlights the problem of the omitted variables, which may at 
the same time affect trade links and the desire to participate in a currency union; therefore resulting 
in a positive bias of OLS estimates.  Whilst the alternative methodologies presented by Tenreyro, 
Melitz and Persson solve the problem of non-random selection into currency unions, they do not 
solve the problem relating to the impact of the size (i.e. small) and wealth (i.e. poor) of countries 
included in the estimates. 
 
Approximately 4,000 plus observations were altered by Nitsch (2002) when reviewing the original 
data set constructed by Rose.  This is approximately 12% of the sample as the information was not 
accurate, such as a country’s common language and regional trade arrangements.  As a result, the 
re-estimated trade-enhancing effect is reduced from 3.3 to an approximate factor of 2.5.  For three 
out of the five years, the coefficient estimates are closer to two which inturn suggests that a 
common currency doubles rather than triples trade.  Kenen (2002) reproduces Persson's result, but 
also produces an anomaly.  When Rose's gravity model is re-estimated using a dataset qualified by 
an alternative definition of a currency union country, Rose's result holds - although the impact is 
smaller than suggested.  In the same year, Frankel and Rose (2002) leverage a larger data set of 
economic and geographic variables for over 200 countries to quantify the implications of currency 
unions for trade and output; finding that a currency union boosts a country’s total trade.  However 
the results are much more modest in comparison to Rose’s seminal paper in 2000. 
 
 42 
The first study undertaken by Rose (2000) used cross-sectional analysis to pose the question of 
whether countries sharing a common currency participate more in trade than others who are not in a 
currency union.   In contrast, Glick and Rose (2002) take a slightly different approach using panel 
data from 1948 to 1997.  They attempt to quantify what the impact of a currency union may be for 
the countries that choose to adopt it: the fundamental question of a policy-maker.   The results 
suggest that trade will double when adopting a currency union.  Glick and Rose also analyse the 
effect of leaving a monetary union and identify that the countries that left currency unions 
experienced economic and statistically significant declines in bilateral trade.  When currency union 
entries and exits are separated, the exit effect on trade is larger than the entry effect.  However it 
should be highlighted that the exits generally took place earlier in the sample, where as the entries 
occurred late.  Hence, the effects of the lags might bias the impact of entry downward in contrast to 
the effect of exits. 
 
Thom and Walsh (2002) find mixed evidence of a considerable decline in Irish-British trade and 
conclude that a common currency has an insignificant effect on trade.  Glick and Rose (2002) 
support this finding through the reproduction of the data set originally used.  The residual generated 
by the gravity equation does not demonstrate a structural interruption to Irish-British trade at or 
around 1979.  Hence, the Irish-British case does not show a decline in trade that is generally 
observed in other observations and should be considered an exception.  Thom and Walsh (2002) 
attribute these results to the business cycle, measurement error and ad hoc effects. 
 
There are two specific papers published in 2003 that attempt to provide some insight into the 
currency union effect on trade in ‘large’ countries; which Melitz (2001), Persson (2001), Rose 
(2000) and Tenreyro (2001) did not address in their respective papers.  Estevadeordal, Frantz et al. 
(2003) investigate global trade volumes between 1870 and 1939 using an augmented gravity model 
to examine the gold standard, tariffs, and transport costs as determinants of trade.  They find that 
common participation in the gold standard increased trade between 34 per cent and 72 percent. 
 
López-Córdova and Meissner (2003) also use historical data from the gold standard time period in 
the late nineteenth century.  They explain up to 70 per cent of the variance in trade patterns and find 
evidence that supports the view that the monetary regime choice has a large impact on patterns of 
trade in the first period of integration.  In this study, trade flows were as much as 60 per cent larger 
when two countries adopted the gold standard.  Furthermore, monetary unions were associated with 
levels of trade that were almost 100 per cent higher.  When merging the two effects, in some cases, 
the increase in trade is as much as 200 percent.  Both papers use smaller samples of industrial 
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countries, including a small group of large developing countries.  They discover that currency 
unions double in trade, which is a result that is very similar to that of Glick and Rose (2002) and 
Nitsch (2002). 
 
McCallum (1995) discovers that trade between two Canadian provinces is more than 20 times 
higher than trade between comparable Canadian (province)/American (State) pairs.  Consequently, 
Yeyati (2003) finds that the link between a common currency and bilateral trade flows is 
significantly stronger for common currency pairs comprising unilaterally dollarized countries than 
for members of a multilateral currency union.  In contrast, Klein (2005) does not find any evidence 
that adopting the US dollar as a national currency increases trade with the US.  Although, a 
reduction in real exchange rate volatility is dependent on the size of trade shares between countries 
in a currency union.  For example, if two countries bilateral trade shares were not large, then fixing 
bilateral exchange rates would have very little impact on real exchange rate volatility.  
 
Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) estimate the EMU effect on trade using data [pre-euro] based on the 
model of bilateral trade generated by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001).  Rose and Van Wincoop 
find that the estimated effect is approximately 60 per cent.  Whereas Micco, Stein et al. (2003) 
endeavour to quantify the impact of the EMU on trade [post-euro] by constructing a panel dataset 
and two different samples of industrial countries.  After controlling for a host of other factors, the 
effect on bilateral trade is statistically significant.34  The estimates are much smaller than the 
doubling of trade identified by Glick and Rose (2002).  Using simular techniques, the result 
coincides with the Rose’s (2002b) assessment, however is smaller than the out of sample estimates 
presented by Rose and Van Wincoop (2001). 
 
Bayoumi, Laxton et al. (2004) estimate the macroeconomic benefits and international spillovers of 
an increase in competition across Europe.  They find that the increase in competition produces large 
effects on macroeconomic performance, highlighting that this generates spillovers globally through 
its impact on international trade.  More recently, Ottaviano, Taglioni et al. (2009) assess the 
quantitative relevance of trade effects calibrating a general equilibrium model using country, sector 
and firm-level empirical observations. The euro turns out to have increased the overall 
competitiveness of euro zone firms, and the effects differ along interesting dimensions: they tend to 
be stronger for countries which are smaller or with better access to foreign markets, and for firms 
which specialise in sectors where international competition is fiercer and barriers to entry lower. 
                                                 
34 For further literature relating to the impact of the euro on trade, see: Bun and Klaassen (2002); Bun and Klaassen (2003); Bun and Klaassen (2007); 
De Souza (2002); Flam and Nordström (2006); Barr, Breedon and Miles (2003); De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003). 
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Rose and Stanley (2005) review thirty-four studies that have investigated the effect of a currency 
union on trade.  They hypothesize that there is no effect, which is robustly rejected at all 
significance levels.  Saiki (2005) investigates the effect of a currency union on the ‘trade balance’ 
rather than the cumulative ‘trade volume’; which is most commonly covered by the vast array of 
aforementioned literature.  Saiki finds that the effect of the currency union can differ substantially 
across exports and imports; when a developing country trades with a developed country that achors 
the currency.  For this reason, modern trade theory suggests that economic maturity [i.e. developed 
vs. developing] and size matters in determining the allocation of welfare gains through the 
enlargement of the trade area among member states (Mundell 2000a).35 
 
Another area which has garned much attention is the endogenity of business cycle correlation 
amongst member states.  Frankel and Rose (1997; 1998) hypothesize that business cycles are 
converging across countries that have intense trade links.  They investigate the relationship between 
the intensity of trade and the extent to which business cycles are correlated across the EMU.36  
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) find that there is a symbiotic relationship between economic 
integration and monetary integration, stating that “…countries among whom the completion of the 
Single Market has led to the greatest increase in bilateral trade have experienced the greatest 
increase in their readiness for monetary integration (according to our OCA index)”.  As discussed 
in Section 2.2, economic integration appears to increase a country’s preparedness for monetary 
integration.  
 
Kenen (2000) suggests that the correlation of business cycles may increase with the intensity of 
trade links between countries, highlighting that this does not necessarily mean that asymmetric 
shocks also decrease.  Kose and Yi (2001) demonstrate that trade links in isolation do not ensure the 
convergence of business cycles; if countries are not sufficiently simular.  Rose and Engel (2002) 
find that currency union members participate in more trade and that business cycles are more highly 
synchronised across currency union countries, than across countries with sovereign monies.  In 
contrast, Kose, Prasad et al. (2003) find weak evidence that support the notion that increased trade 
and financial flows have increased the synchronisation of business cycles. 
 
 
                                                 
35 For example, in context to country size, (1996) postulates that small members states gain relatively more in the EU.  Whilst the results generated by 
(2006) are inconclusive. 
36 Inklaar, Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2008) also examines the relationship between trade intensity and business cycle synchronisation for twenty-one 
OECD countries during the period 1970–2003.  They confirm that trade intensity affects synchronisation, although the effect is much smaller than 
previously reported. 
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Fidrmuc (2004) tests the endogeneity of OCA, arguing that intra-industry trade induces 
convergence of business cycles.  Whilst no direct relationship between business cycles and bilateral 
trade intensity is found, this confirms the underlying endogeneity hypothesis and highlights the role 
that trade specialisation plays as an OCA criterion.  Flandreau and Maurel (2005) also studies the 
impact of monetary arrangements on trade integration and business cycle correlation in late 19th 
century Europe.  Baldwin (2006) recently surveyed the empirical literature on how the EMU affects 
the volume of international trade; including undertaking an earlier study using sectoral data (see 
Baldwin, Skudelny et al. 2005).  Whereas, Barro and Tenreyro (2007) develop a new instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to estimate the effects of a different exchange rate regimes on bilateral 
outcomes.  They find that sharing a common currency enhances trade, increases price co-
movements, and increases the co-movement of real domestic product shocks. 
 
Other than country size, it is also important to note that country pairs have a number of important 
characteristics that explain commercial trade such as common cultural norms, legal systems, 
economic policy, financial stability and history.  These common characteristics are briefly 
mentioned, although not explored in any depth.  These characteristics could explain why trade 
increases in a currency union.  Hence, countries adopting a common currency per se may not 
increase trade, but rather a country’s commitment to political, economic and financial integration. 
 
For example, Dumont, Rayp et al. (2006) assess the impact of international trade on union 
bargaining power in five EU countries – using a two-step procedure.   They find a significant 
negative impact of internationalisation on union bargaining power that is comparable to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NIC).37  Bonnal (2010) investigates the role of labour standards in 
international trade;  proposing that raising labour standards and better institutions increases export 
performance.38  The results suggest that higher levels of labour standards and better institutions 
have a positive effect on export performance.  Whereas, Goh and Javorcik (2007) examine the 
impact of Poland’s trade liberalisation on the industry wage structure between 1994 and 2001, in 
anticipation of Poland’s succession into the EU.  They suggest that a reduction in trade barriers has 
benefited unskilled workers with respect to an increase in wages. 
 
                                                 
37 Although wage-setting arrangements do differ fundamentally amongst OECD countries, as highlighted Calmfors and Driffill (1988). 
38 Bonnal used data from 1980 to 2004 on 112 countries, accounting for both developed and developing countries.  Dynamic panel regressions were 
adopted to account for endogenous labour standards and to control for other specific country and year effects. 
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The EMU is a rather special case of a currency union, as it includes very simular countries that have 
close trade links and an enduring process of integration.  The trade relations within Europe have 
always been intense due to cultural and geographical factors, which have been reinforced over the 
last 30 years by a number of policy decisions implemented across the region.  In conclusion, the 
euro appears to have exerted a statistically significant positive effect on intra-EMU trade; yet the 
magnitude of this impact is small when compared to the measures obtained by studies not 
specifically focussed on the Europe (see De Nardis and Vicarelli 2003). 
  
Clearly, there is a vast range of empirical literature that attempts to quantify the impact of 
participating in a currency union. Broadly speaking, the literature mostly focuses on the 
macroeconomic perspective of the EMU.  The economic costs and benefits of a currency union are 
typically identified through the synchronisation of demand and supply fluctuations (GDP), trade 
value, volume, structures and linkages (and terms of trade movement), exchange rates, inflation 
(CPI), migration (factor mobility) and unemployment.  Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) provide an 
overview of the recent research pertaining to the macroeconomic costs and benefits of the EMU. 
 
The research thus far discussed often highlights the objective of enhancing competition across the 
euro region – either directly or indirectly.  The suggested increase in trade across the European 
region implies that borders have been opened up to allow for the freer flowing of goods and 
services.  This proposition should therefore be supported by an increase in competition amongst 
firms within all industries; given that the SMP mentioned in Section 2.1 has removed trade 
restrictions.  However this analysis is undertaken from a macroeconomic perspective.  The area of 
research that this thesis attempts to investigate is the implications at a microeconomic level.39  The 
field of IO has played a significant role in attempting to quantify the impact of competition 
empirically.  In order to assess this impact, an overview of IO and the SCP paradigm are provided 
in the proceeding section. 
 
                                                 
39 More specifically, the impact on firms and industries – that ultimately is the sum of the macroeconomic overview. 
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2.4 Financial market integration [and the EMU] 
The EMU has been a powerful catalyst for financial integration resulting in institutional changes 
such as the removal of capital controls, harmonised rules for banking and financial services, 
issuance of public debt and various improvements to capital market infrastructure.40  Berger, De 
Young et al. (2001) undertake a detailed analysis on the impact of the SMP and the EMU in the 
context of the financial services industry; in particular, the reduction in barriers to entry and 
potential efficiency gains.  Allen and Song (2005) investigate the impact of the EMU on the 
integration of the financial services industry using announcements of M&A between financial 
institutions.  They find some evidence that is consistent with the claim that the EMU plays an 
important role in the financial integration of EMU members. 
 
Lane (2006) surveys the empirical research that focuses on the impact to capital markets.  The 
evidence suggests that the EMU has played a role in the financial integration of EMU members.  
Welfens and Keim (2009) provide a theoretical overview and empirical analysis of financial market 
integration and economic growth in the EU – supporting the notion of financial integration across 
Europe.  Specific empirical research undertaken in relation to market structure and firm profitability 
is discussed in detail in Section 3.6. 
 
2.5 Industrial organisation and the SCP paradigm 
IO is concerned with the manner in which markets and industries operate; in particular, the way 
firms compete with each other.41  Edward S. Mason (1939; 1949) and his colleagues (Myron, 
Homan et al. 1939) at Harvard University introduced the SCP approach; revolutionising the study 
of IO through the introduction of inferences ascertained in microeconomic analysis. These 
relationships have been formalised in the theory of firms and markets (for example, see Downie 
1958) and are explored in Section 3.2.  Ultimately, IO analyses the theory and empirical evidence of 
imperfectly competitive markets. 
 
                                                 
40 Buti, Deroose, Gaspar and Martins (2010); Buch (2000); Buch and Heinrich (2003); Staikouras, Mamatzakis and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki (2008); 
Dermine (2006); Gual (1999); Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and Tavakoli (2007); European Commission (2001). 
41 Schmalensee (1988) provides a comprehensive overview of the field of IO; which is also referred to as ‘industrial econonomics’. 
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According to the SCP paradigm, an industry’s performance (i.e. its success in producing benefits 
for consumers) depends on the conduct or behaviour of buyers and sellers, which is dependent upon 
the structure of the market.42  The components that make-up the SCP model is defined as follows: 
 Structure consists of the relatively stable features of the market that influence the rivalry 
among the buyers and sellers operating in a market (i.e. number and size of the firm, barriers 
to entry and exit, product differentiation, diversification and vertical integration). 
 Conduct refers to the patterns of behaviour that traders and other market participants adopt to 
affect or adjust to the markets in which they sell or buy (i.e. price setting behaviour, buying 
and selling practices, advertising, research and development, plant investment, legal tactics, 
product choice, mergers, and collusion). 
 Performance refers to the extent to which markets result in outcomes that are deemed good 
or preferred by society.  Market performance concerns how well the market fulfils certain 
social and private objectives.  These include price levels, price stability in the long and short 
term, profit levels, costs, equity, productive efficiency, distributive efficiency, allocative 
efficiency, quantities and product quality, and technical progress.43  
 
Traditionally, a one-way casual relationship was assumed between structure and performance – by 
way of conduct.  Structure was determined by basic market conditions [such as technology and 
demand] and was treated as exogenous.  However, it has been more recently recognised that a 
simultaneously effect in which structure, conduct and performance can actually affect one another 
(for example, see Cabral 2000). 
 
The SCP paradigm is an analytical framework used to investigate the operation of market processes 
(Pass and Lowes 1993).  Markets are assessed in terms of economic performance, in other words, 
how well they have contributed to the achievement of optimal economic efficiency.  The SCP 
schema highlights the interdependency of structure, conduct and performance; and the extent to 
which each element can affect the others, as shown in Figure 2-5.  The SCP paradigm is useful to 
public policy makers (i.e. anti-trust legislators) in framing measures defined to improve market 
performance.   
 
                                                 
42 The SCP paradigm is outlined by many researchers as follows: Caves (1967); Martin (2010); Cabral (2000); Carlton and Perloff (2005); Davies and 
Lyons (1996); McGee (1988); Shephard and Shepherd (2004); Tirole (1988); Tremblay and Tremblay (2012); Waldman and Jensen (1998); Scherer 
and Ross (1990); Martin (2002); Cubbin (2001); Shy (1995); Kambhampati (1996). 
43 Refer to Capon, Farley and Hoenig (1996) for a comprehensive and in-depth discussion regarding determinants of firm financial performance. 
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Figure 2-5: Structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
 
 
Source: adapted from Pass and Lowes (1993), Tremblay and Tremblay (2012) and Martin (2010) 
 
Stigler (1971) discusses the theory of economic regulation highlighting that it should be instituted 
primarily for the protection and benefit of the public.44  It follows then, that the primary role of 
public policy is to avoid the negative consequences of market power (see Hüschelrath 2009). 
 
As stated by Cabral (2000), “one can say that the goal in industrial organization is to address the 
following four questions: (1) Is there market power? (2) How do firms acquire and maintain market 
power? (3) What are the implications of market power? (4) Is there a role for public policy 
regarding market power?”  Geroski (1988) reviews the empirical IO literature devoted to the 
question of inferring the existence of a monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes 
such as profitability and pricing.  Neven (2006) evaluates the influence that economic analysis has 
had on competition policy in Europe across two decades. 
 
                                                 
44 Although (1976) highlights that regulation seems to seldom actually work; and has often engendered resource misallocation. 
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The variables most commonly used to assess market structure and firm performance are 
summarised in Table 2-4.  Typically, the market structure of an industry is measured by the k-firm 
concentration ratio and/or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index – which are discussed extensively in 
Section 3.4.  Other measures include the rank correlation coefficient (Reekie 1981; Scott and 
Reekie 1985), the Hymer-Pashigian index (Hymer and Pashigian 1962; Reekie 1989), the 
Rosenbluth index (Hall and Tideman 1967; Leach 1997), the Horvath index (Horvath 1970; 
Horvath 1972) and the Dominance index (Kwoka 1977; Kate 2006) and the Churn ratio.45 
 
Ratio analysis expresses the relationship among selected items on firm’s financial statements (i.e. 
income statement, balance sheet and cash flow).  Hence, performance measures can be divided into 
three separate categories, which measure the financial health of a firm: 
 Profitability ratios measure the success of a firm for a given period of time; 
 Liquidity ratios measure the short-term ability of a firm to pay its maturing obligations 
and to meet unexpected needs for cash; and 
 Solvency ratios measure the ability of a firm to survive over a long period of time. 
 
Typically, measures of firm performance attempt to identify whether market power is exercised 
within an industry (see Geroski 1988).  The most frequently used performance measures compare 
profits in relation to revenue/sales (i.e. Lerner index, ROS), equity (i.e. ROE) or assets employed 
(i.e. ROA).  However there are also many other measures used such as profitability-related 
measures (e.g. absolute profits, variability in profits), market share, employee satisfaction and firm 
size (e.g. sales, assets, employees).  Furthermore, various measures relating to stock performance 
have also been utilised (i.e. market capitalisation, Tobins Q).  
 
In the banking industry, the net interest margin to total assets (NIMTA) and the H-statistic are also 
used as performance measures to infer competitive behaviour.46  The NIMTA is defined by the net 
interest margin divided by the total assets.  NIMTA reflects the loan-deposit interest spread or the 
interest rate mark-up after controlling for different sized banks [by deflating by total asset value].  
The H-statistic is based on a reduced-form revenue equation and measures the sum of elasticities of 
revenues with respect to input prices (see Panzar and Rosse 1987).  Thus, the H-statistic is 
calculated as the sum of the ratios of the percentage change in total revenue to the percentage 
change in the input prices. 
                                                 
45 The Churn ratio is defined as the total number of firms entering or exiting the market in a given year divided by the number of established firms. 
46 Goddard and Wilson (2009); Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2009); Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006); Goldberg and Rai (1996) 
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Table 2-4: Indicators of competition 
Category Measure (i.e. metric) 
Market concentration 
Measures the degree to which a small 
number of firms control (a large part of) 
a specified market 
k-firm concentration ratio 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
Rank correlation coefficient 
Hymer-Pashigian index 
Rosenbluth index 
Horvath index 
Dominance index 
Churn ratio 
Profitability 
Measures the success of the firm; and 
the ability to generate a reasonable 
return 
Return on sales (ROS) [i.e. profit margin] 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on equity (ROE) 
Return on capital (ROC) 
Return on investment (ROI) 
Internal rate of return (IRR) 
Profit or loss (before tax) 
Profit or loss (after tax) 
Price-earnings (P/E) ratio 
Earnings per share (EPS) 
Dividends 
Lerner index [i.e. price-cost margin (PCM)] 
Market value (MV) 
Tobin’s Q 
Liquidity 
Measures the ability of a firm to pay 
maturing obligations in the short-term 
Working capital 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
Current Cash Debt Coverage ratio 
Solvency 
Measures the ability of a firm to survive 
over a long period of time 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
Equity-to-assets ratio 
Debt-to-equity ratio 
Debt and equity-to-assets ratio 
Payout ratio 
Times interest earned 
Cash debt coverage ratio 
Other H-statistic 
Net interest margin to total assets (NIMTA) 
Market capitalisation 
Openness to trade 
Revenue 
Firm size 
Market share 
Employee satisfaction 
Share turnover 
Source: the author 
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Accounting rates of return has been heavily criticized by [theoretical] researchers as biased 
estimates of the economic rate of return.47  Benston (1985) states that it is not difficult to list many 
reasons why accounting data yields noisy measure of economic variables.48  However accounting 
numbers cannot be dismissed as pure noise (Martin 1984; Martin 1988b).  Schmalensee (1989) 
highlights that many firms use accounting data in decision-making and many empirical studies have 
highlighted that the stock market responds to the publication of accounting (financial) statements.  
Hence, the use of accounting income numbers to measure firm performance is reasonably justified 
on the grounds that they are the best data available (Hirschey and Wichern 1984).  The 
measurement problems only reduce the usefulness of the dataset selected; it does not destroy it. 
 
Since the 1940’s, industrial economists have undertaken SCP studies to examine industries and 
markets.  However it was Joe S. Bain who really pioneered the empirical economics literature 
supporting the SCP paradigm, where he investigates the role of concentration and its relationship to 
performance.  Bain (1951a; 1951b) empirically analyses the relation between after-tax profit rates 
on equity and the level of concentration for 42 US manufacturing industries between 1936 and 
1940. 
 
More recently, John Sutton (1991) derives and tests robust implications of game theoretic models of 
free entry equilibrium for the dependence of minimum viable levels of [seller] concentration in 
context to market size, firm setup costs and other factors – across twenty food and drink industries 
in six of the largest developed countries globally.49  Furthermore, Richard Schmalensee, an expert 
on regulation and antitrust policy, proposes econometric approaches for empirically evaluating the 
SCP paradigm.50  Other notable IO researchers include Gupta (1983), Weiss (1992) and 
Kambhampati (1996). 
 
                                                 
47 Elmendorf (2011); Fisher and McGowan (1983); Harcourt (1965); Hawawini, Subramanian and Verdin (2003) 
48 Carlton and Perloff (2005), pp. 249-252; discuss the issues in detail. 
49 The predictions made by Sutton are supported by Robinson and Chiang (1996). Also see Sutton (2001); Sutton (2007); Shaked and Sutton (1990).   
50 Schmalensee (1976); Schmalensee (1977); Schmalensee (1988); Schmalensee (1989); Schmalensee (1992) 
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Over the last half century, a considerable proportion of the empirical analysis in IO literature 
investigates the relationship between profitability, concentration and barriers to entry.51  An 
extensive body of work discusses the nature of competition and its relationship with the SCP 
paradigm.52  In particular, researchers aim to identify if there is a relationship between the structural 
features of an industry and firm performance (see Carbó, Humphrey et al. 2009).53  As a result, the 
cross-sectional literature has revealed the presence of important relationships between firm 
profitability [as a measure of firm performance] and concentration [as a measure of market 
structure].  These relationships are initially discussed in Section 3.2 and then are further elaborated 
upon in Section 3.3, in context to the EU.   
 
It is important to note that the majority of the research regarding the SCP approach generally 
consists of case studies that focus on a specific industry [group].54  Furthermore, there has been no 
research to date that investigates the impact on competition as a result of the introduction of the 
euro, with the exception of the banking industry to which an extensive body of work has been 
published.55  This highlights a chasm in the research to which this thesis endeavours to explore. 
 
                                                 
51 Bain (1951a); Bain (1956); Clarke (1984); Coate (1989); Coate (1991); Collins and Preston (1966); Collins and Preston (1969); Domowitz, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1986a); Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986b); Hart and Morgan (1977); Kwoka (1981); Ornstein (1975); Phillips 
(1976); Qualls (1972); Sabido and Mulato (2006); Salinger (1990); Schmalensee (1976); Bain (1951b) 
52 Siddharthan (1984); Melicher, Rush and Winn (1976); Demsetz (1973); Lynk (1981); Koeller (1995); Bhattacharya and Chen (2009); Hirschey 
(1985); Clarke and Davies (1982); Jacquemin (1972); John (1977); Pope and Ma (2008) 
53 Chou (1988); Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975); Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002); Caves and Porter (1980); Comanor and 
Wilson (1967); Duchesneau (1974); George (1967); Evely and Little (1960); Gratton and Kemp (1977); Greer (1971); Guth (1971); Hart and 
Clarke (1980); Kamerschen (1968); Lyons (1980); Mueller and Hamm (1974); Mueller and Rogers (1980); Nelson (1960); Ornstein, Weston, 
Intriligator and Shrieves (1973); Pashigian (1969); Porter (1974); Saving (1961); Sawyer (1971); Shepherd (1964); Shepherd (1966); Shepherd 
(1972a); Strickland and Weiss (1976); Weiss (1963a); Wright (1978); Berger (1995); Goldberg and Rai (1996); Gilbert (1984); Evanoff and Fortier 
(1988); Casu and Girardone (2006) 
54 For example, see Wallace (1937); Bain (1951a); Bain (1951b); Bain (1956); Collins and Preston (1966); Clarke (1984). 
55 Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux (2009); Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and Tavakoli (2007); Goddard and Wilson (2009); Gropp and 
Moerman (2004); Berger (1995); Berger (2003); Berger, De Young and Udell (2001); Berger, Demerguc-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich (2004); 
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999); Cecchini, Catinat and Jacquemin (1988); Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Gilbert (1984); Casu and Girardone 
(2009); Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006); Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore (2001); Dermine (2006); Bourke (1989); Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006); Honohan and Kinsella (1982); Bikker and Haaf (2002a); Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006); 
Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2009); Goldberg and Rai (1996); Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Neven and Röller (1999); Casu and Girardone 
(2006). 
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CHAPTER 3: Competition and Market Structure 
3.1 The delineation of market structure 
Market structure relates to the manner in which a market is organised (Pass and Lowes 1993).  The 
theory of markets focuses specifically on the aspects of market structure that have an important 
influence on the behaviour of firms (including buyers) and on market performance.  As mentioned 
in Section 2.5, market structure is affected by market conduct and performance.  In the field of 
microeconomics, market structure is the complete array of industry characteristics that directly 
affect price and output decisions made by firms (Hirschey and Pappas 1993, p. 532).   
 
In 1934, German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg (1905-1946) initially published his 
book Marktform und Gleichgewicht, providing a detailed framework of different types market 
structures in the context of firm competition.56  Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg described and 
analysed different scenarios in which a leader firm moves first and the follower firms then move 
sequentially [using a game-theoretic modelling], which is now widely referred to as Stackelberg 
competition.  Traditionally, the competitive process is generally considered in terms of either 
perfect or imperfect competition.  However, market structures are typically classified into four 
major categories: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly. 
 
In perfect competition, there are many firms and the products being offered are considered 
homogenous (Jackson, McIver et al. 1994).57  Entry and exit are free; and firms are unable to 
influence prices and are therefore considered price takers [i.e. the market price is exogenously 
determined].  Perfect information exists and all firms have equal access to the same product 
technologies.  As stated by Carlton and Perloff (2005),  “…perfect competition provides a 
benchmark against which the behaviour of other markets is judged”. 
 
In contrast, a monopoly exists where barriers to entry make it only possible for one firm to enter the 
market.  A monopoly has considerable control over the supply and pricing of its product; and is 
therefore referred to as a price maker (Byrns and Stone 1992).  This means the firm has the power 
to raise the price of a product without losing all of their customers.  Most markets lie between these 
two polar cases – however perfect competition and monopoly models provide a useful point of 
reference.  The extremes in market structure characteristics identify lower and upper bounds on the 
expected equilibrium price in a market. 
                                                 
56 The work of Von Stackelberg (2011) was later translated in English by Damien Bazin, Lynn Urch and Rowland Hill. 
57 A product is defined as a good or service throughout this thesis. 
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Monopolistic competition has characteristics of both perfect competition and monopoly.   Simular 
to perfect competition, entry and exit are free; and there are many competitors in the market 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1995).  A key characteristic of monopolistic competition is that due to the 
presence of product differentiation, the firm has a monopoly over the sale of its particular product 
offering.  Therefore, monopolistic competition can be considered either perfectly competitive [with 
product differentiation] or a monopoly [with free entry and exit of closely related products]. 
  
An oligopoly may or may not provide products that are differentiated; and barriers to entry exist.  
The key characteristic of an oligopoly is that only a few firms account for the majority of industry 
production; where some control over pricing exists (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998).  Game theory 
is most often used to develop oligopoly models due to the strategic interactions between 
participating firms (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).  This is because one firm’s actions not 
only affect its own profits, but also the profits generated by their competitors (Bresnahan 1982). 
 
Table 3-1: Characteristics of four classic market structures 
Market structure Number of firms Product type Entry and exit Price 
Perfect competition Many Homogenous Free (open) Exogenous 
Monopolistic competition Many Product differentiation Free (open) Endogenous 
Monopoly One One product (only) Barriers to entry Endogenous 
Oligopoly Few Homogenous and product 
differentiation 
Barriers to entry Endogenous 
Source: Tremblay and Tremblay (2012) 
 
As summarised in Table 3-1, a common characteristic of pure monopolists, oligopolists and 
monopolistic competitors is that each recognises that its output decisions have a perceptible 
influence on price (Tremblay and Tremblay 2012).58  This means that by reducing the price of a 
product, each market structure type can increase the quantity of output it sells under demand 
conditions.  Therefore, these three market structure types possess some degree of power over price: 
they possess monopoly power – also known as market power.  The distinction between 
homogeneity and differentiation is dependent upon the substitutability among competing firms 
products.  Homogeneity prevails [in the minds of the buyers], when products are perfect substitutes.  
Furthermore, products are differentiated when one firm’s product is preferred over a competing firm 
due to differences in physical attributes, supplementary services, geography, information and/or 
consumer perception (Hausman, Leonard et al. 1994). 
                                                 
58 Endogenous infers that firms do have some control over price.  Whereas, exogenous infers that firms do not have any control over price. 
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The modern models of quantity-setting competition are based on that proposed by the French 
Professor of Mechanics Antoine Augustin Cournot in 1838; published in his book Research Into the 
Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth.  The Cournot game assumes that the only 
strategic variable chosen by firms is their level of output.  Cournot presents a model that that 
describes two firms competing with each other; where both firms repeatedly adjust the quantity 
produced in response to its rival’s actions.  Gradually, the quantities produced by both firms 
eventually converge; and had the firms chosen these quantities from the beginning, they would have 
gone on producing them forever.  This selection of possible quantities is the first example in the 
literature of a Nash equilibrium.59 
 
The early economic catalyst for anti-merger policy can be traced back to Augustin Cournot’s ideas 
relating to oligopoly theory.  As stated by Pautler (1983)“…Cournot’s theoretical work indicates 
that an increase in the number of competitors in a market has a definite saloubrious effect on 
market performance”.  The Cournot model is most often used to explain the equilibrium in market 
structure with respect to market size and entry costs, assuming that the total number of firms 
changes so that a normal rate of return on investment (ROI) can be earned.60  The following section 
(3.2) proceeds to set up an explicit theoretical model of the relationship between structure and 
performance. 
 
3.2 Microeconomic model  
Assume that there are n firms in the market producing exactly the same product and that there is 
also no difference in the price to the consumer of the product produced by the different firms. The 
price )(P  of the product is determined by market demand and can be expressed as a linear inverse 
demand function given by61 
.QP −≡α  (3.2–A) 
Where Q  is the total quantity consumers will purchase for all the firms together and the size α  is a 
constant characterising the market.  Hence, Equation (3.2–A) captures the perfect substitutability of 
a homogenous product offered; and is consistent with Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984). 
                                                 
59 Interestingly, this is more than 100 years before Nash explicitly defined his equilibrium concept; which was evidently proposed without the 
awareness of Cournot’s body of work: see (1950); (1951). 
60 Hause (1977); Gans (2007); Goppelsroeder, Schinkel and Tuinstra (2008); Campos and Vega (2003); Kwoka (1985); Pautler (1983); Miller (1982); 
Miller (1967); Jacquemin, Ghellinck and Huveneers (1980); Cowling and Waterson (1976); Cowling (1976); Martin (2002); Reekie (1989); Ruffin 
(2008); Economides and Salop (1992); Rader (1972); Hannah and Kay (1977); Waterson (1980); Djolov (2006), pp. 91-105; Hall (1986); Clarke 
and Davies (1982); Hause (1977). 
61 Heifetz (2012), p. 119; Martin (2010), p. 301; Tremblay and Tremblay (2012), p. 243; Davis and Garcés (2010), p. 9; Reekie (1989), p. 39 
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Furthermore, aggregate industry output, which is denoted by Q is equal to the sum of the quantities 
produced by all firms within the market and can be expressed as 
.
1
∑
=
≡
n
i
iqQ  (3.2–B) 
The output level for firm i is denoted as iq , ni ,,1= , must choose how many units iq  to produce; 
and the vector of firm outputs is denoted ),,,( 21 nqqqq ≡ , hence nqqqQ +++= 21 .  At a 
given price )0( >P , some consumers will not want to purchase the product at all, whilst others may 
wish to purchase more than one unit )(Q .  If the price of the product increases to PP >' , some 
consumers that would have purchased the product at price P  may now forgo the purchase; and 
other consumers may purchase fewer units than would have been purchased at the lower price of P.  
Therefore, due to the increase in price, it is likely that there would be a decrease in the overall 
number of units that consumers are willing to purchase. 
 
The cost function for a single firm can be defined as 
,)( 2iii qqFqC χβ ++≡   (3.2–C) 
where 0>iq  and 0)0( =C ; with F , β  and χ  all positive.
62  The fixed cost )(F  must be paid for 
all operating firms, however it can be avoided when exiting the market.  The average variable cost 
(AVC) function and marginal cost (MC) function are linear, and defined as 
ii qqAVC χβ +≡)(  (3.2–D) 
and 
ii qqMC χβ 2)( +≡  (3.2–E) 
respectively, where β  is the minimum value of margin cost and χ  determines the extent of 
diseconomies of scale.  Hence, for every unit increase in output )( iq , average cost rises by χ  and 
MC rises by χ2 .  Diseconomies of scale exist when long run average costs rise with increases in 
outputs. 
 
Initially, as output is increased long run average costs may decline – reflecting the presence of 
economies of scale.  However after a certain critical point, long run average costs may start to rise.  
The most frequently cited sources of such diseconomies are the managerial and administration 
challenges of controlling and co-ordinating large-scale operations; including labour relations issues 
in large plants (Pass and Lowes 1993, p. 134).  Economies and diseconomies of scale is an 
important determinant of market structure (Jackson, McIver et al. 1994, pp. 539-542). 
                                                 
62 Shannon (1995), pp. 35-41; Martin (2010), p. 301; Scherer (2001); Hirschey and Pappas (1993), pp. 440-444 
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The cost function defined in equation (3.2–C) implies an average cost (AC) equation expressed as 
.)( i
i
i qq
FqAC χβ ++≡  (3.2–F) 
Therefore, when output )( iq  is small, fixed cost )(F  per unit of output is large.  When output 
increases, the fixed costs are spread across a higher volume of output; and therefore the fixed cost 
per unit of output decreases.  Also, as output increases, the variable cost per unit rises. 
 
For low levels of output, the fixed cost )(F  per unit of output )( iq  is predominant.  As output rises, 
average cost falls exhibiting an average cost curve that implies economies of scale.  For high levels 
of output, the AC rises as output increases; and the average cost curve exhibits diseconomies of 
scale.  Hence, the average cost curve is roughly U-shaped over varying levels of output, as shown in 
Figure 3-1.  Assuming an average cost function of 210)( iii qqFqC ++= , the alternative levels of 
fixed cost are 5.10121 =F , 61.3302 =F  and 1827 =F  (see Martin 2010). 
Figure 3-1: Average cost curve for a single firm 
 
 
Source: Martin (2010) 
 
The minimum point on the average cost curve occurs where the MC curve and the AC curve 
intersect.  When solving for equations (3.2–E) and (3.2–F), the output level at which the average 
cost and marginal cost curves intersect is known as the minimum efficient scale (MES) as follows: 
.
χ
Fqmes ≡  (3.2–G) 
 59 
The reason for this is because the function yields the lowest value of average cost.63  Hence, MES is 
defined as the smallest scale at which (long run) average cost is minimised.  In other words, MES is 
where firms [plants] are the smallest that will produce output at minimum average cost (Byrns and 
Stone 1992, p. 498).  The MES is often determined by the technology employed by the firm, as 
defined by equation (3.2–C).  Curry and George (1983) undertake a comprehensive survey of 
market concentration research, stating that technological factors are important in explaining the 
observed similarity across countries in the ranking of industries by the level of concentration.  This 
suggests that concentration is influenced by technological differences between industries; and these 
differences are most likely to be present at the firm [plant] level. 
 
The MES increases as the fixed cost )(F  rises, and as the diseconomies of scale )(χ  parameter 
falls.  The minimum value of average cost can be calculated by substituting equation (3.2–G) in 
either Equation (3.2–E) or (3.2–F) as follows: 
.2min FAC χβ +≡  (3.2–H) 
Therefore, the minimum value of average cost minAC  increases as the fixed cost )(F  or 
diseconomies of scale )(χ  rises. 
 
The Cournot oligopoly model represents a framework of imperfect competition (Stigler 1964; 
Bresnahan 1982).   It is a model where the number of firms is important; depicting what may 
happen when the market in which a firm operates is neither perfectly competitive or a monopoly.  
Now assume that there are n firms who behave as Cournot oligopolists, with a cost function of the 
same form as Equation (3.2–C).  Firm i  maximises profit along its residual demand curve by 
selecting an output level that ensures marginal revenue (MR) is equal to MC as follows: 
.22 11 qQq ij χβα +=−− −  (3.2–I) 
Where 0>α  and ijQ −  denotes the output level of the other firm(s). 
 
Equation (3.2–I) can also be used to further derive the equation (3.2–J), expressing the best-
response output of firm i , which implies that there are large diseconomies of scale. 
).(
)1(2
1
iji Qq −−−+
≡ βα
χ
 (3.2–J) 
                                                 
63 For a discussion on MES and the ‘surviour technique’, see Stigler (1958); Weiss (1964); Bain (1969); Shepherd (1967); Lyons (1980); Rees (1973). 
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For example, in a Cournot oligopoly consisting of n  firms, Equation (3.2–I) for firm 1 would be 
notated as follows: .2)(2 1321 qqqqq n χβα +=+++−−    Also, Equation (3.2–J) can also be 
expressed as the best-response output of firm 1 as follows: 
[ ].)(
)1(2
1
321 nqqqq +++−−+
= βα
χ
 
 
In equilibrium, all firms produce the same output due to the assumption that all firms are identical 
(for expositional simplicity).  The equilibrium output per firm )( *q  can be obtained when setting 
*
21 qqqq n ====   in Equation (3.2–I) and rearranging the terms to derive Equation (3.2–K). 
Furthermore, if 0=γ  this would ensure that the returns to scale are constant.   
χ
βα
21
*
++
−
≡
n
q  (3.2–K) 
 
When there are n  firms supplying the market, the equilibrium profit per firm )( *π  is as follows: 
F
n
Fq −





++
−
+≡−+≡
2
2**
21
)21())(21(
χ
βαχχπ  (3.2–L) 
Theoretically, in the long run, new firms will enter the market if short run equilibrium profit 
generated is positive; and incumbent firms will exit the market if profit is negative.  Therefore, the 
long run equilibrium number of firms )( *n  ensures that the equilibrium profit per firm )( *π  is equal 
to zero, as defined by 
).21(11)21()1()(* χ
χ
βαχχβα +−+−≡+−+−≡
mesqF
n  (3.2–M) 
If price is equal to the smallest value of MC )(β , then βα −  is the quantity that would be 
demanded in this market; and can be interpreted as a measure of market size.  As the size of the 
market increases, α  will become larger.  The more money that a consumer would be prepared to 
pay for a product would result in a smaller value of χ .  Consequently, this would generate the 
lowest value of marginal cost.  In other words, this suggests that the long run equilibrium number of 
firms )( *n  is higher, the larger the market; and the smaller is the minimum efficient scale of output.   
 
Obviously, the relationship between market size and the number of firms )( *n  is not proportional.  
The number of firms is increasing and concave in context to the size of the market (see Etro 2009, 
p. 159).  As highlighted by Cabral (2000), for high values of n  the relationship between market size 
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and the number of firms is approximately quadratic.  In order to duplicate the number of firms, 
market size must increase four-fold. 
 
Conversely, if market size duplicates, the number for firms increases by only 40% [i.e. 12 − ].  If 
the market price were constant, with respect to the number of firms, the relation between market 
size and the number of firms would be proportional (for example, double the market size and 
double the number of firms).  However as the number of firms increase, the market becomes more 
competitive: implied by the result of the margin )( βα −  decreasing.  This would mean that the 
variable profit per unit of market size also decreases, which ultimately limits the number of firms 
the market can sustain.  Assume 100=α , 10=β  and 1=χ , Equation (3.2–M) can be substituted 
to illustrate the relationship between fixed cost and the long run equilibrium number of firms, where 
[ ] .3290)1(2111)10100( −=+−+−=
FF
nCour
 
 
As shown in Figure 3-2, if 5.1012>F  the equilibrium number of firms )( *n  is equal to zero.  If the 
fixed cost )(F  were very high (relative to the size of the market), it would not be profitable even 
for a monopolist to supply the market.  For lower values of fixed cost )5.1012648( ≤< F , it would 
be profitable for one firm to supply the market, but not two – because the market is a natural 
monopoly.  Furthermore, the Cournot equilibrium market structure is a duopoly if 648450 ≤< F .  
Hence, the lower the value of fixed cost, the larger the equilibrium number of firms. 
 
Figure 3-2: Equilibrium number of firms 
 
Source: Martin (2010) 
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The European Commission (2002) states that a key economic objective of the integration process in 
Europe was [and remains] to generate structural changes in European markets and in doing so, to 
increase economic welfare.  These structural changes are influenced by the behaviour of firms in the 
competitive landscape, which ultimately impacts the equilibrium number of firms.  One of the 
important aspects of the introduction of the euro is the impact of price transparency and the 
repercussions that this has on the (pricing) behaviour of firms.  Figure 3-3 illustrates an analytical 
framework for analysing the impact of European integration in the context of the interrelationships 
between market structure, prices and industry characteristics. 
 
Figure 3-3 shows the relationship between prices (p) and the number of firms in a given market (n).  
Assume that the profit of a firm )(π  is a function of: the firm’s elasticity of demand )(η ; the size of 
the market (S); the level of fixed costs (F), hence the degree of economies of scale; and the mode of 
competitive interaction, which is determined by the price transparency effect )(τ .  The upward 
sloping (break-even) line shows the relationship between prices and the number of firms in a market 
for which the profits generated by a firm are equal to zero.  Hence, for given values of η , F, S and 
τ , the greater the number of firms in the market and the higher the prices in order to ensure that all 
firms break-even.  Figure 3-2 demonstrated that the higher the level of fixed costs (F), the smaller 
the number of firms (n) that can survive in the market place.  Hence, this results in a shift upwards 
of the break-even line. 
 
Figure 3-3: Price competition and the number of firms 
 
Source: adapted from Sutton (2007) 
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The downward sloping schedules (Pcoll and Pcomp) show the relationship between the price charged 
by the representative firm in the market and the number of firms active in the market.  The greater 
the number of firms competing in the market, the lower the price charged to the consumers.  
Assume that the price is a function of the number of firms in a collusive market and is expressed as 
)(τfpcoll = .  Conversely, the price given by the number of firms in a competitive market is 
expressed as )(τgpcomp = .   In both scenarios, a negative relationship between price )( p  and the 
number of firms )(n  exists; which is referred to by Sutton (2007) as the toughness of price 
competition.  Therefore, )(τg  represents more intense price competition than )(τf .  
 
Following this, it is important to consider what determines the number of firms in an industry –
based on the aforementioned relationship between pricing and firm numbers.  This can be formally 
qualified as the first-stage of a two-stage game, where firms will decide whether or not to enter in 
anticipation of second-stage price competition.  If barriers to entry are high or the first firm in the 
market can respond in a manner that leverages profitable opportunities, the industry may remain a 
monopoly.64  In contrast, if barriers to entry a low the incumbent firms will have no advantage over 
new entrants.  Consequently, new firms will continue to enter the market until the marginal 
potential entrant generates zero economic profits.  In terms of symmetric firms, this means that 
incumbents will only make sufficient profits to remain active participants in the market. 
 
Assuming economies of scale [for any given size of market], the more firms that exist will result in 
higher average costs.  Therefore, the higher the number of firms in the market will result in a higher 
price – just in order for firms to break even.  Hence, the line ),,,( τηπ SF  expresses this 
relationship between the price )( p  and number of firms )(n .  The area above and to the left of this 
line will result in firms making positive profits.  In contrast, the area below and to the right of this 
line suggests that firms would make losses.  Furthermore, S is a measure of market size relative to 
economies of scale in production.  The break-even line will shift to the right if either the market size 
increases or the economies of scale decreases. 
 
A vast amount of outcomes can be observed of price and firm numbers when observing a market of 
size S.  The equilibrium would be along the )(τfpcoll =  line if the market behaved in a collusive 
manner.  The long run equilibrium would be at point A if firms were symmetric, without any 
advantage over potential entrants.  Consequently, the symmetric free entry equilibrium would be at 
                                                 
64 Caves and Porter (1977), Demsetz (1982) and Harbord and Hoehn (1994) provide an insightful discussion concerning barriers to entry in the 
context of IO theorem. 
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point B, if pricing behaviour were very competitive.  This supports the notion that a more 
competitive market can support fewer firms and therefore is more concentrated. 
 
In the absence of information pertaining to pricing behaviour of firms within an industry, the set of 
potential outcomes are likely to be all points along AB.  Point X suggests a feasible price given the 
number of firms in the market.  In the long run, this outcome is unlikely because the existing firms 
would be generating losses.  In contrast, point Y is also unfeasible because the price of the product 
would be unsustainably high. 
  
In Figure 3-4, a set of feasible outcomes relating to price and the number of firms is illustrated as 
the market increases in size.65  Assuming market size 0S , any outcome within the area of points 
ABCD is feasible with the maximum number of firms being 0n .  In contrast, if market size is equal 
to 1S , the feasible set of outcomes is extended to include the area between points ADE with the 
maximum number of firms being 1n . 
 
Figure 3-4: Market size and the number of firms 
 
Source: Davies and Lyons (1996) 
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3.3 Application of framework to the EU 
The relationship between market size and number of firms can be further extrapolated with respect 
to the introduction of the euro.  Assume that the market size )( 0S  of the members of the EU can 
sustain a maximum number of firms )( 0n  and can be observed at point A in Figure 3-4.  If a 
potential country were to be granted membership into the EU, the increase in the size of the market 
would be represented by point F.  Initially there would be no change to the price )( 0p  paid by 
consumers across the member states.  Eventually 0p  will no longer be possible due to the toughness 
of price proposition.  Hence, during the integration process, the equilibrium price may move to 
point G whilst existing firms attempt to maintain market share, which is threatened by the price 
transparency proposition.  This will result in firms generating unsustainable negative profits.  In the 
long run, firms will exit the market, and consequently price will increase marginally until the new 
equilibrium at point E is reached. 
 
Once the incumbent member state is full integrated, it is anticipated that the size of the market 
would settle somewhere between points CFH.  Assuming that integration introduces a qualitatively 
more competitive pricing environment, then the price and market structure implications will be 
more dramatic; potentially moving the EU from point F to H, and then gradually back to C.  
Ultimately, this would suggest that competition has increased in the prescribed region and as a 
result the market has become less concentrated.  This process is referred to as the direct market 
expansion effect and is discussed in detail by Davies and Lyons (1996).  A truly integrated market 
would encourage intense price competition between firms that is consistent with )(τgpcomp = . 
 
Information on the structural characteristics of a market can be deduced by observing a 
concentration curve.66  To demonstrate, consider three hypothetical industries that have six, eight 
and ten competitors respectively.  Revenue and market share information is summarised for each 
industry (X, Y and Z) in Table 3-2.   Market share is defined as follows: 
market (total) of Revenue
firm of Revenue = shareMarket  (3.3–A) 
 
                                                 
66 Rosenbluth (1955); Kwoka (1985); Reekie (1989); Tremblay and Tremblay (2012); Pass and Lowes (1993); Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark 
(1982) 
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Firms are ranked in order of size (from largest to smallest) and then plotted against their cumulative 
output in Figure 3-5.  The concentration curve for industry X shows that the two largest firm 
supplies approximately 60 per cent of the market.  Industry Y contains a larger a number of firms 
and is less concentrated and its curve always remains below that of industry X.  Industry X has less 
firms, however is more concentrated up to the four-firm level in comparison to industry Z. 
 
When analysing the three concentration curves, two very important characterises are highlighted 
(see Tremblay and Tremblay 2012, p. 180).  Firstly, the concentration curve for industry Z 
illustrates that if each firm is of equal size, a linear line emerges.   Secondly, the concentration 
curve shifts upward with a smaller number of competitors and as the larger firms gain market share. 
 
Table 3-2: Revenue and market share by [hypothetical] industry 
 
 Revenue (in $ billions) Market share 
Firm X Y Z X Y Z 
1 14.4 14.4 10.8 40% 20% 10% 
2 7.2 14.4 10.8 20% 20% 10% 
3 3.6 14.4 10.8 10% 20% 10% 
4 3.6 14.4 10.8 10% 20% 10% 
5 3.6 3.6 10.8 10% 5% 10% 
6 3.6 3.6 10.8 10% 5% 10% 
7  3.6 10.8  5% 10% 
8  3.6 10.8  5% 10% 
9   10.8   10% 
10   10.8   10% 
Source: adapted from Tremblay and Tremblay (2012) 
 
For example, industries X and Y have fewer firms and higher concentration curves when compared 
to industry Z.   Furthermore, the concentration curve for industry X commences at a higher point 
[than industry X and Z] in contrast to the market share of the largest firm in industry X [at 40%] and 
industry Z [at 10%].  This suggests that higher the industry concentration is reflected in a higher 
concentration curve.  It is anticipated that the concentration curve will move from X [pre-EMU] to 
Y [post-EMU] due to the introduction of the euro.  This means that the EMU is expected to reduce 
firm revenue (on average), as the increase in competition will result in a more even spread of the 
revenue [and profit] amongst market participants.  This would signify an increase in competition 
amongst the member states. 
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Figure 3-5: Concentration curve for [hypothetical] industries X, Y and Z 
 
Source: adapted from Tremblay and Tremblay (2012) 
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3.4 Measures of market structure 
Some economists have attempted to measure market power using indices based upon familiar 
theoretical considerations.67  However no satisfactory explanation of the size-distribution of firms 
has yet been derived from economic theory (for example, see Saving 1970).  There is no 
concentration measure in existence that captures every conceivable aspect of business behaviour 
(Kwoka 1985).  Therefore an ideal concentration index can be presumed not to exist, however it is 
possible to specify a collection of desirable properties.68  The following axioms are based on the 
assumption of the relative importance of a firm’s shares when formulating a concentration index:  
i. A concentration index should be a one-dimensional measure.  This ensures 
simplicity of use and interpretation. 
ii. Concentration of an industry should be independent of the size of that industry.  
This implies that a firm’s share of an industry indicates it’s relative importance. 
iii. An increase in the cumulative share of the ith firm, for all i, ranking firms 1, 2, 
3…i…n in descending order of size, implies an increase in concentration. 
iv. The principle of transfers should hold i.e. concentration should increase if the share 
of any firm is increased at the expense of the smaller firm. 
v. The entry of new firms below some arbitrary significant size should reduce 
concentration. 
vi. Mergers should increase concentration.  In some instances, mergers would not be 
expected to influence concentration at all.  Furthermore, mergers may lead to an 
increase in competition.  The outcome will be determined by numerous factors, 
including the actual number and size distribution of firms following the mergers, the 
type of product or service provided, the structure of costs and the state of trade. 
vii. Random brand switching by consumers should reduce concentration. 
viii. If sj is the share of a new firm, then sj becomes progressively smaller, so too should 
its effect on the concentration index.  Concentration should not be influenced by the 
total number of firms, but rather by the number of firms that are of significant size. 
ix. If all firms are divided into k equal parts, then the concentration index should be 
reduced by a proportion of 1/k. 
x. If there are n firms of equal size, concentration should be a decreasing function of n. 
xi. Random factors in the growth of firms should increase competition. 
                                                 
67 Lerner (1934); Herfindahl (1950); Hirschman (1945); Stigler (1964); Horvath (1970); Horvath (1972); Gans (2007); Goppelsroeder, Schinkel and 
Tuinstra (2008); Lijesen (2004); Kate (2006); Campos and Vega (2003) 
68 Curry and George (1983); Hall and Tideman (1967); Dansby and Willig (1979); Geithman, Marvel and Weiss (1981); Kilpatrick (1967); 
Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1982) 
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Concentration indices embody, to a greater or lesser extent, information on the numbers of firms 
operating in an industry or market (Reekie 1989).  Concentration, however measured, typically has 
been used as a proxy that describes the extent to which the structure, and consequently the conduct 
and performance of an industry is either believed to be competitive or presents monopoly conditions 
(Bailey and Boyle 1971).  Economic theory suggests that all things being equal (for example, 
barriers to entry), the degree of competition is related positively to the number of firms in the 
relevant industry (Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 71).  However, the number of firms (n) in an industry 
is an unsatisfactory index of market concentration unless all firms within an industry are the same 
size.  Hence, the degree of inequality is important.69   
 
A commonly accepted measure of market concentration [combining the elements of both firm 
numbers and inequality] is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index; also known as the Herfindahl index.70  
The names Herfindahl and Hirschman are interconnected not because the two gentlemen worked 
together to develop the index, but rather because each developed it independently of one another.  
Herfindahl (1950) used the index to measure gross changes in the concentration of the United States 
steel industry.  Furthermore, Herfindahl proposed his version of the index because traditional 
measures of concentration were sensitive only to disparities in market shares and not the scarcity of 
competitors.  Whereas Hirschman (1945) used a variation of the index as a measure of the 
concentration of a country’s foreign trade. 
 
The HHI is a measure of the size of a firm relative to the total industry and hence is an indicator of 
the amount of competition amongst the participating firms (see Rhoades 1993).  The HHI is 
calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the 
resulting numbers as follows: 
∑
=
=
n
i
is
1
2HHI  (3.4–A) 
Where si is equal to the market share of firm i and the number of firms is represented by n.71 
 
Thus, the HHI for a market consisting of three firms with shares of 50%, 30% and 20% 
respectively, is the sum of 502, 302, and 202 (2,500 + 900 + 400) is equal to 3,800.  The HHI will 
take values between 0 and 10,000.  An industry controlled by a single firm (a pure monopolist) has 
a HHI equal to 10,000 (1002); whereas the HHI for an industry populated by a very large number of 
                                                 
69 Atkinson (1970); Blackorby and Donaldson (1978); Kolm (1969); Sen (1973); Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1982) 
70 Herfindahl (1950); Hirschman (1964); Hirschman (1945) 
71 Market share is typically calculated by dividing the revenue of a firm by the total revenue generated by an industry (or defined market). 
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small firms (i.e. competitive market) would approach zero, which is the theoretical minimum value.  
Hence the value of the HHI decreases when the number of firms n increases. 
 
Unlike the concentration ratio (Ck), the HHI decreases with the number of firms (n) and increases 
with the variance in market share (σ2).72  In order to measure market share in decimal form 
Equation (3.4–A) can be revised as  
./1HHI 2 nn += σ    (3.4–B) 
 
This demonstrates that HHI increases in value as the variance in market share increases.  This also 
implies that when firms are equal size (i.e. σ2 = 0), the HHI = 1/n.73  The first term on the right-
hand side of the equation is often referred to as the variance equivalent )( 2σn  and the second term 
is known as the inverse of a numbers equivalent )/1( n .74  Equation (3.4–B) can further provide a 
numbers equivalent, such that a given value of HHI can be translated into a number of equal size 
firms )(n′ .  The numbers equivalent of a given value of HHI is HHI/1=′n  when market share is 
measured as a decimal. 
 
In other words, the HHI can be interpreted as a numbers equivalent by multiplying the HHI by 
0.0001 and taking the reciprocal of that product.  This means that one can readily compute the 
number of firms with equal market shares, which would be necessary in calculating any given HHI.  
For example, a HHI of 1,250 corresponds to a market of eight equal sized firms since the reciprocal 
of 0.125 (1,250 x 0.0001) is 8 (Calkins 1983, p. 406).  Contrariwise, to obtain the HHI 
corresponding to a market with a specified number of equal sized firms the reciprocal of that 
number is multiplied by 10,000.  Accordingly, the HHI corresponding of four equal sized firms 
would be (¼ x 10,000) equal to 2,500. 
 
One of the major advantages of the HHI is that it is highly responsive to asymmetry in market 
shares.  The HHI will be lowest when the share of the market is equal between firms and highest 
when one firm has an extremely large share of the market.  For example, the HHI for a market 
consisting of three firms with equal shares (331/32 + 331/32 + 331/32 or 331/32 x 3 = 1,111 x 3) is equal 
to 3,333.  Alternatively, the HHI for a market consisting of three firms where one firm has an 85% 
share (852 + 102 + 52 = 7,225 + 100 + 25) is equal to 7,350. 
                                                 
72 The k-firm concentration ratio is defined as the market share of the k largest firms in the industry. 
73 In a monopoly market, the HHI has a value of 1; and diminishes as n increases and firms remain equal in size. 
74 Adelman (1969); Hause (1977); Finkelstein and Friedberg (1967); Hannah and Kay (1977); Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1982) 
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Another advantage of the HHI is that it reflects the shares of every firm in the market.  In contrast, 
the k-firm concentration ratio requires an arbitrary selection method of which firms are included in 
the model.  This all-inclusive characteristic is considered one of the key advantages of using the 
HHI as a measure rather than the k-firm concentration ratio. Whilst the number of firms in an 
industry is evident in its intuitive economic meaning, using the traditional variance measure of size 
dispersion has some shortcomings (see Kelly 1981).  
 
One of the major disadvantages of the HHI is that small errors in estimating market shares of 
leading firms can produce large differences in the HHI.75  For example, the HHI for a market 
consisting of four firms, where two firms have a 40% and 10% share respectively (402 + 402 + 102 
+102 = 1,600 + 1,600 + 100 + 100) is equal to 3,400.  Now assuming that the market share of both 
the major firms are 45% and 35% respectively (rather than 40% each), the HHI would be equal to 
3,450 (452 + 352 + 102 + 102 = 2025 + 1225 + 100 + 100).  Whereas, if the market share of one 
large firm and one small firm is recalculated at 45% and 10% respectively, the HHI would be equal 
to 3,750.  Hence, as summarised in Table 3-3, it is critical to avoid erroneously estimated market 
shares as this can impact on the value of the HHI (i.e. calculation error increases from 1.47% to 
10.29%). 
 
Table 3-3: Market share re-distribution implications 
Group  Market A  Market B  Market C 
Overview Two large and two small 
firms 
Large firms redistributed Large and small firm 
redistributed 
Market Share 40%, 40%, 10% and 10% 45%, 35%, 10% and 10% 45%, 40%, 10% and 5% 
∑
=
=
n
i
is
1
2HHI  
402 + 402 + 102 + 102 = 452 + 352 + 102 + 102 = 452 + 402 + 102 + 52 = 
1,600 + 1,600 + 100 + 
100 2,025 + 1,225 + 100 + 100 2,025 + 1,600 + 100 + 25 
HHI 3,400 3,450 
+ 50 (1.5%) 
3,750 
+ 350 (10.3%) 
Source: the author 
 
As demonstrated, the HHI index weights more heavily the values for large firms than small firms 
when squaring the market shares in Equation (3.4–A).  As a result, if precise data were not available 
on the market share of extremely small firms, the potential errors generated would not be large.  
Hence, it is important that market share data is available on the largest firms in order for 
concentration to be measured accurately.  Obtaining all the markets shares of very small firms can 
                                                 
75 Scherer and Ross (1990); Calkins (1983); Weinstock (1982); Miller ibid.; Laine (1995); Greenfield (1984) 
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be quite difficult.  Therefore, the all-inclusive characteristic of the HHI can also be a disadvantage 
in the event of missing or unavailable data due to incompleteness.  However given that fringe firms 
are unlikely to contribute significantly to the HHI, these firms would hardly raise any dominant 
position or anti-competitive behaviour (antitrust in the context of the US) concerns. 
 
As highlighted by Calkins (1983), George J. Stigler was perhaps more important than either 
Herfindahl or Hirschman in bringing about the acceptance of HHI.  Stigler (1964) investigated the 
issue of detecting secret price-cutting in the presence of a collusive agreement.  Stigler assumes that 
the basic method of detection of a price cutter is that the seller is getting business, which would 
otherwise be unobtainable.  Stigler used the HHI to measure the likelihood of effective collusion in 
the event that cheating on agreed prices were not detected.  As a result, his evidence suggests that 
the more concentrated the industry structure, the larger the price reductions.   
 
The relationship between market size and the maximum feasible number of firms is shown in 
Figure 3-6.76  The HHI is plotted on the vertical axis and is the reciprocal of the number of firms 
assuming that they are characteristically symmetrical.  Each of the curves are downward sloping 
and the lower bound for H gets closer to zero as the market size expands.  In other words, the 
theoretical minimum level of market concentration decreases as market size relative to economies 
of scale (S) increases as plotted on the horizontal axis.  Hence, as S becomes large, market 
concentration will approach zero.  
 
An industry with identical firms and no incumbent advantages can be represented by )(0 shH =  and 
can be considered the lower bound for an unintegrated market.  In practice, the size of firms is never 
identical.  However, the smallest firms in an industry cannot make losses if they are to survive.  
This reduces the maximum number of sustainable firms and increases concentration; and is 
consistent with pushing the minimum level of concentration from points A to D.  In contrast, the 
lower bound relationship between concentration and market size can be represented by )(1 shH = .  
This would be reflective of an integrated market in the absence of the toughness of price 
competition, suggesting that pricing behaviour remains unchanged irrespective of the increase in the 
number of firms; and the equilibrium market share at s1 moves from point A to point B. 
 
                                                 
76 Tremblay and Tremblay (2012), pp. 200-203; Davies and Lyons (1996), pp. 92-95 
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Now assume that )(2 shH =  represents the lower bound for a fully integrated European market 
prior to the launch of the euro (i.e. pre-EMU), where the equilibrium market share settles at point C.  
It is anticipated that the introduction of the euro will enhance competition across the region.  Hence, 
the lower bound of the integrated market curve moves down, which can be represented by 
)(1 shH = .  Initially, this suggests that the market is more competitive as the equilibrium HHI 
moves from point C to point B.  However as competition intensifies, the relationship between 
market size and the number of firms may move even further down the existing curve or recalibrate 
at )(0 shH = . 
 
 Figure 3-6: Market concentration and size 
 
Source: adapted from Davis and Garcés (2010) 
 
The HHI is commonly used as preliminary benchmark in merger control, where the data on a post-
merger situation cannot be observed (see Davis and Garcés 2010, p. 288).77  Both EU merger and 
US antitrust guidelines use the HHI screen for mergers which are unlikely to be of much concern; 
and to flag those mergers which need to be scrutinised.  This assessment is undertaken by using the 
market shares to calculate the HHI pre merger (HHIP) and post merger (HHIM) as follows: 
∑
=
=
n
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iP s
1
2)(HHI  and ∑
=
=
n
i
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1
2)(HHI  (3.4–C) 
                                                 
77 Interestingly, the HHI has also been used to assess the relationship between concentrated industries and lower stock returns: see Hou and Robinson 
(2006). 
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3.5 Competition policy in the EU 
The EC is responsible for competition at the EU level: specifically in areas of anti-trust, cartels, 
mergers and acquisitions, and the granting of state aid to financial institutions.  In initial screening 
of mergers, the values estimated in Equation (3.4–C) are assumed to be an indicator of the extent of 
margins before and after the proposed merger and the effect of the merger on such margins.   As per 
Equation (3.4–C), two import factors that the EC consider when deciding whether to allow a 
proposed merger are the level of market concentration if the merger is consummated (HHIM); and 
the change in market concentration from its pre-merger level (∆HHIP = HHIP – HHIM). 
 
Hence, the level and the change in market concentration post-merger affect the degree to which a 
merger raises competitive concerns as follows: 
(i) If HHIM < 1,000, no competition issues arise. 
(ii) If 1,000 ≤ HHIM ≤ 2,000 and 
 HHIM – HHIP < 250, no competition issues arise; 
 HHIM – HHIP ≥ 250, anti-competitive issues arise. 
(iii) If HHIM > 2,000 and 
 HHIM – HHIP < 150, no competition issues arise; 
 HHIM – HHIP ≥ 150, anti-competitive issues arise. 
 
In the US, markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are considered to be 
moderately concentrated, and those in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to 
be concentrated.  Markets that have a HHI of less than 1000 are considered unconcentrated.78   
When evaluating horizontal mergers, the US antitrust authorities consider the impact on the level of 
concentration pre-merger (HHIP) and post merger (HHIM); as per the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1997). 
 
In contrast to the EU, the critical thresholds in the US are summarised as follows (see Fry 2011):  
(i) If HHIM < 1,000, no competition issues arise. 
(ii) If 1,000 ≤ HHIM < 1,800 and 
 HHIM – HHIP ≤ 100, no competition issues arise; 
 HHIM – HHIP > 100, anti-competitive issues arise. 
(iii) If HHIM ≥ 1,800 and 
                                                 
78 Byrns and Stone (1992); Gans (2007); Sleuwaegen, De Bondt and Dehandschutter (1989); Fox (1982); Weinstock (1984); Greenfield (1984) 
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 HHIM – HHIP < 50, no competition issues arise; 
 50 ≤ HHIM – HHIP < 100, anti-competitive issues arise. 
(iv) If HHIM – HHIP > 100, then serious competition issues arise. 
 
The preliminary decision criteria established by the aforementioned merger guidelines in both the 
EU and US are illustrated in Figure 3-7.  The matrix identifies the likelihood of whether the 
respective governing bodies will challenge a proposed acquisition; based on the size of the 
acquisition (HHI increase) and the post-merger level of concentration in the relevant market. 
 
Figure 3-7: Likelihood of prosecution: EU vs. US 
 
 
**Except in extraordinary cases 
Source: adapted from Bronsteen (1984, p. 622) 
 
Cases falling slightly above or below a threshold category can present comparable competitive 
issues.  Market shares and the HHI play a vital role in the weighing up of evidence by authorities 
when deciding whether ‘on balance’ a merger is likely to substantially reduce competition within 
the pre-defined market.  However, it is important to note that it is not the practice of governing 
agencies to prohibit mergers based on the values generated in isolation.  But rather, the HHI is used 
as a screening mechanism that is a purely a useful indicator of potential anti-trust issues.  It is 
absolutely critical that the source of the potential market power must be understood first before the 
measures available to competition authorities are applied (see Drexl, Kerber et al. 2011). 
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3.6 Empirical literature on Europe 
The impact of competition within a specific industry, country and/or region has been explored, 
however there is no research that investigates the competition effect across all industries, pre and 
post the introduction of the euro.  Most of the European empirical literature can be separated into 
four categories – banking [and financial services] sector; manufacturing sector; multiple industries 
(pre-EMU); and country, industry or firm specific.  The following section highlights some of the 
diverse literature pertaining to Europe, which also elucidates the research gap. 
 
3.6.1 Banking sector 
Over the last 20 years, globalisation, deregulation, technological innovation and European 
integration has fundamentally transformed the European banking sector.  A partnered study by 
Cecchini, Catinat et al. (1988) with Price Waterhouse was the first to comprehensively analyse 
comparative competitive conditions across EU banking and financial systems.  Overtime, the degree 
of competition and market concentration in the enlarged EU banking environment has been 
investigated extensively.79  Furthermore, an extensive body of empirical literature regarding firm 
profitability and the EMU has also been covered.80 
 
Empirical analysis has highlighted that the main EU banking markets are becoming progressively 
more concentrated.  The reorganisation of the European financial markets has resulted in hostile 
takeover bids and a reduction in the cost of capital.  The total number of banks operating in the 
EU15 between 1985 and 2004 reduced from 12,315 to 7,300, which is a 41% reduction (see 
Goddard, Molyneux et al. 2007).81  In particular, there has been a 17% reduction in the number of 
banks operating between 1998 to 2002 (see Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki 2006).  Many of 
the most successful European banks have responded to the changing competitive environment by 
expanding significantly through internally generated growth or through mergers and acquisitions.  
                                                 
79 Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux (2009); Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and Tavakoli (2007); Goddard and Wilson (2009); Gropp and 
Moerman (2004); Berger (1995); Berger (2003); Berger, De Young and Udell (2001); Berger, Demerguc-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich (2004); 
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999); Cecchini, Catinat and Jacquemin (1988); Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Gilbert (1984); Casu and Girardone 
(2009); Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006); Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore (2001); Dermine (2006); Bourke (1989); Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006); Honohan and Kinsella (1982); Bikker and Haaf (2002a); Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006); 
Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2009); Goldberg and Rai (1996); Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Neven and Röller (1999); Casu and Girardone 
(2006); Barth, Lin, Lin and Song (2009); Affinito and Piazza (2009)  
80 Dermine (2006); Dermine (1996); Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008); Bourke (1989); Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008); Dietrich 
and Wanzenried (2011); Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2007); Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007); Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson 
(2004); Goddard and Wilson (2009); Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) 
81 The EU15 comprises of the following fifteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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Gilbert (1984), Bikker and Haaf (2002b) and Berger, Demerguc-Kunt et al. (2004) provide a 
detailed review of the banking literature and concentration measures selected.  Much of the research 
has both used event study methodology and stock price data to investigate investors’ expectations 
(around the date of the merger announcement), or has compared pre and post-merger performance 
using accounting ratios or efficiency measures. 
 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) analyse the interest margin in the principal European 
banking sectors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) during the period 1993 to 
2000.  A direct measure of the degree of competition, the Lerner index, is estimated for the different 
markets.  The results show that the fall of margins in the banking sector is compatible with a 
relaxation of the competitive conditions – namely an increase in market power and concentration. 
 
Goddard, Molyneux et al. (2007) survey the recent European banking literature.  These studies of 
banking competition and competitive behaviour both within and across countries typically utilise 
only one competition measure.  This would be irrelevant if the different measures provided similar 
results, however they do not.  Hence, this raises the question of the reliability of studies examining 
competition in the banking market.  As a result, a recent paper Carbó, Humphrey et al. (2009) on 
cross-country comparisons of market competition reviews the EU banking industry between 1995 
and 2001, using the following measures: NIMTA, Lerner index, ROA, H-statistic and HHI. 
 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis et al. (2008) examine the effect of bank specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability for a panel of Greek banks that cover the time 
period 1985 to 2001.  Applying a GMM technique, they find that all bank-specific determinants 
affect bank profitability significantly and that the business cycle has a positive [albeit] asymmetric 
effect on bank profitability.  Asimakopoulos, Samitas et al. (2009) also examine the determinants of 
profitability for Greek [non-financial] firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange between 1995 and 
2003.  Using panel data estimation techniques, they analyse the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods in 
an attempt to quantify the macroeconomic ‘euro’ effect on firm profitability.  The model suggests 
that firm profitability is positively affected by size, sales growth and investment; and negatively by 
leverage and current assets.  Furthermore, they suggest that EMU participation and adoption of the 
euro is negatively related to firm profitability. 
 
Carbó, Humphrey et al. (2009) found that the relationship between the five competition measures is 
weak. Furthermore, it does not appear possible to select a consistent measure, which is 
representative of the competition findings in each of the EU countries.  Attempts to assess the 
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relative competitive position of banking markets across the EU were found to give conflicting 
predictions across countries, within countries, and over time.  Hence, this suggests that all five 
measures of competition do not provide the same inferences about competition in the banking 
industry.  Also, the results do indicate that banking market competition in Europe may be stronger 
than implied by traditional measures and analysis. 
 
3.6.2 Manufacturing sector 
Internationally, there is an extensive body of work that uses the concentration ratios across 
manufacturing sector studies.82  In terms of the EU, early research pertaining to competition focuses 
mostly on manufacturing firms in the UK.83  For example, Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975) 
investigate the impact of acquisitions and mergers on the growth of firms and concentration, 
specifically C25, C50 and C100 – across manufacturing and distribution industries in the UK between 
1958 and 1967.  In contrast, Clarke (1984) examines the relationship between profit margins and 
market concentration in the UK manufacturing industry between 1970 to 1976.   
 
Allen, Gasiorek et al. (1998) estimate price and demand functions for 15 ‘selected’ manufacturing 
industries of the four largest EU countries (Germany, France, Italy and UK), consequently deriving 
single market effects on PCMs.  The evidence suggests that the SMP has enhanced competition 
across the region indicated by a reduction in the PCMs in all industries except for motor vehicles. 
Interestingly, the industries selected were assumed to be particularly sensitive to single market 
effects according to earlier research undertaken by Buigues, Ilzkovitz et al. (1990); and only 
consisted of sectors that made up one third of total manufacturing output.   
 
Allen, Gasiorek et al. (1998) conclude that the single market has had a substantial pro-competitive 
effect which has led to significant reductions in PCMs.  At the country level, Bottasso and 
Sembenelli (2001) adopt similar industry classifications as Allen, Gasiorek et al. – using a large 
sample of Italian firms.  A structural break due to the single market is tested using the mark-up 
estimation method suggested by Hall (1988).  As a result, significant reductions in mark-ups and 
increases in productivity are found for the group firms which were previously classified the most 
sensitive by Buigues, Ilzkovitz et al. (1990). 
 
                                                 
82 Stigler (1964); Rosenbluth (1954); Rosenbluth (1957); Rosenbluth (1970); Weiss (1977); McFetridge (1973); Jones, Laudadio and Percy ibid.; 
Marvel (1978); Kwoka (1979); Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002) 
83 George (1967); Hart and Clarke (1980); Gratton and Kemp (1977); Evely and Little (1960); Weiss (1963a); Weiss (1963b); Sawyer (1971); 
Cowling and Waterson (1976); Symeonidis (2000a); Symeonidis (2000b) 
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Martins, Scarpetta et al. (1996) provide estimates of mark-up ratios for 36 manufacturing industries 
in 14 OECD countries over the 1970 to 1992 time period. The mark-ups estimated are 
overwhelmingly positive and statistically significant; and appear to be related to the market 
structure of a particular industry. They also find that there is considerable variation of mark-ups 
across countries and industries, which may be due to the impact of specific policies. 
 
Aiginger and Davies (2004b) find that the concentration of manufacturing industries has decreased 
for the members of the EU, between 1985 and 1998.  Høj, Jimenez et al. (2007) examine the cross-
country differences in policy approaches to product market competition. They estimate mark-up 
ratios for a panel of OECD economies for the manfacturing, including several sub-branches of non-
manufacturing industries. 
 
For country specific research, Klette (1999) presents a framework for estimating PCM and scale 
economies for 14 manufacturing industries in Norway during 1980 and 1990.  He finds that price 
exceeds MC by between five and ten percent for most of the industries considered and that a firm 
(plant) with higher market power tend to be less productive.  Oustapassidis, Vlachvei et al. (2000) 
examine the market power versus efficiency hypothesis; in relation to 266 Greek food 
manufacturing firms for the period 1987 to 1995.  They take into consideration the long-run 
behaviour of profitability and the endogeneity bias between profitability, market share and 
advertising variables.  Using a two-stage least squares specification, market share and advertising 
are both positive and statistically significant when explaining profitability.  Lastly, Spanos, Zaralis 
et al. (2004) examine the impact of firm and industry-specific factors on profitability for Greek 
manufacturing firms between 1995 and 1996.  Industry-level effects show a strong impact of 
industry entry barriers.  Moreover, the findings suggest that firm-specific factors explain more than 
twice as much profit variability as industry-specific factors. 
 
In terms of euro specific research, the European Commission (2003) analyse the evolution of mark-
up levels in the EU manufacturing industry from the period 1987 to 2000; in the context of price 
and cost developments.  The impact of the completion of the single market is assessed based on the 
productive efficiency, market power and pricing structure.  PCMs are calculated and a simple 
regression framework with further variables is used to test for the impact of the single market.  The 
results suggest that in the period prior to the completion of the single market (pre-1992), mark-ups 
of the manufacturing firms deteriorated in line with a reduction in prices.  Post 1992, mark-ups 
recovered thereafter due to the realisation of productive efficiency gains. 
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3.6.3 Multiple sectors 
There are a number of studies encompassing multiple sectors; however the focus has been to 
ascertain the impact of the SMP [pre-euro].  Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki (1988) examine the effects 
of the formation of the EU on changes in concentration and PCMs in the member states.  They test 
the hypothesis that concentration measured at the EU-wide level is becoming a relevant structural 
variable which affects the national PCM.  Using [three-digit] industry data for West Germany, 
France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, they endeavour to ascertain the effect of the removal of 
intra-EC tariffs on changes in national concentration.  The results suggest that there is a decrease in 
industry concentration using a single market model. 
 
Smith and Venables (1988) study the effect of changes in the internal market in the EU in a partial 
equilibrium model of imperfect competition with economies of scale – finding substantial gains for 
member states.  The framework focuses on ten specific industries and simulates the behaviour of 
countries in a proposed European wide integrated market; where exploitation of domestic markets 
by firms is removed.  The results yield large welfare gains and consequently causes a large 
reduction in profit. 
 
The European Commission (1996) issued a review of the single market programme by country and 
industry up to 1992, which was too early to present a conclusive ex post assessment.  A review of 
competition [pre-euro] is undertaken that looks at various industries, including products.  They find 
that the C4 concentration ratio for the manufacturing industry specifically increased between 1987 
and 1993.  When reviewing all sectors between 1985 and 1992, concentration has decreased in 
France, Belgium and the UK – whereas the C4 has increased for Germany.  The evidence also 
suggests that competition amongst manufacturing firms has increased through measuring changes in 
price-cost mark-ups.  The estimates present a yearly reduction of 0.2 percentage points [in mark-up] 
proceeding 1987.  A further study published a couple of years later built upon the European 
Commission review through the use of additional data up to 1994. 
 
The European Commission (2002) further assess the impact on competition in context to the EMU.  
However the time period encompasses 1987 to 1997, where they find that market concentration has 
remained fairly stable.  Whereas more recently, the European Commission (2006) find a link 
between mark-ups and macroeconomic performance for a panel of euro countries using a two stage 
procedure – using a dataset between the time period 1980 and 2002. 
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Jorgensen and Schroder (2003) find that economic integration has ambiguous effects on industry 
concentration where the common market is measured over the time period 1970 to 1986; focussing 
on West Germany, France, Italy Spain and the UK.  They argue that economic integration alone can 
generate opposing forces on industry concentration due to differing trade cost types.84  The HHI 
falls when a reduction in real costs occurs and rises when there is a reduction in tariff costs.  In 
addition to international trade implications [discussed in Section 2.3], Bayoumi, Laxton et al. 
(2004) highlight that the average price mark-up in the euro area is approximately 10 per cent above 
the US level. 
 
Aiginger and Pfaffermayr (2004a) use a disaggregated dataset to substantiate whether spatial 
concentration increased across Europe between 1985 and 1998 – using the HHI.  They find that 
geographic concentration decreased, suggesting an increase in competition across the region.85  
Méon and Weill (2004) measure the evolution of diversification across Europe using the HHI.  
They find that the EU grew less concentrated between 1986 and 1997. 
 
Brülhart and Traeger (2005) provide an account of geographic concentration patterns in a broad 
range of industries across Europe from 1975 to 2000.86  They find that the manufacturing sector is 
slowly becoming more concentrated.  The service sector appears to be more concentrated than the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors, whereas a significant decrease in concentration is observed 
for the transport and telecommunications sectors.  In contrast, there has been no significant change 
in the market services sectors [i.e. financial services, distribution and other services]. 
 
Goddard, Tavakoli et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of profitability for the manufacturing 
and services sector in Belgium, France, Italy and the UK – between 1993 and 2001.  They find that 
despite the SMP, abnormal profit appears to persist significantly from year to year.  Furthermore, 
there is evidence of a negative size-profitability relationship, however the relationship between 
market share and profitability is positive – which is stronger in manufacturing sector than in 
services.  Also, the relationship between a firm's gearing ratio and profitability is negative and firms 
with higher liquidity tend to be more profitable. 
 
 
                                                 
84 For empirical distinctions between the various trade cost types see: Baier and Bergstrand (2001); McCallum (1995); Harrigan (1993). 
85 Refer to Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (2002) for an insighful discusion on geographic concentration. 
86 For comparative purposes, see Holmes and Stevens ibid. who undertake the simular analysis for US firms in 1992. 
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Badinger (2007) investigates whether the SMP has fostered competition in Europe by testing for a 
decrease in mark-up ratios in eighteen industries within the manufacturing, services and 
construction sector.  A panel approach is used which includes the ten EU member states over the 
period of 1981 to 1999 [pre euro].  As highlighted by Badinger, overall evidence on single market 
achievements is mixed at best and far from comprehensive. 
 
3.6.4 Country, industry or firm specific 
Pivovarsky (2003), an example of country specific research, investigates empirically the 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance across 376 [partially and fully 
privatised] Ukrainian firms in 1998. Pivovarsky finds that ownership concentration is positively 
associated with performance; in the context of total factor productivity (TFP), material input cost 
[per unit of revenue] and labour productivity.87  Matraves and Rodriguez (2005) analyse the 
relationship between product and geographic diversification and profitability in leading German and 
UK firms – between the years 1987 and 1993.  They link the level of product and geographic 
diversification of firms to industry-specific and firm-specific factors.  The impact of the SMP and 
industry type is found to be important in explaining diversification levels. 
 
Matraves (1999) is an example of [non-banking and non-manufacturing] industry specific research, 
specifically the market structure of the global pharmaceutical industry.  The evidence finds that 
there is no systematic pattern in changing market shares at the EU level, however concentration has 
significantly increased at the global level.  Størdal (2004), studies the market structure and 
concentration of the Norwegian forestry sector using round-wood sales data in 1996 and 2000;  
finding that there is no evidence of increased competition after estimating the HHI.  Colla (2004) 
analyses the literature encompassing retail trends across Europe; providing a qualitative review of 
format evolution and competition amongst grocery retail firms.  Mateus and Moreira (2007) also 
provide a qualitative review of competition and antitrust enforcement with respect to Portugal. 
 
Barros, Brito et al. (2006), an example of firm specific research, provide an ex ante evaluation of 
the potential merger of two Portuguese retailing groups by estimating the HHI [pre and post euro].  
In contrast, Keller (2010) calculates the HHI to analyse the competition effects in the German 
electricity market; resulting from the acquisition of three regional utilities by a Swedish firm. 
 
                                                 
87 See Aghion, Braun and Fedderke (2008) for a comparison of TFP results in South Africa. 
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3.7 Concluding remarks 
Competition is a function of the health of the firm, industry and overall economy.  Generally 
speaking, the health of a firm is measured by revenue growth, market share, profitability, liquidity 
and solvency.  The health of an industry can also be captured by the same firm explanatory 
variables (profitability, liquidity and solvency) consolidated at the industry level.  However, 
contemporary economic theorists have come to appreciate the importance of viewing market 
concentration as the outcome of the competitive process – rather than just an exogenously given 
determinant of competition.  Hence, market structure is a denouement of economic forces [where 
firms choose to enter or exit], ultimately expanding or contracting the scale of their operations. 
 
When analysing these economic forces, industrial economists endeavour to explain the number and 
size distributions of firms.   Typically, the larger the number of market participants, the more 
vigorous and robust the competition.  The competitive process will yield maximum benefits when 
there is a greater balance of power between buyers and sellers.  The theoretical model in this 
chapter highlights that if an industry becomes more competitive, market concentration (and 
profitability) decreases.  Consequently, if market concentration increases this suggests that 
competition in the industry decreases.  The following two chapters will explore competition and its 
impact on market structure and firm profitability; in context to the introduction of the euro. 
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CHAPTER 4: Market Concentration and the Euro 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the last thirty years, the EU has been committed to critical transformative change to the 
product market; with notable reforms including the SMP and Lisbon agenda, as discussed in 
Section 2.1.  The product market reforms have included the dismantling of barriers to trade, 
resulting in the liberalisation of many industries [e.g. telecommunications, electricity, gas, transport 
and postal services].  Fundamentally, what is of interest in this thesis is whether the currency union 
of the European region has actually delivered with respect to creating a more [price] transparent, 
open and consequently competitive market.  The purpose of this chapter is to assess the impact that 
the introduction of the euro has had on market structure across the EU and its member states. 
 
Market structure consists of a collection of factors that determine how buyers and sellers interact in 
a market, how prices change, and how different levels of the production and selling processes 
function; as summarised in Section 3.1.  Market structures are typically classified with respect to 
the ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ of competition.  When competition is absent, the market is believed to 
be concentrated; and when competition is present, the market is believed to be unconcentrated.  
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4-1.  Generally speaking, the larger the number of market 
participants, the more vigorous and robust the competition.  Hence, the competitive process will 
yield maximum benefits when there is a greater balance of power between buyers and sellers. 
 
Figure 4-1: Market structure, concentration and competition 
 
 
Source: the author 
 
Market power refers to conditions where the providers of a product can consistently charge prices 
above those that would be established by a competitive market, as demonstrated in Section 3.2.  
Davis and Garcés (2010, p. 287) state that “…there is a long tradition of inferring the extent of 
market power from structural indicators of (an) industry”.  Competition policy relies on structural 
indictors for an initial assessment of the extent to which market power exists within a specified 
market (see Section 3.5). 
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Although the importance of using structural indicators has gradually decreased over time [due to the 
expanding use of detailed industry analysis], their use as an indicator remains important among 
practitioners and decision-makers.  This is largely due to the simplicity and direct relationship to 
economic theory, as outlined by the Cournot oligopoly model in Section 3.2. 
 
There are several methods of measuring market structure, as summarised in Section 2.5.  In 
particular, concentration indices are the simplest and most often used to assess the depth of 
competition and the presence of a market power.  One of the abundantly used indicators of market 
concentration is the HHI, as explored in detail in Section 3.4.  The HHI has been estimated for eight 
different market definitions, as defined in Appendix A1.2.  In this chapter, the HHI is used to assess 
the policy objective of the EMU with respect to increased competition.  A more transparent and 
open economy in Europe should result in an increase in competition and therefore a decrease in the 
HHI. 
 
As discussed is Section 3.6, most analysis to date focuses specifically on industries within countries 
and not across countries; with the exception of Lyons, Matraves et al. (2001).  Furthermore, there 
has been no research to date that investigates pre and post EMU market concentration, with the 
exception of the banking industry to which an extensive body of work has been published.88  This 
chapter endeavours to abate this research gap. 
 
Despite its shortcomings, concentration indices are frequently employed in IO empirical literature.89  
Some studies endeavour to explain differential concentration across industries.  Differential 
concentration refers to the different levels of market concentration across industries [i.e. 
variation].90  Other researchers analyse changes in the levels of concentration over time.91  To 
capture the change in the level of competition of the countries participating in the EMU, it is 
important to identify the determinants of competition; in order to isolate the impact the currency 
union has had on overall market structure.  Economic theory does not provide any firm predictions, 
however it is generally hypothesised that changes in industry concentration can be explained by a 
                                                 
88 See Bikker and Haaf (2002b), Berger, Demerguc-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich (2004) and Gilbert (1984) for a review of the banking literature. 
89 Caves and Porter (1980); Berger (1995); Goldberg and Rai (1996); Gilbert (1984); Evanoff and Fortier (1988); Casu and Girardone (2006) 
90 Hart and Clarke (1980); Strickland and Weiss (1976); Sawyer (1971); Porter (1974); Pashigian (1969); Lyons (1980); Guth (1971); Greer (1971); 
Comanor and Wilson (1967); Saving (1961); Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator and Shrieves (1973); Chou (1988); Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and 
Ford Voeks (2002); Ratnayake (1999); Bhattacharya and Chen (2009) 
91 Hart and Clarke (1980); Gratton and Kemp (1977); Evely and Little (1960); Wright (1978); Weiss (1963a); Shepherd (1964); Shepherd (1972a); 
Shepherd (1966); Porter (1974); Nelson (1960); Mueller and Rogers (1980); Mueller and Hamm (1974); Kamerschen (1968); George (1967); 
Duchesneau (1974); Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975); Davies and Geroski (1997) 
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number of variables such as barriers to entry, size of the market and scale economies.  The 
determinants of concentration are explored in detail in the preceding section.  
 
4.2 The model 
Caves and Porter (1980) argue that explaining changes in market concentration by past levels of 
market structure variables is critical in ensuring that the industries accounted for are in the process 
of adjusting into a disequilibrium situation.  Whereas Ornstein, Weston et al. (1973, p. 612) 
highlight that differential market concentration and changes in market concentration “…should be 
related since, if a set of variables explains a high percentage of variation in differential 
concentration, the time rate of change of these variables should also explain changes in 
concentration over time, and conversely”.  Ergo, the empirical model for differential market 
concentration will be approximated and defined by the following function: 
),,,,,,,( ijkjkjiiiiij SizeBEGRINVADVKRESfCR π=  (4.2–A) 
 
The dependent variable CRj represents market concentration of an industry; which is typically is 
measured by a k-firm concentration ratio (e.g. C4, C5, C8) and/or the HHI as discussed extensively 
in Section 3.4.  Furthermore, the explanatory variables are as follows (including the postulated sign 
of the coefficient in brackets): 
π = Profitability of firm i (+), 
ES = Economies of scale of firm i (+), 
KR = Initial capital requirements of firm i (+), 
ADV = Advertising of firm i (+), 
INV = Innovation of firm i (+), 
GR = Growth of industry j (+), 
BE = Protectionism of industry j and/or country k (+), and 
Size = Size of firm i (+), industry j (-), and/or country k (-). 
 
4.2.1 Profitability 
There have been many studies undertaken which investigate the relationship between market 
concentration and profitability. 92  The price-cost margin (PCM) of an industry is commonly used 
to measure the degree of monopoly power (Feinberg 1980; Chou 1988).   Industries that exhibit 
                                                 
92 Bain (1951a); Phillips (1976); Jacquemin, Ghellinck and Huveneers (1980); Kilpatrick (1968); Dalton and Penn (1976); Lambson (1987); Kwoka 
(1981); Mann (1966); Brozen (1971a); Ravenscraft (1983); Smirlock (1985) 
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high levels of market concentration are believed to exhibit prices above that of the competitive 
equilibrium.   Therefore it follows that profits within those industries are higher, and therefore 
positively correlated with market concentration. On the other hand, a market may be under-
performing (in the context of ROI) due to poor strategic and operational leadership. 
 
Seasoned investors and entrepreneurs will enter the market with the sole purpose of optimising the 
portfolio and therefore maximising the profitability potential of the firm [i.e. return to shareholders].  
Therefore, profitability in a prior period will impact the market concentration in future periods, 
given that investors will be attracted to exploiting the opportunities in the market.  Hence investors 
and entrepreneurs will enter the market in the current period based on the profit generated in 
previous periods as this provides an indicator of potential return on investment in the future.  In 
other words, investors and entrepreneurs would like a slice of the ‘profit’ pie. 
 
4.2.2 Economies of scale 
The basic theory of market structure suggests that market concentration is determined by economies 
of scale relative to the size of the market (see Lyons, Matraves et al. 2001).  If a market has 
significant economies of scale that has already been exploited and maximised (i.e. optimised) by the 
incumbents, new entrants will be consequently deterred from entering the market.  Therefore, 
economies of scale are considered a barrier to entry.  Many studies highlight the importance of 
[plant] economies of scale as a determinant of the levels of market concentration, suggesting 
statistical significance and positive correlation.93 
 
MES is commonly used as a proxy for economies of scale (see Section 3.2).  Empirical research 
typically includes MES as explanatory variable when determining market concentration.  Small 
values of MES indicate lower levels of market concentration and vice versa (see Caves, 
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi et al. 1975).  Geroski, Masson et al. (1987) find that levels of concentration in 
the long run are largely determined by MES.  Caves and Porter (1980) find that MES is positive, 
however not statistically significant.  In contrast, MES are both positive and statistically significant 
according to Guth (1971), Porter (1974), Levy (1985), Kessides (1990), Ratnayake (1999), and 
Bhattacharya and Chen (2009).  Whereas Chou (1988)  produces mixed results. 
 
                                                 
93 Hart and Clarke (1980); Strickland and Weiss (1976); Sawyer (1971); Porter (1974); Pashigian (1969); Lyons (1980); Guth (1971); Greer (1971); 
Comanor and Wilson (1967); Saving (1961); Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator and Shrieves (1973); Jacquemin, Ghellinck and Huveneers (1980).  
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4.2.3 Initial capital requirements 
Empirical research validates the proposition that initial capital requirements (ICR) are positively 
correlated with market concentration, given that higher set-up costs will result in higher barriers to 
entry; and therefore a higher level of market concentration.94 Comanor and Wilson (1967) and 
Porter (1974) find that ICR is positive and statistically significant.  Guth (1971) also suggests that 
ICR is positive and ‘predominantly’ statistically significant.  Whereas, Mueller and Rogers (1980) 
discover that ICR is negative and statistically significant;  Greer (1971) finds that ICR is not 
significant; and Bhattacharya and Chen (2009) present mixed results. 
   
4.2.4 Advertising 
Advertising is considered a sunk cost, and can be a barrier to entry in the context that heavy 
investment in advertising [by an existing firm] may signal to incumbents the requirement to match 
this expenditure.  This would be costly and therefore associated with significant risk.  Although it 
has long been argued that advertising performs a useful social function by providing consumers 
information about product price, quality and availability.95  This type of ‘advertising investment’ is 
in the form of product placement and awareness.  However, this does not mean that firms are 
unmotivated to invest in advertising with the intention of creating future barriers to entry for 
potential incumbents: given that advertising signals investment in a product, much like research and 
development.  As a result, a number of studies have included a measure of advertising when 
attempting to explain the determinants of various concentration measures.96   
 
Typically, an advertising-to-sales ratio (also known as advertising intensity) is used as an 
explanatory variable when modelling for market concentration. 97  A vast body of empirical 
research suggests that advertising has a positive and significant effect on industry level 
concentration, and as a result, questions the view that advertising is not motivated by predatory 
behaviours pertaining to firms protecting their market share.98  Lynk (1981) and Eckard (1991) find 
that advertising is significant, however negatively correlated with concentration.  Strickland and 
                                                 
94 Porter (1974); Guth (1971); Greer (1971); Comanor and Wilson (1967); Bhattacharya and Chen (2009) 
95 Demsetz (1979); Nelson (1974); Stigler (1961); Telser (1964) 
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and Rogers (1980); Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator and Shrieves (1973); Strickland and Weiss (1976); Weiss (1963a); Mueller and Hamm (1974); 
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Weiss (1976) and Mueller and Rogers (1980) also determine that advertising is significant, however 
positively correlated with concentration.  Telser (1964), Ekelund and Maurice (1969), Telser 
(1969), Guth (1971), Porter (1974), Nelson (1975), Gratton and Kemp (1977), Jenny and Weber 
(1978), Asch (1979), Hart and Clarke (1980), Levy (1985), Eckard (1987) and Delorme, 
Kamerschen et al. (2002) discover that advertising as an explanatory variable was not significant.  
Guth (1971), Metwally (1977) and Ornstein (1977) produce mixed results. 
 
4.2.5 Innovation 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1939; 1950; 1954) is famous for his theory explaining the activities that 
lead to economic growth in capitalist economies.  Schumpeter argues that competition among 
market participants stimulates a desire to innovate, which utlimately increases profit margins.  The 
Schumpeterian hypothesis proposes that innovation that is successful is related to changes in market 
structure; and has consequently stimulated an extensive body of work that examines this 
proposition.99  For example, Acs and Audretsch (1987) find that large firms tend to have the relative 
innovation advantage in industries which are captial intensive, highly concentrated and heavily 
unionised.  Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) stipulate a competitive model in which innovation 
opportunities fuel entry; and relative failure prompts exit of firms in a market.  Blundell, Griffith et 
al. (1999) examine the empirical relationship between technological innovation, market share and 
stock value.  They find a robust and positive effect of market share on innovation, although 
increased product market competition in an industry tends to stimulate innovative activity.100 
 
Research and development (R&D) data represents inputs into innovative activities and outputs from 
innovative activities are reflected in innovation data or patent data (Cohen and Levin 1989; Ahn 
2002).  As a proxy of innovation, high levels of R&D expenditure are considered a barrier to entry 
to new incumbents.  Also, when a firm invests in R&D, this signals to potential market entrants that 
the existing firm has large financial reserves.  In order for an incumbent to be competitive, matching 
or exceeding the investment in R&D will be critical in order to compete in the future.  Hence, high 
R&D expenditure is likely to deter entry into an established market (for example, chemical and 
pharmaceutical).  
 
                                                 
99 Koeller (1995); Nelson and Winter (1978); Siddharthan (1984); Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980); Levin and Reiss (1984); Cohen and Levin (1989); 
Lunn (1986); Lunn (1989); Winter (1984); Acs and Audretsch (1987); Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999); Mansfield (1963); Reekie 
(1981); Samuelson and Nordhaus (1998); Etro (2009) 
100 This supports the notion that the SCP paradigm [discussed in Section 2.5] is not a one-way casual relationship. 
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The vast body of research finds mostly inconclusive and mixed results. 101  Whereas, Waldman and 
Jensen (1998) suggest that increases in R&D expenditure leads to an increase in market 
concentration.  Kambhampati and Kattuman (2009) find that lagged values of R&D are statistically 
significant and positively correlated with market concentration.  This supports the notion that highly 
innovative industries tend to be more concentrated as they mature.  Koeller (1995) and Delorme, 
Kamerschen et al. (2002) produced mixed, although mostly significant results; when accounting for 
innovation as a determinant of market concentration.  It is also important to note that the research 
suggests that innovation and market structure are jointly endogenous aspects of competition (Levin 
and Reiss 1984; Winter 1984; Koeller 1995).   
 
In a paper examining the dynamics of market shares underlying the changes in market 
concentration, Davies and Geroski (1997, p. 389) state that “…advertising and, to a lesser extent, 
R&D and innovation play a major role in affecting the dynamics of market shares and, therefore, in 
affecting both concentration levels and industry turbulence.  However, these effects are complex 
and multifaceted, and are more clearly identified when working at the disaggregated level of 
individual market shares rather than at the aggregate industry level”. 
 
4.2.6 Growth 
Market concentration is dependent upon the relative growth rates of firms, hence industry growth is 
typically used as a proxy of total market demand.102  A higher level of revenue growth is likely to 
signal to potential incumbents that the industry is able to accommodate the entry of more firms, and 
therefore result in a reduction of concentration (Nelson 1960; Mueller and Rogers 1980).  In a 
contracting market, firms are more likely to face cost pressures and consequently profitability will 
fall; particularly due to the inability to re-negotiate fixed costs in the short-term (i.e. wages, 
occupancy costs etc).  As a result, potential incumbents will be discouraged in entering the market 
as the profit potential of firms is no longer an apealling incentive. 
 
In earlier empirical research, industry growth is used as a determinant of ‘changes’ in concentration; 
providing very mixed results.  Nelson (1960) finds positive support that market growth leads to 
lower concentration.  Whereas Evely and Little (1960) and Shepherd (1966) find that [output and 
                                                 
101 Gratton and Kemp (1977); Greer (1971); Guth (1971); Hart and Clarke (1980); Mueller and Rogers (1980); Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator and 
Shrieves (1973); Strickland and Weiss (1976); Asch (1979); Gisser (1991); Eckard (1987); Jenny and Weber (1978); Levy (1985); Mann, 
Henning and Meehan (1967); Marcus (1969); Metwally (1977); Mueller and Hamm (1974); Mueller and Rogers (1984); Nelson (1975); Ornstein 
(1977); Telser (1964); Telser (1969); Tremblay (1985); Wright (1978); Ekelund and Maurice (1969); Weiss (1963a) 
102 Bhattacharya and Chen (2009); Berger (1995); Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator and Shrieves (1973) 
 91 
employment] growth and concentration are not inversley associated.  Shepherd suggests that more 
growth ‘may’ be associated with more concentration.  However, George (1967) disagrees with 
Shepherd, supporting the ‘negative correlation hypothesis’ when using the same UK dataset 
between the years of 1951 and 1958.  Using a US dataset from 1947 and 1958, Shepherd (1964) 
finds empirical support for the negative relationship to be modest.  Although between 1958 and 
1963, Shepherd (1972a) finds that growth rates do not appear to be associated with changes in 
concentration. 
 
Kamerschen (1968) findings do not support the negative relationship proposition when using 
shipment data.  Mueller and Hamm (1974) find industry growth tends to exert a negative impact on 
market concentration.  Sawyer (1971) and Hart and Clarke (1980) find industry growth to be 
statistically significant and negatively correlated to concentration. Greer (1971), Porter (1974), 
Gratton and Kemp (1977), Wright (1978), Mueller and Rogers (1980), Caves and Porter (1980), 
Levy (1985), and Bhattacharya and Chen (2009) find that although industry growth is negatively 
correlated to concentration, it is not [consistently] statistically significant.  Duchesneau (1974) finds 
industry growth to be positively correlated, however not significant. And Ornstein, Weston et al. 
(1973) finds mixed results as the signs vary across the different equations estimated. 
 
Hart and Prais (1956) suggest that smaller firms grow faster and that they are less likely to survive. 
Hart (1962) offers some evidence on the rates of growth of small and large firms in the UK.  
Mansfield (1962) finds that smaller firms have higher and more variable rates of growth.  Lucas and 
Prescott (1971) and Lucas (1978) imply that firms should grow in proportion to their size, with 
respect to adjustment costs and constant returns to scale.  These findings conflict with the 
adjustment costs theory in which all firms grow at the same rate; and where failure does not happen 
(see Jovanovic 1982).  Whereas Simon and Bonini (1958) and Hymer and Pashigian (1962) find 
that no relationship between the size of firms and their growth rate exists.  And more recently, Hart 
and Oulton (1996) find mixed results. 
 
4.2.7 Firm size 
Holmes and Stevens (2002) most eloquently state that “the connection between size and 
concentration is stronger than what we would expect to find if [firms] were randomly distributed 
like darts on a board”.  Typically, firm size is measured by market share, as defined by Equation 
(3.3–A) in Section 3.3.  Davies and Geroski (1997) find that changes in market share of surviving 
firms are the dominant influence on changes in concentration.  Whilst concentration may appear to 
be fairly stable, this stability can conceal considerable turbulence in market shares among leading 
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firms.  Also, when there are a small number of market players, it also becomes much easier for 
pricing policies to be observed; that may create a ‘perceived’ transparency of collusive behaviour 
i.e. price fixing and signalling (see Spanos, Zaralis et al. 2004).  George (1967) finds that there is a 
strong positive association with between the degree of concentration and the average size of a firm 
[plant].  In contrast, Mueller and Rogers (1980) use a proxy for industry size (rather than firm size); 
and find that it is mostly negative and statistically significant. 
 
In addition to firm size, the number of firms in an industry is also inversely correlated with market 
concentration (as discussed in Section 3.4).  Changes in market size due to an increase in consumer 
demand will reduce market concentration, due to new firms entering the market to exploit potential 
profit opportunities.  Thus, the number of firms in an industry is often adopted as an independent 
variable (for example, see Caves and Porter 1980).  Ornstein, Weston et al. (1973) highlights that 
concentration is negatively correlated with market size and therefore directly related to optimum 
firm size; whilst the number of firms is directly related to market size and negatively correlated with 
optimum firm size.103  Therefore market concentration and firm size are interchangeable measures 
of market structure (Pashigian 1969). 
 
4.2.8 Protectionism 
The relationship between trade policy and industry concentration has been investigated Van Long 
and Soubeyran (1997; 1999).104  Trade variables are often used as a proxy for protectionism.  The 
relationship between market concentration and firm export behaviour is mixed and inconclusive.  
Some researchers (Chou 1988; Ratnayake 1999) include export intensity as an explanatory variable 
of concentration; which is typically measured by dividing industry (j) exports by firm (i) sales.  The 
same applies to import intensity, which is also measured by dividing industry (j) imports by firm (i) 
sales.  Bhattacharya and Chen (2009) included both import intensity and exports intensity as an 
explanatory variable of concentration.  Neither of the variables was found to be significant.   
 
Competition may become more intense within an industry due to a reduction in the barriers to entry.   
As a result, the market expands allowing for more firms to enter the market.  Eventually, some 
firms are competed out of the market; and the net affect is an increase in the number of rivals that 
exist in the endlessly evolving ‘new-world order’ that is faced by firms.  Hence, it is suggested that 
                                                 
103 Pashigian (1968b) formulates that in the long-run for perfectly competitive markets, the number of firms and level of concentration are determined 
by the unique optimum firm size relative to the market size.  The optimum size of a firm is defined by the minimum average costs in light of the 
total economic environment: see Saving (1961). 
104 The empirical analysis centres on how optimal export taxes and subsidies are linked to demand elasticities and the HHI. 
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market concentration and the volume of market participants are inversely correlated, however not 
perfectly due to the unequal size distribution of firms among industries (Ornstein, Weston et al. 
1973; Ratnayake 1999).  Therefore, variations in concentration and firm participants are a function 
of relative changes in the market size and economies of scale. 
 
4.2.9 Other indicators 
When assessing the health of a country’s economy, the key performance indicators taken into 
consideration include commodity prices, economic growth, exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, 
stock prices, unemployment rate, money supply, government spending and international trade. 
These economic indicators provide an overview of an economy’s wealth, stability, protectionism, 
sustainability and confidence.  Typically, empirical research has omitted country indicators with the 
exception of trade variables i.e. imports and exports (Chou 1988). 
 
4.3 Data sources and variable selection 
The model will be estimated using annual data over a twenty-one year time period (from 1987 to 
2007).  The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  The countries selected are based on their 
membership in the EU and the EMU, as summarised in Appendix A1.1. 
 
The data extracted from OSIRIS includes 12,348 firms: 42% of the firms (5,209 firms) in the euro-
zone, 22% are in the continental-zone (2,667 firms), and the UK-zone consists of 36% (4,472 
firms).  The three zones are defined in Appendix A1.1 (see Table A1-1).  The data is also separated 
into three time periods: pre-1992, single-market and the euro-era, which are defined in Appendix 
A1.3.  Interestingly, there are 262 firms that contain 21 years of sales data.  This includes 3.7% of 
euro-zone firms, 2.1% of continental-zone firms, and 0.3% of UK-zone firms.  The number of firms 
[identified based on the presence of sales data] by zone is shown in Figure 4-2.  The number of 
firms in both the euro-zone and continental-zone increased every year from 1988 to 2007, with the 
exception of 2001 and 2002 (three years post euro launch in 1999).  
 
In the UK-zone, the only time periods that resulted in a decrease in the number of firms between the 
years of 1988 and 2007 were 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2007.  This reduction in firms was only 
marginal; at worst a 2.9 per cent drop in 1999 consisting of 52 firms exiting the market.  The 
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number of firms increased significantly by 40.2% in 1988 in the euro-zone and by 35.6% in the 
continental-zone in 1995.  During the single-market time period, the number of firms in the 
continental-zone increased year-on-year by more than 20%, with the exception of 1997 and 1998.  
In the earlier years of the single-market time period, specifically from 1992 to 1995, double-digit 
growth was also present in the UK-zone. 
 
 Figure 4-2: Number of firms (by zone) 
 
Source: the author 
 
In contrast, the number of firms also increased by double digits in the euro-zone, however this was 
from 1996 to 1999, impacting only the latter years of the single-market era.  In 2001, the number of 
firms in the euro-zone decreased by 3.0%.  However, within the euro-zone an increase was recorded 
in Finland (+0.7%), Ireland (+1.3%), Italy (+3.9%) and Portugal (+3.2%).  Furthermore, the results 
show that in 2002, Belgium (+3.4%), France (+1.5%), Luxembourg (+19.4%) and Portugal 
(+10.8%) recorded an increase in the number of firms in the euro-zone.  However, it was not 
enough to offset the reduction (-1.1%) of firms overall in the region. 
 
During the pre-1992 era, Belgium (-3.2% in 1989), Finland (-6.7% in 1990), France (-0.8% in 
1991), Germany (-1.0% in 1991) and Ireland (-6.1% in 1990) recorded a reduction in the number of 
firms in only one of the four years of that time period.  Netherlands was the only country that 
recorded a reduction in two of the four years as follows: 1990 (-5.2%) and 1991 (-2.3%).  During 
the single-market era, Italy (1992, 1994 and 1998) and Spain (1992 to 1994) generated negative 
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growth due to the number of firms exiting the market; which is three out of the seven years during 
this era.  The only reduction of firms for Greece between 1987 and 2001 was in 1989 at 10.0%. 
 
During the euro-era, Luxembourg was the only country to have a reduction in the number of firms 
in one out of the nine years, specifically -6.1% in 2001; followed by Belgium France, Italy and 
Portugal who experienced a reduction in firms in three of the years during this time period.  On the 
other end of the scale, Spain was the only country to have a reduction in the number of firms in six 
of the nine years – with the exception of 1999 (+3.4%), 2000 (+28.5%) and 2004 (+34.2%) where 
an increase occurred. 
 
Figure 4-3 highlights a significant increase in the number of firms in the both the continental-zone 
and euro-zone during the pre-1992 era, with an overall increase of 99.3% and 91.5% respectively.  
Furthermore, the continental-zone increased at the highest rate of 206.5% overall during the single-
market era, with a net of 766 firms entering the market.  The euro-zone and UK-zone also generated 
impressive increases of approximately 80%.  Interestingly, the increase in the number of firms is at 
its lowest levels during the euro-era; where the highest increase overall occurred in the continental-
zone (+44.2%), followed by the UK-zone (+23.9%), and euro-zone (+10.1%). 
 
Figure 4-3: Percentage change in the number of firms (by zone) 
 
Source: the author 
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This reason for the slow down in firm growth may be the result of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A).  A currency union increases the level of takeovers, as the stronger performing firms 
acquire the weaker performing firms or at least drive them out of the market.  Firms that fail to 
maximise value become a target, not just because the EMU has removed the barriers to cross-border 
mergers, but also because the cost of acquisitions has reduced significantly.  As highlighted by 
Mundell (1998): the bigger the currency area, the stronger and more efficient it is.  If resources are 
not utilised at maximum capacity, firms may no longer be protected due to a reduction in the 
barriers to entry (Mundell 2000a). 
 
According to the European Commission (1996), the intra-European share of world merger and 
acquisition activity increased by 9.9% from 1985 to 1987; and by 28.8% from 1991 to 1993. The 
number of EU mergers increased from 575 in 1984 to 1,159 in 1988 as highlighted by Schmittmann 
and Vonnemann (1992, p. 1026).  The number of mergers that included at least one of the top 1,000 
firms in the EU increased from 185 to 492: from 1984/85 to 1988/89 respectively (Jacquemin 1990, 
p. 544).  In the defence industry, the number of mergers and acquisitions that took place in the US 
were 95 compared to 40 in Europe between the years of 1980 to 1992 (see Reppy and Pilat 1994). 
 
In order to construct the concentration curve illustrated by Figure 3-5 in Section 3.3, the market 
share of firms has been calculated using the SALES variable obtained from OSIRIS (see Appendix 
A1.4) – as defined by Equation (3.3–A).  The mean market share has been calculated across the four 
SIC categories: division, major group, industry group and industry type – as defined by Table A1-2 
in Appendix A1.1.  The concentration curve for the firms located in the euro-zone for the three time 
periods [defined in Appendix A1.3] is illustrated in Figure 4-4. 
 
The concentration curves for the pre-1992 time period are consistently skewed higher than the 
single-market and euro-era time periods – with the exception of the division level.  The reason for 
this may be because the market definition at the one-digit SIC code is perhaps too broad in scope 
(i.e. too high level), given that there are only seven industry classifications.  Therefore the 
usefulness of the concentration curve at the division level is perhaps redundant, although it has been 
included below for full disclosure and completeness.   Interestingly, the concentration curves for the 
euro-era in the three-digit and four-digit SIC codes are marginally [albeit noticeably] lower than the 
single-market time period.  This suggests that the defined markets have [on average] become less 
concentrated after the introduction of the euro. 
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Figure 4-4: Concentration curve by industry classification [for the euro-zone] 
 
 
Source: the author 
 
The HHI is a measure of market concentration and is therefore used as a proxy for competition.  
The HHI is theoretically justified using the static Cournot model (see Section 3.2) as defined under 
Section 3.4.  The SALES variable is used to calculate the HHI as defined by Equation (3.4–A); 
where S is equal to the operating revenue/turnover of firm i.  The HHI has been calculated across 
eight different market definitions as discussed in Appendix A1.2. 
 
The mean HHI is summarised at both the country level and the zone level as shown in Table 4-1. In 
the euro-zone at the country level, the mean HHI has increased, with the exception of the one-digit 
SIC in both the single-market and euro-era time period, and at the two-digit SIC in the single-
market time period [where there is no change in the value of HHI].  The continental-zone also 
illustrates an increase in the mean HHI across all SIC code levels in both the single-market and 
euro-era time periods; with the exception of the one-digit SIC in the single-market era where there 
is a reduction of 4.9.   This suggests that the markets have become mostly more concentrated. 
 
In the euro-zone, the mean HHI is higher when calculated at the country level comparative to the 
zone level, with the exception of the four-digit SIC in the pre-1992 time period.   In contrast the 
results are quite mixed for the continental-zone.  In the UK, the mean HHI has reduced at all levels 
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of the SIC code when comparing the three time periods; with the exception of a marginal increase at 
the one-digit SIC in the euro-era (+3.4) and the four digit SIC in the single-market era (+1.7).  To 
conclude, the number of firms continued to increase (after the launch of the euro) in the euro-zone, 
albeit at a slower rate [as illustrated in Figure 4-3].   The concentration curves shown in Figure 4-4 
highlight that the cumulative mean market share of the top ten firms (in the euro-zone) has 
predominantly shifted downward during the euro-era time period.   In contrast, the mean HHI 
[summarised in Table 4-1] for the euro-zone suggests that the region is becoming more 
concentrated. 
 
Table 4-1: Mean HHI by geographic sector [and industry sector] 
Geographic sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC 
Two-digit 
SIC 
Three-digit 
SIC 
Four-digit 
SIC 
One-digit 
SIC 
Two-digit 
SIC 
Three-digit 
SIC 
Four-digit 
SIC 
EURO-ZONE 
Pre-1992 245 411 440 399 69 221 370 426 
Single-market 196 411 494 480 43 179 339 427 
Euro-era 163 433 528 562 35 150 306 385 
CONTINENTAL-ZONE 
Pre-1992 230 305 203 173 164 435 437 350 
Single-market 225 422 412 381 88 290 458 478 
Euro-era 245 440 495 514 78 246 426 481 
UK-ZONE 
Pre-1992 122 320 462 448  
Single-market 104 244 390 450 
Euro-era 108 232 370 446 
Source: the author 
 
To further investigate which countries are impacting the results, the mean HHI by country and year 
(at the four-digit SIC) is presented in Table 4-2.  The preferred market definition of HHI is at the 
four-digit SIC (by country).  The reason for this is that the one-digit SIC aggregates all the 
industries into ten categories; and is therefore too highly aggregated.  Whereas the four-digit SIC 
encompasses seven hundred and ninety-five industry categories.105  However in order to avoid any 
bias in the model based on the HHI measure selected, all eight definitions of market structure will 
be estimated; ensuring that the model is not sensitive [and remains robust] to any changes in market 
definition. 
 
 
                                                 
105 Refer to Appendix A1.1 for a summary of SIC code statistics; specifically Table A1-2. 
Not applicable 
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Table 4-2: Mean HHI at the four-digit SIC [by country and year]  
Time period PRE-1992 SINGLE-MARKET EURO-ERA 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EURO-ZONE 
Austria 244 261 256 318 350 398 469 486 497 541 634 662 636 630 617 571 582 562 591 588 603 
Belgium 293 296 356 376 393 413 431 481 556 524 535 559 604 572 502 532 577 617 593 598 564 
Finland 325 349 361 362 386 395 497 469 445 518 551 553 655 636 629 645 642 648 674 671 664 
France 484 474 475 463 471 501 499 513 520 532 534 555 570 558 566 571 580 564 561 558 552 
Germany 333 408 445 442 444 456 425 434 481 484 490 522 513 510 544 537 560 545 528 545 575 
Ireland 353 385 421 437 446 460 375 425 390 555 578 602 599 653 640 669 653 670 667 667 622 
Italy 195 277 246 296 295 275 287 332 401 438 455 419 466 491 525 532 518 530 557 585 603 
Luxembourg 53 53 105 70 97 123 215 241 297 267 354 375 359 385 397 475 520 593 552 670 667 
Netherlands 363 538 573 547 597 592 603 603 581 606 625 647 641 589 568 562 602 584 556 577 538 
Portugal 16 16 111 119 143 160 263 331 327 358 351 408 474 473 561 567 630 615 600 582 612 
Spain 234 335 357 389 421 346 368 355 348 372 406 456 493 530 518 518 522 560 571 564 572 
CONTINENTAL-ZONE 
Bulgaria          83 417 406 389 365 308 548 541 443 607 615 749 
Cyprus         12 11 41 41 41 27 27 33 282 169 376 468 469 
Czech Republic     10 10 192 306 428 504 570 552 605 576 421 286 261 220 248 183 200 
Denmark 156 280 322 409 446 512 572 557 566 564 558 544 571 610 612 608 552 544 539 570 576 
Estonia         83 83 134 147 180 595 637 806 888 841 885 757 751 
Greece 67 86 81 62 125 199 237 364 419 451 444 458 496 531 546 484 530 869 630 634 637 
Hungary 22 22 89 89 111 133 133 169 258 413 369 519 704 601 550 565 531 531 487 494 498 
Latvia        101 415 510 370 197 215 197 521 333 413 543 611 561 489 
Lithuania         106 56 91 137 133 194 192 556 653 720 763 810 812 
Malta         88 88 206 206 208 206 147 206 260 259 317 433 786 
Poland      125 125 106 102 148 175 343 337 341 353 393 484 523 539 536 616 
Romania           67 333 201 273 467 591 520 635 621 749 614 
Slovakia        189 198 178 326 557 575 459 501 562 559 559 674 634 524 
Slovenia       233 81 291 349 380 332 428 410 521 564 622 473 529 762 695 
Sweden 207 198 213 231 290 334 372 471 484 492 535 563 533 501 489 539 536 557 575 562 560 
Switzerland 349 408 429 455 417 437 430 485 453 502 541 549 568 575 559 597 617 611 616 619 630 
UK-ZONE 
UK 421 425 476 475 442 466 453 451 462 436 426 452 445 439 460 444 459 457 450 445 417 
Source: the author 
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There has been a reduction in the mean HHI during the euro-era for Austria (-5.3%),             
Belgium (-6.5%), France (-3.2%) and Netherlands (+16.1%).  Interestingly, there has been an 
increase in the mean HHI for Germany (+12.0%), Ireland (3.9%), Italy (+29.3%), Luxembourg 
(+86.0%), Portugal (+29.1%) and Spain (+16.3%).  As a proxy for competition, the HHI is 
impacted not only by the presence of price transparency introduced by the launch of the euro; but 
by the macroeconomic challenges faced by the member states.  Hence, the values of the HHI do not 
take into consideration country, industry and firm characteristics that influence a firm’s competitive 
position in the market.  The preceeding section endeavours to identify the key variables that may 
affect competition in an effort to isolate the impact of the introduction of the euro in 1999.  
 
To recap, the dependent variable in Equation (4.2–A) is the HHI, which has been calculated across 
eight different market definitions.  The determinants of market concentration have been discussed in 
detail in Section 4.2 and are further summarised below in Table 4-3.  In order to ascertain which 
variables should be included in the model, a correlation matrix is shown in Appendix A1 (see Table 
A1-4); which also outlines the comprehensive dataset that has been extracted from the various data 
sources.106  Most of the country indicators are highly correlated. 
 
The profitability measures are also highly correlated with one another given that they are all 
calculated using a common index relating to either assets or sales.  In order to reduce the level of 
multicollinearity amongst the variables, only one measure of profitability will be included in the 
model as an explanatory variable.  The profitability measure that will be included in the model as an 
independent variable is the return on sales (ROS), as defined in the next chapter (see Section 5.2.1).  
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) will also be substituted for the ROS in order to 
ensure robustness of the model.  This will confirm whether the model estimated is sensitive to the 
profitability measure selected. 
 
Industry growth will be captured as the percentage change on the previous period relative to the 
year, country and industry sector; as constructed in Appendix A1.4.  MES will be used as a proxy 
for capturing economies of scale.  MES is useful in determining the likely structure of a market.  
MES is measured by calculating the 50th percentile of sales (i.e. revenue) for an industry. The 
method of calculating MES is discussed in detail in Appendix A1.4.  Furthermore, the 75th 
                                                 
106 Those variables that are highly correlated suggest that the presence of multicollinearity in the data is highly likely. There are three alternatives to 
addressing multicollinearity in the specified model [see Studenmund (2011)].  The first option is to do nothing.  The second is drop redundant 
variables.  And the third option is to increase the size of the dataset.  Given that the size of the dataset is already quite large, the third option has 
already been exhausted. The second option to drop some insignificant variables is a feasible alternative given the number of variables available.  
However it is important to note that in doing so, this may generate omitted-variable bias in the estimated coefficients. 
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percentile of MES will also be included in the model as the alternative MES variable.  This will 
ensure robustness and sensitivity of the model estimated – irrespective of which MES variable is 
selected.107 
 
Table 4-3: Determinants of market concentration 
FIRM (i) variables  
Profitability Absolute profit, ROA, ROE, ROS 
Liquidity Current ratio 
Solvency Solvency ratio 
Initial Capital Requirements Absolute assets, Asset-to-sales ratio 
Economies of scale Minimum efficient scale (MES) 
Advertising Absolute advertising*, Advertising-to-sales ratio* 
Innovation Research and development* 
Size Market share 
INDUSTRY (j) variables  
Growth Revenue growth 
Size Revenue, Assets, Number of firms 
COUNTRY (k) variables  
Wealth GDP, GDP per capita, Tax revenue 
Stability CPI 
Sustainability FDI, GFCF, Market capitalisation, Portfolio 
equity, Portfolio investment, Government bond 
yield 
Size Population 
Protectionism Trade 
Other Unemployment 
* Variables unavailable due to inaccessibility of firm-wide dataset 
Source: the author 
 
The asset-to-sales ratio will be used to as a proxy for capturing ICR.  As discussed in Section 4.2, 
this is consistent with the research undertaken by Chou (1988).  In order to ensure sensitivity and 
robustness of the model, ‘absolute’ assets will also be used.  This is consistent with the research 
undertaken by Pashigian (1969).  It is important to note that when using ROA as a measure of 
profitability in the model, ‘absolute’ assets and the asset-to-sales ratio will be omitted as 
explanatory variables.  This will ensure that the error term is not serially correlated.  
 
                                                 
107 Industry growth and MES is calculated at the four-digit SIC code by country. 
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Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita will be used as a measure of economic health and 
(indirectly) country economies of scale.  GDP is the most commonly used measure to assess the 
wealth of an economy, despite its shortcomings, as discussed in Appendix A1.4.  GDP per capita 
measures the wealth of the wallet and therefore is also a proxy for country (economies of scale) 
size.  It is anticipated that GDP per capita will be negatively correlated with market concentration.  
The more wealth that exists in an economy suggests that there are more funds available to investors.  
As a result, entrepreneurs will exploit investment opportunities, which will increase the number of 
participants in the economic environment.  This investment will mean that there will be an 
expansion in the number of firms in an industry and therefore a reduction in market concentration. 
 
Consumer price index (CPI) will be included as an explanatory variable in the model.  One of the 
key measures of a country’s economic health is the stability of prices.  Instability in an economy 
may cause prices to rise or fall too fast.  Hence, this can cause further instability, and as a result 
losses in an economy.  The most commonly used measure of price stability is the CPI, which 
measures changes in the cost of living.  It is anticipated that CPI will be positively correlated with 
market concentration.  The higher the value of CPI in an economy (which is an indicator of an 
increase in prices) ultimately suggests economic instability.  A number of firms will exit the market 
due to the uncertain economic environment; which will result in fewer firms competing in the 
market.  Therefore, a reduction in the number of firms in an industry will result in an increase 
market concentration. 
 
The government bond yield will be used as a proxy for sustainability.108  It is anticipated that 
government bond yield will be positively correlated with market concentration.  The higher the 
government bond yield, the more expensive it is to borrow in a particular economy.  As a result, this 
creates a barrier to entry for potential investors; which ultimately discourages new market entrants.  
Therefore existing firms are unchallenged with respect to existing market share.  The summary 
statistics are presented in Table 4-4 of all the independent variables employed in this chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 Generally speaking, economic sustainability is the ability of an economy to support a defined level of economic production well into the future (i.e. 
ideally indefinitely, although unrealistic).  Economic sustainability is about ensuring an economy is ‘built to last’ and is therefore able to function 
efficiently over a long period of time.  Hence, economic sustainability can be captured by the potential future growth represented by investment 
(for example, in debt and equity securities); including foreign direct investment. 
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Table 4-4: Summary statistics of independent variables [for market concentration] 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
EU_MEMBER 0.88 0.33 0 1 
EURO_MEMBER 0.19 0.39 0 1 
GDP_PER_CAPITA 0.02 0.01 0 0.06 
CPI 0.09 0.02 0 0.15 
BOND_YIELD 0.01 0 0 0.27 
MES_50_PERCENTILE 0.36 0.4 -0.05 1 
MES_75_PERCENTILE 0.49 0.41 -1.67 1.05 
%_CHANGE_NO_OF_FIRMS 0.1 0.49 -1 14 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0 0.23 -0.03 30.61 
ROS 0.01 0.02 -0.1 0.1 
ROA 0 0.02 -0.1 0.1 
ROE 0.01 0.07 -1 0.99 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO 0 0.06 0 9.86 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS 4785.77 41099.53 0 2590923 
Source: the author 
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4.4 Estimation techniques 
Pooled cross-sections are very useful when evaluating the impact of a particular policy or event.  A 
natural experiment occurs when an exogenous event such as currency union, changes the 
environment in which individuals, firms, industries and countries operate.  A natural experiment 
always has a control group that is not affected by the change in policy.  Hence, the treatment group 
are those who are affected by the policy change; which in this case is the introduction of the euro.  
In order to account for systematic differences between the control and treatment groups, twenty-one 
years of data has been obtained; as discussed in Appendix A1.3. 
 
Two of the most commonly used techniques in panel data estimation are fixed effects and random 
effects (Baltagi 2008).  The difference between the fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) 
market concentration models generated is that the FE model accounts for firm fixed effects; which 
controls for omitted variables that are constant over time (Wooldridge 2000).  The use of firm fixed 
effects is dependent upon whether heterogeneity exists between the unobserved firm characteristics 
and the dependent variables; which is tested by the Hausman specification test (Wooldridge 2002). 
 
The Hausman test evaluates the significance of an estimator in contrast to an alternative estimator 
(see Hausman 1978).  The Hausman test identifies whether the coefficient estimates of a FE 
specification are different from a RE specification.  In all eight different definitions of market 
concentration, the FE estimates are significantly different from zero.  This implies that the FE 
methodology provides efficient and unbiased linear estimators. 
 
Hence, the model specification proposed follows a FE methodology and is determined by Equation 
(4.4–A).  All the variables selected, both dependent and independent, are time-varying. 
itititjtjt
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 (4.4–A) 
Where; 
EU_MEMBER = EU membership dummy for country k (-), 
EURO_MEMBER = EMU membership dummy variable for country k (-), 
GDPpC = GDP per capita of country k (-), 
CPI = Consumer price index of country k (+), 
YIELD = Government bond yield of country k (-), 
GR = Lagged revenue growth of industry j (-), 
MES = Minimum efficient scale of industry j (+), 
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PROFIT = Lagged ROS of firm i (-), 
ASSETS = Asset-to-sales ratio of firm i (+), and 
u = Unobserved fixed effects of firm i (+/-). 
 
Two dummy variables have been included in Equation (4.4–A) which captures a country’s 
membership in the EU (EU_MEMBER) and the EMU (EURO_MEMBER).  Lagged specifications 
of profitability (PROFIT) and industry growth (GR) are employed for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
possible endogeneity bias requires lagging the independent variables in the absence of good 
instrumental variables (refer to Leigh and Jencks 2007). 
 
Secondly, as discussed in Section 4.2, the profitability and industry growth variables are a signal to 
the market that there is potential value to be extracted for shareholders.  This signal relates to future 
periods, which will result in the redistribution of the ‘profit’ pie [when entrepreneurs and investors 
enter the market].  The criterion of how many lags will be used is based on the most robust results 
generated under the various specifications. Hence, adding and removing different variables 
including up to 4-year lags of PROFIT and GR will test robustness of the models estimated. 109 
 
The market concentration models estimated show evidence of heteroskedasticity.  
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the disturbance is not constant.  Heteroskedasticity 
does not affect the parameter estimates [i.e. the coefficients should be unbiased].  However, it does 
bias the variance of the estimated parameters.  Hence the t-values of the estimated coefficients 
cannot be trusted.  As a result, the market concentration models are estimated using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  This specification allows the standard errors to provide t-
statistics that are asymptotically Z distributed. 
 
The presence of multicollinearity in the data exists as shown in Table 4-5, which indicates that the 
main explanatory variables are highly correlated.  Almost all of the independent variables display 
multicollinearity, with the exception of lagged industry growth.  There are three methods in 
addressing the issue of multicollinearity: (1) do nothing, (2) drop redundant variables, and (3) 
increase the size of the dataset.   Given that the data set is already large, this is not a feasible option.  
Hence, many different combinations of dropping redundant variables have been undertaken.   This 
had little to no effect on the results of the models estimated.  Therefore, option three is the preferred 
alternative and all the independent variables remain in the estimated Equation (4.4–A).  As a result, 
                                                 
109 The selection of both lagged variables are consistent with the research undertaken by Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002). 
 106 
multicollinearity remains in the model, which generates large standard errors in the related 
independent variables. 
 
There is also evidence of serial correlation in the market concentration models under the Lagrange 
Multiplier test.110  The serial correlation causes the standard error of the coefficients to be smaller 
than they actually are; including a higher R-squared.  The results generated by the market 
concentration models reject the null hypothesis and therefore conclude that first-order 
autocorrelation exists. 
  
In order to confirm whether the models estimated are consistent with the extensive body of 
empirical literature discussed in Section 4.3, the OLS and RE estimation methods will also be 
applied using the same explanatory variables included in the FE specification defined in Equation 
(4.4–A).  Furthermore, time dummy variables will also be estimated employing the OLS functional 
form.  The correlation matrix of the independent variables selected to be included in the model is 
shown in Table 4-5. 
  
 
                                                 
110 To test for autocorrelation, a Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation discussed in Wooldridge (2002) is used; where strong serial correlation 
is indicated with a p-value of zero. 
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Table 4-5: Correlation coefficients of independent variables [for market concentration] 
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EU_MEMBER 1              
EURO_MEMBER 0.0846 1             
GDP_PER_CAPITA 0.2108 -0.0698 1            
CPI 0.0552 0.443 0.3583 1           
BOND_YIELD -0.1079 -0.508 -0.421 -0.8326 1          
MES_50_PERCENTILE -0.1064 0.0461 -0.1705 -0.0534 0.069 1         
MES_75_PERCENTILE -0.0899 0.0567 -0.1668 -0.0511 0.061 0.8759 1        
%_CHANGE_NO_OF_FIRMS 0.01 -0.0504 -0.0586 -0.0611 0.0483 -0.1295 -0.0828 1       
INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0.0015 -0.0063 -0.0002 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0115 0.0578 1      
ROS 0.0118 -0.0052 -0.0644 -0.0268 0.0371 -0.0761 -0.0844 0.0246 0.0014 1     
ROA 0.021 -0.0362 -0.0543 -0.0859 0.0733 0.0501 0.0565 0.0237 0.0004 0.5797 1    
ROE 0.0137 -0.0285 -0.037 -0.0549 0.0459 0.0156 0.0175 0.0213 0.0013 0.3664 0.6458 1   
ASSET_SALES_RATIO 0.0017 0.0146 -0.0179 0.0146 -0.0078 -0.0193 -0.0211 0.0003 0.0006 0.0463 -0.0192 -0.0036 1  
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS 0.0102 0.051 0.011 0.0455 -0.0415 -0.0629 -0.0657 -0.0039 -0.0002 0.0787 -0.0263 0.0121 0.0517 1 
Source: the author 
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4.5 Results 
The coefficient estimates for Equation (4.4–A) are summarised in Table 4-6; relating to the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) across all eight different market definitions.111  The EU dummy 
variable (EU_MEMBER) is not statistically significant in the FE model.112  This suggests that the 
SMP and the Lisbon agenda has not had a significant impact on increasing the level of competition 
within the EU, when taking firm fixed effects into consideration.  In contrast, being a participant in 
the EMU (EURO_MEMBER) is statistically significant across all eight different market 
definitions.113 
 
Generally speaking, this suggests that if a country has adopted the euro, market concentration (i.e. 
HHI) has decreased.  This inturn implies that competition has increased for those countries that are 
a member of the EMU over the time period [1999 to 2007] specified.  However, it is important to 
note that in the FE model the reduction in the coefficient of the HHI ranges from 9.40 to 59.03; 
which is quite small. As discussed in Section 3.5, proposed mergers in the EU are unlikely to be 
approved following firm consummation when market concentration is estimated as follows: 
- HHI is between 1,000 and 2,000 and the change in HHI is greater than 250 points; or 
- HHI is greater than 2,000 and the change in HHI is greater than 150 points. 
This means that movement in the HHI of at least 150 points would draw interest from the antitrust 
authorities, which is well below the threshold.  Interestingly, if the firms where operating in the US, 
values greater than 50 would be a cause for concern. 
 
The level of significance pertaining to the EURO_MEMBER variable may be directly related to the 
level of transaction costs associated with firms having to manage multiple currencies in their 
portfolio.  The introduction of the euro has removed the costs associated with firms managing (and 
hedging) risk associated with fluctuating exchange rates between Member States.  As a result, firms 
no longer have to make allowances on their balance sheet to cover any potential risk, given that it 
has been eliminated by the introduction of a single currency.  Hence, this implies that the removal 
                                                 
111 Appendix A2.1 shows the output generated for OLS with and without time dummy variables.  Furthermore, Appendix A2.2 summarises the 
coefficients estimated under panel estimation for RE. 
112 The model estimated for OLS highlights that being a member of the EU is statistically significant across all market definitions, with the exception 
of OLS by zone at the one-digit SIC (division); as shown in Appendix A2.1.  Furthermore, the EU dummy variable (EU_MEMBER) is not 
statistically significant in the RE model, with the exception of RE by country at the two-digit SIC (major group), as shown in Appendix A2.2.  
113 Under the RE model (see Appendix A2.2), being a participant in the EMU is statistically significant across all eight different market definitions: 
with the exception of the two-digit SIC (major group) by country and four-digit SIC (industry type) by country.  The postulated sign of the 
coefficients in the OLS models are mixed for the euro dummy variable (EURO_MEMBER): see Appendix A2.1.  When defining the geographical 
region by country, the HHI is positive.  Whereas when this is defined by zone, the HHI is negative. 
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of these transaction costs may have enabled firms to become [much more] price competitive; and 
therefore the level of competition has increased within the EMU. 
 
The asset-to-sales ratio does not appear to be ‘consistently’ statistically significant across all eight 
different market definitions.  This is supports the research undertaken by Bhattacharya and Chen 
(2009) who also presented mixed results.  When adding lags to the asset-to-sales ratio or omitting 
the variable completely from the model, there is no material change to the statistical significance.114  
Also, when substituting the asset-to-sales ratio for the ‘absolute’ assets variable there is no 
statistical improvement in the model (see Appendix A2.4 – Table A2-9).115  In all three alternative 
scenarios, there is no change to the statistical significance of the EU and EMU membership 
variables. 
 
The results suggest that initial capital requirements are not a barrier to entry within the EU.  
However, given the non-generic nature of the asset-to-sales ratio and ‘absolute’ assets proxy, this 
may not fairly reflect the level of investment required to enter a specific market.  As discussed in 
Section 2.5, due to the dependency of the data having a direct relationship with the accounting 
treatment (i.e. method) selected, this may distort the results.  This varied treatment specifically 
relates to the asset value creation and depreciation method selected by each individual firm.   
Therefore, further research is necessary to ascertain a more appropriate variable that accounts for 
the investment required to enter a specified market. 
 
The lagged ROS variable is not significant under the FE model, with the exception of the one-digit 
SIC (division) across countries.116  The results suggest that lagged profitability is not a leading 
indicator to entrepreneurs in the EU, regarding potential investment opportunities in a market.  
Much like the asset-to-sales variable, this may be due to the accounting treatment selected by a 
firm; which can distort the profit results.  However as discussed in Section 2.5 and the next chapter, 
investors and analysts use these ‘profit’ key performance indicators; to ascertain firm performance, 
                                                 
114 Refer to Appendix A2.3 for the FE model estimated with a ‘lagged’ assets proxy (see Table A2-4) and ‘omitted’ assets proxy (see Table A2-5). 
115 When substituting the asset-to-sales ratio for the ‘absolute’ assets variable, the initial capital requirements proxy becomes predominantly 
statistically significant across the OLS models: see Table A2-6 (OLS without t) and Table A2-7 (OLS with t).  Furthermore, there is no statistical 
improvement in the RE model: see Table A2-8. 
116 Lagged ROS is statistically significant under the OLS model generated, with the exception of OLS across zones at the two-digit SIC (major 
group): see Appendix A2.1 for the model estimated using OLS with time dummies (Table A2-2) and without time dummies (Table A2-1).  This is 
consistent with the empirical research undertaken by Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002), whom find that only one of the three 
time periods (i.e. 1987) that were estimated for under OLS is statistically significant.  The lagged ROS variable is not significant under the RE 
model, with the exception of across countries at the two-digit SIC (major group) and across zones at the four-digit SIC (industry type).  Refer to 
the output of results in Appendix A2.2 as shown in Table A2-3. 
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market positioning and leadership assessment.  Therefore, further research is necessary to ascertain 
a more consist and generic [adjusted] profit measure across all industries, in order to ascertain 
unbiased comparability. 
 
When increasing the number of lags or adding additional lagged ROS variables, the statistical 
significance of ROS across the models only changes marginally.117  Interestingly there is no change 
to the statistical significance of the EU and EMU membership variables.118  According to the 
Hausman test, ROS becomes endogenous at two to four lags.  However, it is not endogenous at lag 
one across the eight different market definitions.   Hence lagged profitability of one year remains an 
explanatory variable in the model. 
 
When substituting the lagged ROS variable for lagged ROE, the EURO_MEMBER variable remains 
statistically significant.119  However lagged ROE is less significant across the eight market 
definitions of HHI when compared to the lagged ROS variable, when used as a proxy for 
profitability.  Furthermore, when including both profit variables in the model, the EURO_MEMBER 
variable continues to remain statistically significant.120  It is important to note that the measure of 
ROE directly relates to the ownership structure of a firm.  Therefore, depending on how a firm is 
funded, this balance sheet variable will vary across firms.  Hence, the lagged ROS variable is a 
more appropriate proxy for measuring profitability in the market concentration model. 
 
When substituting the lagged ROS variable for lagged ROA, the EURO_MEMBER variable 
remains statistically significant. 121  However lagged ROA is only significant at the country level for 
the divisional industry sector (which is at the one-digit SIC level).  The reason for this may be due 
to the inclusion of the asset-to-sales ratio that acts as a proxy for initial capital requirements.  Both 
ROA and the asset-to-sales ratio include ‘absolute’ assets in the measure calculated; which means 
multicollinearity is present. 
 
 
                                                 
117 Refer to Appendix A2.5 for alternative lagged profitability variables: year two lag (see Table A2-10), year three lag (see Table A2-11), and year 
four lag (see Table A2-12) 
118 This is also the case when omitting the lagged profitability variable from the model, as shown in Appendix A2.5: see Table A2-13. 
119 Refer to Appendix A2.6 for the model estimated with ROE as a proxy for profit; specifically Table A2-14. 
120 Refer to Appendix A2.6 for the model estimated with both ROE and ROS as a proxies for profit; specifically Table A2-15. 
121 Refer to Appendix A2.7 for the model estimated with ROA (including assets) as a proxy for profit: see Table A2-16. 
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Table 4-6: Market concentration model – panel with fixed effects (FE) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -10.61 -29.07 -7.86 -7.85 4.43 6.30 7.50 3.68 
 (-0.72) (-0.92) (-0.65) (-0.78) (1.50) (1.02) (0.62) (0.32) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.36*** -59.03** -29.83*** -20.68*** -11.64*** -9.40*** -11.76** -18.40*** 
 (-6.78) (-2.29) (-5.42) (-4.21) (-7.64) (-2.84) (-2.19) (-3.39) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.15 -3.53 -1.81 -2.37 0.27 -0.38 -3.89** -4.32** 
 (-1.28) (-0.94) (-1.09) (-1.57) (0.67) (-0.46) (-2.35) (-2.33) 
CPI -0.66* -13.37*** -1.47*** -1.62*** 0.38*** -0.01 0.28 0.38 
 (-1.73) (-3.74) (-2.94) (-3.61) (3.10) (-0.05) (0.63) (0.83) 
BOND_YIELD 7.66*** 15.75 0.77 0.54 2.77*** 1.67 6.07*** 6.19*** 
 (6.12) (0.58) (0.43) (0.35) (3.95) (1.63) (3.19) (3.33) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.70*** 100.49*** 304.60*** 399.75*** 6.71*** 46.23*** 138.98*** 236.72*** 
 (5.56) (4.13) (27.74) (38.54) (4.25) (8.30) (14.71) (22.24) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.43*** 3.80 2.84*** 4.30*** 0.14 3.13 6.27* 7.31* 
 (5.38) (0.58) (2.59) (2.74) (0.83) (1.21) (1.65) (1.68) 
LAGGED_ROS -48.59* 240.59 41.76 18.68 -10.76 -9.11 39.63 21.17 
 (-1.88) (0.51) (0.79) (0.37) (-0.68) (-0.32) (0.66) (0.34) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -35.93 1,075.35 65.46** 71.60** -9.66 60.70*** -8.15 9.42 
 (-1.05) (0.92) (2.18) (2.56) (-1.33) (3.32) (-0.10) (0.12) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0533 0.0032 0.1383 0.2291 0.0446 0.0450 0.0342 0.0642 
Adjusted R2 0.0529 0.0028 0.1379 0.2288 0.0442 0.0446 0.0337 0.0638 
Number of firms 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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When re-estimating the model to exclude the asset-to-sales ratio, the lagged ROA variable is 
predominantly statistically significant across the eight different market definitions estimated.122  
Furthermore, the results continue to remain qualitatively significant in relation to the 
EURO_MEMBER variable.  Lastly, when estimating the model to include both lagged ROS and 
lagged ROA (including and excluding the asset-to sales ratio) the statistical significance of the 
EURO_MEMBER variable remains consistent with the results estimated in Table 4-6.123 
 
Lagged industry growth produces mixed results, however the variables coefficient is positive across 
all the models estimated.124  This is not consistent with Greer (1971), Porter (1974), and 
Bhattacharya and Chen (2009) whom find the existance of a negative relationship with industry 
growth.  When increasing the number of lags, the statistical significance of industry growth across 
the models only changes negligibly.125  Interestingly, there is no change to the statistical 
significance of the EU and EMU membership variables. 
 
Therefore, the results suggest that lagged industry growth is not a leading indicator to entrepreneurs 
in the EU, regarding potential investment opportunities in a market.  Much like the profit variable, 
this may be due to the accounting treatment selected by a firm; which can distort the revenue results 
reported.  However as discussed in Section 2.5 investors and analysts use revenue growth (year-on-
year) as a critical key performance indicator of firm and industry performance.  Therefore, further 
research is necessary to ascertain a more consist and generic [adjusted] revenue measure across all 
industries, in order to ascertain unbiased comparability. 
 
MES is positive and statistically significant across all the models estimated.  This is consistent with 
the empirical research undertaken by Levy (1985), Kessides (1990), Ratnayake (1999) and 
Bhattacharya and Chen (2009).  The results suggest that economies of scale are a major source of 
market power in the EU.  Typically, endogeneity is an issue with MES because of the manner in 
which it is calculated [i.e. based on sales, which is used to construct the HHI].   Hence, when the 
MES variable is omitted from the model; there is no material change to the statistical significance 
relating to EMU membership.126  In other words, the coefficient value of the EURO_MEMBER 
                                                 
122 Refer to Appendix A2.7 for the model estimated with ROA (including assets) as a proxy for profit: see Table A2-17. 
123 Refer to Appendix A2.8 for the model estimated with both ROA and ROS as proxies for profit: specifically Table A2-16 (including assets) and 
Table A2-17 (excluding assets). 
124 Refer to Appendix A2.1 (OLS) and A2.2 (RE) for a comprehensive summary of the models estimated for Equation (4.4–A). 
125 Refer to Appendix A2.9 for the model estimated substituting alternative lagged industry growth variables: year two lag (see Table A2-20), year 
three lag (see Table A2-21), and year four lag (see Table A2-22). 
126 Refer to Appendix A2.10 for the model estimated excluding the MES variable at the 50th percentile; specifically Table A2-23. 
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variable is marginally reduced; however it still remains statistically significant across all the 
models.  However, due to the MES variable being omitted, the R-squared is reduced significantly. 
 
When substituting MES for the percentage change in the number of firms across all eight different 
market definitions, the results only change marginally.127  In contrast, when including the 
percentage change in the number of firms as an additional ‘entry-exit’ variable, the coefficient 
values of the MES variable only decrease marginally.128  As a result, the additional entry-exit 
variable is predominantly significant; however the MES variable remains statistically significant 
across all eight different market definitions.  Finally, when substituting 50th percentile MES for the 
75th percentile MES variable, the results do not change.129  In all three alternative scenarios, the 
EU_MEMBER variable remains statistically significant.  
 
Under the country definition of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the CPI is predominantly 
statistically significant, whereas the HHI across zones produces mixed results.130  Furthermore, the 
coefficients are mostly negatively correlated with market concentration.131  GDP per capita 
produces mixed results where the coefficients are mostly negative and not statistically 
significant.132  The government bond yield variable (BOND_YIELD) appears to produce mixed 
results as shown in Table 4-6.133 
 
Lagged ROS and lagged industry growth are predetermined variables; and therefore they are not 
endogenous.  This is further supported by the Hausman test (see Hausman 1978), which does not 
reject the null hypothesis that both these variables are exogenous.  Whereas the asset-to-sales ratio 
and the MES variables are both endogenous according to the Hausman test.  A frequently used 
technique to remove bias within a model caused by measurement errors in the data for one or more 
independent variables is to use an instrumental variable, which replaces an endogenous variable.  
As highlighted by Wooldridge (2000, p. 491), “…an instrumental variable must have two 
properties: (1) it must be exogenous, that is, uncorrelated with the error term of the structural 
                                                 
127 Refer to Appendix A2.11 for the models estimated substituting MES with the percentage change in the number of firms: see Table A2-25. 
128 Refer to Appendix A2.11 for the models estimated with both MES and the percentage change in the number of firms: see Table A2-26. 
129 Refer to Appendix A2.10 for the models estimated including the MES variable at the 75th percentile; specifically Table A2-24. 
130 CPI is predominantly statistically significant across the OLS model; however the sign of the coefficient is inconsistent [i.e. equally negative and 
positive].  Refer to Appendix A2.1 for the model estimated using OLS with (see Table A2-2) and without (see Table A2-1) time dummies. 
131 Refer to Appendix A2.2 for the models estimated using panel with FE and RE. 
132 GDP per capita is predominantly statistically significant with positive coefficients across all the OLS (see Appendix A2.1) and (see Appendix 
A2.2) RE models estimated. 
133 The government bond yield is predominantly statistically significant in the OLS models: see Appendix A2.1.  Interestingly, the coefficient across 
all the models estimated is predominantly positive: OLS, RE and FE. 
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equation; (2) it must be partially correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable.  Finding a 
variable with these two properties is often challenging”. 
 
Given the small R-squared summarised in Table 4-6, there is still substantial variation yet to be 
explained.  Other determinants of market concentration must be considered for inclusion in the 
model.  As highlighted by Levy (1985), “…further research is (also) warranted in devising better 
measures of scale economies and entry barriers and in distinguishing entry barrier effects from 
pure scale economy effects”.  Also, the role of technological innovation is also extremely important 
and should be taken into account when estimating a model of market concentration (see Nelson and 
Winter 1978).  
 
In order to improve the efficiency of the models shown in Table 4-6, the endogeneity of the asset-
to-sales ratio and MES variables are addressed by using the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel 
estimators.  Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimator that instruments the differenced variables that are not strictly exogenous with all their 
available lags in levels; and is often referred to as ‘difference’ GMM.  It is important to note that 
the country indicators are also endogenous according to the Hausman test.  However given that CPI, 
GDP per capita and the government bond yield are control variables, they will not be included as 
instruments when re-estimating the coefficients under the Arellano-Bond test.  
 
Under the Sargan test, all market definitions of HHI fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments as a group are exogenous.  However, the test for AR (2) in first differences detects 
autocorrelation in levels for HHI at the one-digit SIC (major group) by zone.  The HHI at the 
country level is optimised at 20 and 19 lags respectively (i.e. 20 lags differenced and 19 lags in all 
levels) for the one-digit SIC (division), two-digit SIC (major group) and four-digit SIC (industry 
type).  Whereas the HHI for the three-digit SIC (industry group) is optimised at 17 and 19 lags 
respectively (i.e. 17 lags differenced and 19 lags in all levels) with a p-value of 0.384.  Under the 
aforementioned lag structures, the EURO_MEMBER remains negatively correlated with the HHI; 
however it is no longer significant at the two-digit SIC (major group) market definition. 
  
The HHI at the zone level is optimised at 20 and 18 lags respectively (i.e. 20 lags differenced and 
18 lags in all levels) for the one-digit SIC (division) with a p-value of 0.291.  The HHI for the two-
digit SIC (major group) and three-digit SIC (industry group) is optimised at a lag structure of 19 
[differenced and in levels], with a p-value of 0.888 and 0.822 respectively.  The HHI for the four-
digit SIC (industry type) is optimised at 19 and 20 lags respectively (i.e. 19 lags differenced and 20 
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lags in all levels) for with a p-value of 0.422.  Under the aforementioned lag structures, the 
EURO_MEMBER remains negatively correlated with the HHI; with the exception of the two-digit 
SIC (major group) market definition; and remains statistically significant at the one-digit SIC 
(division) and four-digit SIC (industry type). 
 
An augmented version of GMM outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995) that was fully developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) is utilised; which is commonly referred to as ‘system’ GMM.  Under the 
market definition for HHI at the two-digit SIC (major group) by country and four-digit SIC 
(industry type) by zone, the lagged levels of the regressors (i.e. asset-to-sales ratio and MES) are 
poor instruments for the first-differenced regressors.  Hence, the augmented alternative of system 
GMM is also estimated.  The system GMM estimator uses the level equation in order to obtain a 
system of two equations [i.e. one equation that is differenced and another that is in levels].  Hence, 
by adding a second equation to the estimator, this results in additional instruments being obtained.  
Therefore, the variables in the second equation are instrumented with their own differences, and 
hence increase efficiency. 
 
In robust estimation, the Arellano-Bond estimator produces the Hansen J statistic [instead of 
Sargan], suggesting that the standard errors generated are consistent with panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in one-step estimation.  Under the Hansen test, HHI at the 
two-digit SIC (major group) by country fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments as a 
group are exogenous.  Although the lag structure is optimised at 17 and 20 respectively (i.e. 17 lags 
differenced and 20 lags in levels), generating a p-value of 0.831.  Under this lag structure, the 
EURO_MEMBER remains negatively correlated with the HHI, however it is no longer significant.  
Furthermore, the asset-to-sales ratio becomes significant.  In contrast, when the coefficients are re-
estimated with a lag structure of 19 lags [both differenced and in levels], the EURO_MEMBER 
variable is significant; however the p-value generated is 0.177 which is not as efficient as the lag 
structure of 17 [differenced] and 20 [in levels]. 
 
Lastly, under the Hansen test for HHI at the four-digit SIC (industry type) by zone, the p-value of 
0.747 is maximised at 15 lags for both differenced and within groups.  Under this lag structure, the 
EURO_MEMBER remains negatively correlated and statistically significant with the HHI.  In 
contrast, the EU_MEMBER remains positively correlated, however becomes statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, GDP per capita becomes positive; CPI and lagged ROS become negative; 
and CPI is now statistically significant.  Whereas lagged industry growth is no longer statistically 
significant. 
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Table 4-7: Market concentration model – generalised method of moments (GMM)     
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
  Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER 11.05 -17.57 -11.72 17.25 7.566** -9.502 -29.77 54.23 
 (1.202) (-0.0587) (-0.868) (1.043) (2.073) (-0.343) (-0.246) (1.347) 
EURO_MEMBER -17.98*** -159.1 -25.91*** -44.12** -3.185*** 5.637 -12.86 -84.52* 
 (-2.646) (-0.417) (-2.774) (-2.392) (-2.748) (0.213) (-0.111) (-1.799) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -4.709*** 0.0558 3.499 -4.264 -0.338 2.453 3.365 -17.08* 
 (-2.979) (0.717) (0.782) (-1.435) (-1.100) (0.382) (0.115) (-1.808) 
CPI 0.752* -32.55 -1.403 0.801 -0.0383 -1.048 -5.430 1.964 
 (1.658) (-1.238) (-1.531) (0.873) (-0.401) (-0.587) (-0.683) (0.762) 
BOND_YIELD 9.699*** -39.31 0.702 4.836 2.000*** -1.577 -3.920 11.38 
 (6.354) (-0.515) (0.295) (1.627) (3.021) (-0.325) (-0.184) (1.491) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE -54.05 862.9 479.6 -870.2 -7.456 888.3 2,017 -2,616 
 (-0.228) (0.0626) (1.348) (-1.431) (-0.216) (0.709) (0.358) (-1.558) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0.700 -0.00861 -0.917 0.998 0.272 -0.299 -2.628 4.010 
 (0.997) (-0.323) (-0.476) (0.568) (1.219) (-0.0824) (-0.231) (0.926) 
LAGGED_ROS -10.92 -0.347 -13.40 -33.45 1.872 -3.924 -14.04 31.90 
 (-0.177) (-0.0885) (-0.0543) (-0.640) (0.301) (-0.0162) (-0.0122) (0.0958) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO 5,367** 351.8** 22,708* -1,983 -116.3 21,444 102,990 -28,101 
 (2.549) (2.064) (1.820) (-0.390) (-0.811) (0.672) (0.703) (-1.143) 
AR (2) 0.171 0.327 0.534 0.055 0.0169 0.957 0.542 0.254 
Sargan (p-value) 0.879 0.776 0.384 0.517 0.291 0.888 0.822 0.422 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 51,697 51,697 51,697 51,697 51,697 51,697 51,697 51,697 
Number of firms 7,918 7,918 7,918 7,918 7,918 7,918 7,918 7,918 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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4.6 Concluding remarks 
Irrespective of which estimation method selected, there appears to be overwhelming statistical 
evidence that the introduction of the euro has resulted in a reduction in the level of market 
concentration pertaining to member states.  The market concentration models estimated highlight 
that a common currency does matter in the context of competition.  More specifically, countries that 
participate in a currency union are by default more competitive than those countries that doe not 
adopt a common [regional] currency.  Surprisingly, the formation of the EU and its quest for single-
market policy development has not had a larger impact of competition.  This may be due to the 
unintended benefits bleeding across borders [i.e. affecting all countries geographically close; rather 
than just EU participants].   
 
Many factors relevant to how well a market is functioning may not be captured by any of the 
empirical indicators that have been included in the model estimated in Section 4.3.  These factors 
predominantly involve omitted variables that capture barriers to entry within a specified market.  
This explains the small adjusted R-squared.  Future research must address this issue and undertake 
further detailed analysis.  However, as highlighted by Curry and George (1983), industrial 
concentration is only an ‘indicator’ of market power that constitutes an important component of the 
structure of an industry; and therefore cannot be regarded as ‘all-knowing’, fundamental or 
exogenous. 
 
Lastly, it often argued that market concentration and profitability measures are jointly determined 
(see Jacquemin, Ghellinck et al. 1980).  Due to the simultaneous determination of market 
concentration and profitability, a recursive concentration-performance method is employed in a 
study by Chou (1988) who focuses on the Taiwanese market and Kalirajan (1993) who focuses on 
the Malaysian market.   This relationship is explored further in Chapters 5 and 6.  Interestingly, 
recent empirical research suggests that industry structure is not dependent upon industry 
performance.  Specifically, the average profitability of an industry does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the industry’s concentration, even when controlling for past profitability.134  
The models estimated in this Chapter support this proposition. 
                                                 
134 Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002) find that lagged profitability does not have a statistically significant effect market 
concentration for US manufacturing firms in 1982, 1987 and 1992. 
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CHAPTER 5: Firm Profitability and the Euro 
5.1 Introduction 
For many decades, industrial economists have conducted SCP studies that attempt to identify the 
major factors that determine market power; and as a consequence, identify a relationship between 
market performance and market structure.  There are many SCP studies that focus specifically on 
the market concentration and firm profitability relationship.135  Domowitz, Hubbard et al. (1986b) 
highlight that there are very few areas of applied economics that have attracted as much empirical 
work and spirited policy debate as the so-called ‘concentration-margins relationship’ in IO.  As 
illustrated in Figure 5-1, the competitive process guarantees that diverse market structures go 
through different stages over a period of time; the final stage being perfect competion, where firms 
earn normal profits or rate of return.  Consequently, the competitive process ensures that there is 
“…competition beyond perfect competition” (Djolov 2006, p. 4).   
 
Figure 5-1: SCP paradigm and market structure 
 
Source: the author 
 
In order to interpret the theory and role of the firm in a free enterprise economy, it is important to 
understand the nature of profits.  Profits are a critical component in a free enterprise system that 
would fail without the ‘profit motive’ of generating profits.  Even in planned economies (where 
state ownership rather than private enterprise is typical) the ‘profit motive’ is increasingly used to 
encourage the use of resources efficiently (Hirschey and Pappas 1993, p 9).  An enhanced approach 
to the analysis of competition called the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) draws 
inferences about market structure from the observation of conduct.136  This approach involves the 
estimation of behavioural equations which specify how firms set their prices and quantities 
(Goddard, Molyneux et al. 2007). 
 
                                                 
135 Ravenscraft (1983); Bourke (1989); Chou (1988); Dalton and Penn (1976); Jones, Laudadio and Percy (1973); Kalirajan (1993); Melicher, Rush 
and Winn (1976); Phillips (1976); Raya (2009); Scott and Pascoe (1986); Thomadakis (1977); Shepherd (1986); Slade (2004a); Beck (1981) 
136 Bresnahan (1982); Lau ibid.; Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
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The assessment of a market’s competitiveness is traditionally measured through concentration 
indices, which describe market structure; and/or serve as a prima facie indicator of market power or 
competition between firms.  As stated by Djolov (2006, p. 161), concentration indices 
“…numerically determine a market’s competitiveness, namely whether a market is characterised by 
firms lacking market power (as in perfect competition), dominant firms (as in oligopoly), or a 
monopoly”.  However market concentration is not the only measure that can be used to assess the 
existence of a dominant market player. 
 
In Bain’s (1951a; 1951b) seminal study, he argues that if high market concentration facilitates 
collusion, that firms in highly concentrated industries should on average earn supra-competitive 
profits.  Furthermore, Bain (1956) also suggests that both high concentration and high barriers to 
entry are necessary to produce excess profits in the long run.  This implies that high-profit firms 
prefer to operate in high-profit industries that have a favourable competitive (i.e. high 
concentration) structure, which ensures a higher return to shareholders. 
 
Profitability is the most commonly used measure of firm financial performance, which has been 
modelled extensively over the last sixty years; to ascertain if differences exist based on identified 
levels of market competitiveness.137  The primary purpose of this Chapter is to identify what impact 
does a currency union have on firm profitability in the context of the EU?  As highlighted in 
Section 3.6, there has been no research to date that has investigated the impact on firm profitability 
across all industries in the EMU – with the exception of the manufacturing and banking sector.138   
 
IO theorem has inspired an extensive body of work that examines the roles of industry effects (i.e. 
market concentration, barriers to entry and growth) which has largely supported the notion that 
industry characteristics (i.e. structure) are an important determinant of firm profitability.   This 
empirical research is discussed extensively in the next section. 
                                                 
137 Bain (1951a); Bain (1956); Chou (1988); Clarke (1984); Coate (1989); Coate (1991); Collins and Preston (1966); Collins and Preston (1969); 
Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002); Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986a); Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986b); Hart 
and Morgan (1977); Kwoka (1981); Ornstein (1975); Phillips (1976); Qualls (1972); Sabido and Mulato (2006); Salinger (1990); Schmalensee 
(1976); Bain (1951b) 
138 Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux (2009); Dermine (2006); Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008); Dermine (1996); Bourke (1989); 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008); Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011); Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2007); Goddard, 
Molyneux and Wilson (2004); Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2005); Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007); Goddard and Wilson (2009) 
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5.2 The model 
A high level of market concentration in an industry is interpreted as indicative of scarce market 
competition, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  In particular, Section 3.2 highlights that market 
concentration will vary across industries due to the level of barriers to entry.  The more difficult it is 
to enter an industry, (all things being equal) the greater the concentration of sales [i.e. high levels of 
HHI].  Markets that are dominated by a small number of suppliers allow incumbent firms to 
accumulate market power; and thereby approximate monopolistic price-makers rather than perfectly 
competitive price-takers (Barker 2010).  Consequently, firms can exploit their pricing powers to 
earn supernormal profits at the expense of consumers.  Such uncompetitive conditions are often 
associated with a segmented market structure; where there are significant barriers to entry and high 
sunk costs.  
 
Most of the empirical literature focuses on the relationship between profitability, market 
concentration and barriers to entry (Martin 1979a; Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter 1986).139  An 
empirical model for differential profitability typically involves estimating the following function, 
where the dependent variable  represents the profitability of a firm:140 
 (5.2–A) 
Where; 
 = market concentration of industry  (+), 
 = barriers to entry of industry  (+), 
 = set of measures characterising the state of demand of industry  (+), 
 = other structural characteristics affecting industry  (+ or -), and 
 = error term (reflecting a range of unmeasured factors; and the discrepancy between  
and the true, although unknown, function relating  to the other variables). 
 
5.2.1 Profitability 
Firm profitability is typically expressed as a ratio.141  Mathematically, it is a relative index and is 
also referred to as a rate of return – a measure of how much is earned per dollar of investment 
(Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 247).  The three most universally adopted accounting profit measures 
                                                 
139 Refer to Schmalensee (1989) for a comprehensive review of the literature. 
140 Differential profitability refers to the differences between industries and firms: see Phillips (1976); Martin (1979b); Martin (1979a). 
141 Ross, Westerfield and Jordan (1999), pp. 59-60; Carlon, Mladenovic-McAlpine, Loftus, Palm, Kimmel, Kieso and Weygandt (2009), pp. 41-44; 
Peirson, Bird, Brown and Howard (1995), p. 797; Bishop, Crapp, Faff and Twite (1998), pp. 644-645 
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used across the business community and in empirical research: return on sales, return on assets and 
return on equity.142  These measures have varying degrees of reliability as proxies for the elevation 
of price above MC.  A high level of competition in an industry is assumed to result in low profit 
ratios.  Alternatively, high profit ratios are interpreted as reflecting a market structure in which 
incumbent firms possess significant market power (Barker 2010).  Hence, firms will exploit high 
‘mark-ups’ to generate economic profit.  This is consist with the Cournot model constructed in 
Section 3.2. 
 
The return on sales (ROS), also known as the profit margin, measures the percentage of each dollar 
of sales that results in profit.  The ROS is calculated by dividing the profit of a firm by net sales 
(revenue) for a specified period, as shown in Equation (5.2–B).  Generally, firms with a high 
turnover, such as Coles or Woolworths, experience low ROS.  In contrast, firms with a low 
turnover, such as Tiffany’s or BMW, usually have high ROS. 
(net) Sales
Profit  ROS ≡  (5.2–B) 
 
The return on assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing the profit of a firm by average assets, as 
shown in Equation (5.2–C).  Generally, profit refers to profit after income tax unless stated 
otherwise.  Average assets are usually calculated by adding the opening and closing values of total 
assets and dividing them by two. 
(average)  totalAssets
ProfitROA ≡  (5.2–C) 
 
The return on equity (ROE) ratio is used to measure profitability from a shareholders perspective.  
ROE illustrates how many dollars of profit are earned for every dollar invested in ordinary 
shareholders and it calculated by dividing profit available to ordinary shareholders by average 
ordinary shareholders equity; as shown in Equation (5.2–D). 
(average)equity  rs'shareholdeOrdinary 
dividends Preference -Profit  ROE ≡  (5.2–D) 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 Bain (1951a); Bain (1956); Collins and Preston (1969); Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011); Bourke (1989); Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos and 
Molyneux (2009); Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004); Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007); Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006); 
Berger (1995); Goldberg and Rai (1996); Berger (2003); Smirlock (1985); Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002); Qualls (1972); 
Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989); Roquebert, Phillips and Westfall (1996); Szymanski, Bharadwaj and Varadarajan (1993) 
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5.2.2 Market concentration 
The relationship between market concentration (CRj) and rate of return was first demonstrated by 
Bain (1951a).  Most empirical research has found that a positive relationship exists between 
industry profit rates and market concentration.143  Interestingly, observed positive correlations 
between various measures of industry profitability and market concentration have justified the use 
of concentration measures in anti-trust deliberation internationally, particularly in the USA and 
Europe.  These correlations have inspired many theoretical studies in macroeconomics and 
industrial economics, in particular on the inter-temporal variation in the prices and margins of 
oligopolists.  The empirical applications have had a diversity and scope that are at the same time 
overwhelming and inconclusive.144 
 
Kilpatrick (1968) finds that greater concentration leads to higher profit rates; however it is 
highlighted that the exact size of the effect is unclear.  Hence, of the empirical research that finds a 
positive relationship existing between profitability and market concentration; only a diluted cross-
section finds that a strongly significant relationship exists.145  For example, Dickson (1994) finds 
that on average, higher concentration leads to lower total costs [ceteris paribus] indicating that at 
least part of any relationship between industry profits and concentration may be due to efficiency 
effects. 
 
Collins and Preston (1969) report that the coefficient for concentration for C4 is positive and 
statistically significant.  Domowitz, Hubbard et al. (1986a) also find that concentration for C4 is 
positive and statistically significant, across 284 industries.  Strickland and Weiss (1976) state that 
concentration is “unequivocally positive and significant” when modelling for PCMs across 408 
manufacturing industries.  Cowling and Waterson (1976) discover that lagged concentration is 
positive and statistically significant when determining changes in PCMs.  Dalton and Penn (1976) 
find that concentration for both the C4 and C8 are positive and statistically significant.  However 
they also find that there is a threshold level of concentration that separates groups of industries 
earning significantly different profit rates.  When this is accounted for they observe that changes in 
market concentration does not have a significant impact on profit rates within concentration groups.   
 
                                                 
143 Fuchs (1961); Levinson (1960); Minhas (1963); Sherman (1964); Weiss (1963b); Coate (1989); Coate (1991); Hirsch (1990); Hitiris (1978); 
Phillips (1972); Shepherd (1972a); Galbraith and Stiles (1983); Leach (1997); Slade (2004a); Weiss (1974); Imel and Helmberger (1971); Imel and 
Helmberger (1973).  Also see (1990) who review ninety-nine studies and epitomise that there is a postive relationship. 
144 Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986b); Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986a); Scherer and Ross (1990) 
145 Hitiris (1978); Phillips (1972); Shepherd (1972a); Hirsch (1990); Coate (1991); Kalirajan (1993). 
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In contrast, Nickell and Metcalf (1978) determine that a significant and negative relationship exists 
between market concentration and firm profitability.  Holtermann (1973), Khalilzadeh-Shirazi 
(1974), Hart and Morgan (1977) and Oustapassidis, Vlachvei et al. (2000) find that concentration is 
not statistically significant.  Porter (1974), Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi et al. (1975), Clarke (1984), 
Chou (1988) and Delorme, Kamerschen et al. (2002) produce mixed results. 
 
5.2.3 Barriers to entry 
It is argued that a market with high concentration and low barriers to entry (BEj) can also infer high 
levels of profitability (Gaskins 1971).  According to Weiss (1971) a positive relationship exists 
between market concentration and profitability; particularly when market concentration exceeds 
some critical limit and when there are substantial barriers to entry.  Therefore firm profits are likely 
to rise more rapidly with market concentration when barriers to entry are high.146  This is consistent 
with the original research undertaken by Bain (1951a; 1951b); who suggests that profits are 
significantly higher only when high market concentration is combined with high barriers to entry. 
 
Orr (1974) constructs an index of the overall entry of barriers for seventy-one Canadian 
manufacturing industries.  He strongly confirms the Bain (1956) and Mann (1966) conclusion that 
high barrier industries are significantly more profitable than other industries; however low barrier 
industries are not significantly less profitable than others.  He also supports Mann’s conclusion that 
entry barriers exert an influence on profitability independent of concentration, which is vigorously 
refuted by Rhoades (1970).  However, the independent role of barriers to entry has not been 
universally accepted.147  It is argued that in the absence of concentration, high barriers to entry will 
not encourage high levels of profitability; given that firms within a specified industry will cultivate 
competitive performance (Bain 1956). 
 
The static limit pricing model estimated by Martin (1979b) proposes that the profitability and 
market concentration relationship is dependent upon barriers to entry in a defined market.  In order 
for the limit price model to be useful, Pashigian (1968a) suggests that the proposition must explain 
when and how a new entrant integrates into a specified market; given the profit maximising 
behaviour of firms.  Hence, Gaskins (1971) developed a limit price model which indicates that 
growth of a particular industry not only raises the long-run price level, it also results in dominant 
firms with insignificant cost advantages to maintain a steady market share. 
                                                 
146 Also see Weiss (1974) and Phillips (1976) for further conventional wisdom of the relationship between market concentration and barriers to entry.  
147 Brozen (1971a); Brozen (1970); Brozen (1971b); Demsetz (1974); Rhoades (1970) 
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5.2.4 Initial capital requirements 
The most common barriers to entry that are considered determinants of firm profitability are initial 
capital requirements, advertising expenditure, innovation and economies of scale.  Comanor and 
Wilson (1967) find that initial capital requirements are positive and predominantly statistically 
significant.  Porter (1974) finds that ‘absolute’ capital requirements are positive and mostly 
statistically significant.  Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi et al. (1975) and Kwoka (1981) include a 
measure of capital intensity (i.e. asset-to sales ratio) as an explanatory variable of PCMs; which is 
also positive and statistically significant.  In contrast, Coate (1991) demonstrates that capital 
intensity is negative and statistically significant.  Whereas, Chou (1988) finds mixed results across 
domestic (export-orientated) and foreign (import-orientated) industry sectors.  As highlighted by 
Phillips (1976, p. 245), capital intensity is “…undoubtedly positively associated with ratios of 
depreciation to output…thus…as an independent variable is indirectly contained in PCM, the 
dependent variable”.  Capon, Farley et al. (1990) review eighty studies and find that capital 
investment intensity shows a positive relationship to financial performance at the industry level. 
 
5.2.5 Advertising 
Rhoades (1985) states that some firms with a high market share enjoy a unique form of market 
power; that of ‘inherent product differentiation’.  This quite often occurs as a result of significant 
investment in advertising relating to a firm’s branding and promotion of product offering.  Hence, 
in early empirical research, a commonly used measure of barriers to entry is the advertising-to-sales 
ratio (see Phillips 1976).148  It is suggested that advertising expenditure reduces consumer welfare 
and hence increases profits by creating spurious product differentiation; and hence barriers to 
entry.149  However, large portion of empirical research to date has found that advertising as a 
determinant of profitability is not statistically significant.150  For example, Schmalensee (1976) 
develop an explicity stochastic model of promotional competition and find that advertising neither 
raises barriers to entry – not facilitates collusion. 
 
In contrast, Comanor and Wilson (1967) and Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi et al. (1975) employ a 
advertising-to-sales ratio as an explanatory variable of PCMs; finding that there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship.  In particular, Comanor and Wilson (1967) find that industries 
with high levels of investment in advertising result in a profit rate that exceeds other industries by 
                                                 
148 Kelly and Cowling (1973) suggest that ‘absolute’ advertising better captures the effect of advertising; rather than the asset-to-sales ratio. 
149 Bain (1956); Comanor and Wilson (1974); Kaldor (1950); Robinson (1933) 
150 Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein and Ford Voeks (2002); Grabowski and Mueller (1978); Imel and Helmberger (1971); Nagle (1981); Porter (1979); 
Coate (1991) 
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four percentage points.  Porter (1974) also finds that there is a positive relationship; however the 
results are ‘predominantly’ statistically significant.  Dalton and Penn (1976) find that the asset-to-
sales ratio (for both the C4 and C8 models estimated) is positive and statistically significant with 
respect to profitability.  Clarke (1984) also employs advertising intensity as an explanatory variable 
of profit margins; which is positive and statistically significant.   
 
Capon, Farley et al. (1990) review sixty-eight studies and find that advertising intensity is positively 
related to performance at both the industry and firm level.  In more recent research, Oustapassidis, 
Vlachvei et al. (2000) construct a long-run advertising variable in their two-stage least-squares 
estimation, demonstrating a positive coefficient that is statistically significant in relation to 
profitability.  This suggests that product differentiation plays an important role in determining 
monopoly power.  In addition to this, when reviewing the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Nevo (2001) 
finds that maintaining differentiated products and perceived product quality leads to higher PCMs.  
This supports Oustapassidis, Vlachvei et al. (2000) findings. 
 
5.2.6 Economies of scale 
Economies of scale is also considered a barrier to entry, which has been discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi et al. (1975) and Strickland and Weiss (1976) notice that MES is 
positive and statistically significant.  Ravenscraft (1983) also finds that larger MES leads to higher 
profits, indicating the existence of some plant economies of scale.  In contrast, Comanor and 
Wilson (1967) does not find a strong relationship between PCM and economies of scale.  Porter 
(1974) find that the relationship between MES and profit rates produces mixed results.  
 
More specifically, Lambson (1987) demonstrates [theoretically] that the larger the economies of 
scale, the higher the profit rates can be without being depressed by incumbent firms.  The reason for 
this is because entry is more likely to depress profit rates to negative levels when scale economies 
are significant.   Firm entry halts just prior to lowering profit rates to normal levels; and stops short 
by greater amounts when scale economies are higher.  Thus, Leach (1997) suggests that market 
concentration can affect profitability through a large-share firms’ ability to control prices 
independently of their disposition towards collusion; which can in fact leverage economies of scale 
in the context of cost sharing. 
 
Typically, MES of firm [plant] size expressed in terms of investment or employment requirements 
is used to explain differences in firm profitability.  Substitutes for MES appear as average capital or 
employment per establishment in an industry; or some other cut-off in the frequency distribution of 
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total capital or employment divided by number of establishments (see Phillips 1976).  Martin 
(1979b) measures MES as the average sales [per firm] for firms in the mid-point size class, as a 
percentage of industry sales.  Kwoka (1981) includes MES at the 50th percentile as an explanatory 
variable of PCMs; which is positive and statistically significant.  Kwoka calculates MES for the 50th 
percentile using exactly the same methodology described in Appendix A1.4. 
 
5.2.7 Innovation 
Delorme, Kamerschen et al. (2002) include measures of investment and R&D, as a proxy of 
innovation; which produce mixed results in their model of OLS and two-stage least squares.151  
Coate (1991) finds that R&D is positive, however not always statistically significant when 
explaining the variation is price-cost margins.  Chou (1988) finds that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as an explanatory variable produces mixed results; as it is significant however the coefficient 
signs generated are inconsistent across the defined industry sectors. 
 
5.2.8 Market demand 
Dj denotes the level (or rate of change) of market demand as specified by Equation (5.2–A), which 
is typically measured by industry or market growth.  Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi et al. (1975) and 
Kwoka (1981) include [shipment] growth as an explanatory variable of PCMs; which is positive 
and statistically significant.  Coate (1991) finds that a mostly positive and strongly significant 
relationship exists with market growth and profitability in the US from 1958 to 1982, across 233 
industries. According to Matraves and Rodriguez (2005), industry growth is positive and 
statistically significant; when analysing German and UK firms in 1993.  Capon, Farley et al. (1990) 
review eighty-eight studies and find that growth consistently related to higher performance.  More 
specifically, growth [in assets or sales] show positive relationships at the industry and firm level. 
 
Dalton and Penn (1976) determine that industry growth (for both the C4 and C8 models estimated) is 
negative and statistically significant in relation to profitability.  Porter (1974) finds mixed results in 
terms of statistical significance – although the coefficient appears to be consistently positive.  
Clarke (1984) and Chou (1988) find that market growth in sales is not statistically significant.  
Domowitz, Hubbard et al. (1986b) find that industry output [and unemployment] have a postive 
relationship with profitability across all industries; however the results are mixed when estimating 
the model within industries and across time periods.  More recently, Delorme, Kamerschen et al. 
(2002) produce mixed results when including lagged industry growth as a determinant of 
                                                 
151 Refer to Spence (1984) for an interesting discussion on the theorical and empirical relationship between R&D, concentration and profitability. 
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profitability.  Heger and Kraft (2008) find that lagged demand (sales) growth is positive and 
statistically significant. 
 
5.2.9 Other indicators 
Other structural characteristics (OSj) that determine the levels of firm profitability include firm size, 
market share and international trade.152  Baumol (1967) suggests that ‘absolute’ firm size has a 
positive influence on a firm’s profitability.  Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) find that firm size is 
negatively correlated with adjusted ROA measure.  Dalton and Penn (1976) find that firm size is 
predominantly negative and statistically significant.  According to Jovanovic (1982) firm size and 
concentration seem to be positively related to rates of return.  Weiss (1977) summarises a number 
of studies that supports this finding; with the exception of Stigler (1963) who found no relationship 
and Samuels and Smyth (1968) found that a negative relationship exists. 
 
Market share reflects the current competitive position a company realises in the specified market.  
Firms which have a high market share are considered to satisfy customer needs better; and hence 
are able to enjoy a competitive advantage to their smaller counterparts (see Schwalbach 1991).  A 
large proportion of research exploring the relationship between market share and firm profitability 
have found a positive and often statistically significant association (Szymanski, Bharadwaj et al. 
1993).153  This indicates that large market shares leads to an increase in firm profit margins. 
 
In contrast, Woo (1981; 1983) and Woo and Cooper (1981; 1982) demonstrate that some low 
market share firms have high levels of profitability.  Boulding and Staelin (1990) who provide an 
overview of the existing literature, also demonstrate that increasing market share does not always 
result in increasing profits.  Furthermore, Capon, Farley et al. (1990) review sixty-nine studies and 
find that firm size in unrelated to performance.  More recently, Slade (2004a) and Raya (2009) do 
not find empirical evidence to support the fundamental market share and profitability relationship. 
 
Of particular interest are the studies that primarily examine stochastic growth processes and the 
market share and profitability relationship.154  They conclude that a strong stochastic element is 
present in the market share and profitability relationship, finding little evidence of a direct effect of 
market share on business performance (see Prescott, Kohli et al. 1986). 
                                                 
152 More recently, (2007) assess whether geography plays a major role in determining the performance of Indian manufacturing firms. 
153 For example, see Shepherd (1972b); Dalton and Penn (1976); Galbraith and Stiles (1983); Oustapassidis, Vlachvei and Notta (2000); Schoeffler, 
Buzzell and Heany (1974); Rumelt and Wensley (1981); Gale (1972); Buzzell, Gale and Sultan (1975); Ravenscraft (1983). 
154 Rumelt and Wensley (1981); Mancke (1977); Mancke (1974); Caves and Porter (1978); Albin and Alcaly (1979) 
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Research in IO has shown that international trade, both imports and exports, have a significant 
impact on the performance of an industry (Caves 1981).  Hence, trade variables are often included 
as explanatory variables of PCMs.  For example, Hitiris (1978) and Esposito and Esposito (1971) 
control for protection from foreign competition.  Heger and Kraft (2008) find that imports are not 
statistically signficant, however exports are positive and statistically significant.  Coate (1991) find 
that import intensity (i.e. imports divided by industry sales) is negatively correlated and statistically 
significant.  In contrast, Jacquemin, Ghellinck et al. (1980) and Clarke (1984) include import 
intensity as an explanatory variable of profit margins; which is not statistically significant.  Chou 
(1988, p. 425) also finds that import competition does not influence profits.  Whereas, Domowitz, 
Hubbard et al. (1986b) and Kambhampati and Parikh (2003) find mixed results.   
 
5.3 Data sources and variable selection 
Profitability (π) will be measured using ROA, ROE and ROS.  These firm profitability measures 
have been extracted from OSIRIS and discussed extensively in Appendix A1.4.  All the profitability 
measures are dependent upon accounting data that may be incorrectly skewed by important inter-
industry differences relating to depreciation and competitive rates of return (see Liebowitz 1982).  
However despite this, they are used extensively as an indicator of firm performance globally. 
 
The explanatory variables of firm profitability most commonly used are summarised in Table 5-1.  
The HHI will be used to measure market concentration i.e. the level of competition, which has been 
constructed in Section 4.3.  The HHI represents the structural characteristics of an industry, as 
discussed extensively in Chapters 3 and 4.  It is anticipated that an increase in market concentration 
will result in an increase in firm profitability.  This is consistent with traditional economic theorem 
discussed in detail (in the context of the Cournot model) in Section 3.2. 
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Table 5-1: Determinants of profitability 
Key performance indicator Measure Firm (i) Industry (j) Country (k) Variables 
Concentration ratios Market concentration    Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)  
Capital investment Initial capital requirements    Absolute assets, Asset-to-sales ratio 
Advertising [i.e. marketing] Advertising    Absolute advertising*, Advertising-to-sales ratio* 
Research and development Innovation    Research and development expenditure* 
Minimum efficient scale (MES) Economies of scale    MES at the 50th percentile, MES at the 75th percentile 
Debt [i.e. liquidity and solvency] Strategy (firm)    Current ratio, Solvency Ratio 
Market share Strategy (firm)    Revenue, Absolute assets 
Business development [i.e. sales force] Strategy (firm)    Business development expenditure* 
Geographical dispersion [i.e. regional vs. national] Strategy (firm)    Dummy variable* 
Quality of product [i.e. good or service] Strategy (firm)    Dummy variable* 
Diversification Strategy (firm)    Dummy variable* 
Corporate social responsibility [i.e. governance] Strategy (firm)    Dummy variable* 
Capacity [i.e. utilisation and optimisation] Strategy (firm)    Dummy variable* 
Industry growth Market demand    Revenue, Absolute assets 
Economic activity and health Wealth    GDP, GDP per capita, Tax revenue, Unemployment 
Price (financial) stability Stability    CPI 
Economic (financial) longevity and strength Sustainability    FDI, GFCF, Market capitalisation, Portfolio equity, 
Portfolio investment, Government bond yield 
Imports and Exports Protectionism    Trade 
Size Size    Market share (firm and industry), Population (country) 
* Variables unavailable due to inaccessibility of firm-wide dataset 
Source: the author 
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The HHI at the country level for the four-digit SIC (industry type) will be included as a proxy for 
measuring the level of competition in an industry.  In order to ensure robustness and sensitivity of 
the model, the HHI constructed at the four-digit SIC will also be substituted for the HHI by the 
three-digit SIC (industry group), two-digit SIC (major group) and one-digit SIC (division); at the 
country level only.  This will ensure that measurement selection will not bias the models generated 
– as highlighted by Kwoka (1981) in Section 4.3. 
 
Ultimately, an increase in the profitability of a firm is likely to have an inverse relationship with 
competition; as any [potential] rise in profitability is passed onto shareholders rather than 
consumers.  This would result in an increase (i.e. expensive; or higher than necessary) price of 
products offered in the market, which suggests anti-competitive behaviour.  In other words, a 
reduction in competition will result in an increase in firm profitability. 
 
It then follows, that one would expect market concentration to be positively correlated with firm 
profitability [as demonstrated by extensive empirical research].155  Using the comprehensive dataset 
[defined in Appendix A1.4], Table 5-2 illustrates that all three measures of profitability [at the 
country level] are mostly positively correlated with the exception of ROS at the three-digit SIC 
(industry group) and four-digit SIC (industry type).  Interestingly, at the zone level the results are 
mixed across all three measures of profitability.  Hence, it is important to note that higher profits 
could be the result of greater efficiency in production and managerial organisation (Smirlock 1985; 
Evanoff and Fortier 1988).  Peltzman (1977) presents evidence that “…is consistent with an eclectic 
view, but one in which efficiency effects dominates”.   
 
Table 5-2: Correlation matrix of profitability and market concentration 
 Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS 
HHI by country (by division): one-digit SIC 0.013 0.0094 0.0548 
HHI by country (by major group): two-digit SIC 0.001 0.0006 0.0137 
HHI by country (by industry group): three-digit SIC 0.0383 0.0112 -0.0346 
HHI by country (by industry type): four digit SIC 0.0469 0.0097 -0.0668 
HHI by zone (by division): one-digit SIC -0.0012 -0.0044 0.0025 
HHI by zone (by major group): two-digit SIC 0.0077 -0.0038 -0.0217 
HHI by zone (by industry group): three-digit SIC 0.0196 0.0038 -0.0549 
HHI by zone (by industry type): four-digit SIC 0.0344 0.0058 -0.0879 
Source: the author 
                                                 
155 Fuchs (1961); Levinson (1960); Minhas (1963); Sherman (1964); Weiss (1963b); Coate (1989); Coate (1991); Hirsch (1990); Hitiris (1978); 
Phillips (1972); Shepherd (1972a) 
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Peltzman (1977) highlights that most practitioners have chosen to interpret the profitability and 
concentration relationship as evidence for collusion.  However only a minority have emphasized the 
concentration-efficiency nexus (for example, see Demsetz 1973; 1974).156  Demsetz argues that the 
relationship between market concentration and firm profitability is due to the efficiency differences 
between firms; rather than that of firm collusion and co-ordination as postulated in the SCP model.  
Therefore supranormal profits are taken as a result of efficiency-generating competencies at the 
firm level (McGee 1988). 
 
However, Bond and Greenberg (1976) disagree and test the efficiency hypothesis of Demsetz, 
concluding that the ability to raise prices – rather than the ability to raise costs – appears to explain 
the higher profitability generated by the dominant firms.  In contrast, Martin (1988a) finds some 
support for both hypotheses; suggesting that they should be regarded as complementary rather than 
alternatives to one another. 
 
Kwoka (1981) demonstrates that the choice of concentration measure can matter a great deal when 
explaining the differences in PCMs across the US manufacturing industry in 1972.  These findings 
support earlier empirical research, which suggests that statistical relationships found between 
market concentration and profitability are sensitive to the market concentration measure selected.  
This is despite the fact that the measures selected are themselves highly correlated (Ravenscraft 
1983; Phillips 1986; Scherer and Ross 1990). The output in Table 5-2 may support this notion, as 
the eight different market definitions [of HHI] appear to be impacting the level of correlation 
between the three different profit variables. 
 
Section 4.2 identified that lagged profitability is considered an explanatory variable of the market 
concentration (see Delorme, Kamerschen et al. 2002).  This is based on the assumption that 
previous year profitability will affect current year market concentration.  This is due to the 
signalling properties of the HHI, which highlights that there is potential profit to be extracted for 
shareholders whom are not currently participating in the specified industry.  This inturn results in a 
re-distribution of the ‘profit’ pie. 
 
                                                 
156 Demsetz (1973) finds that higher concentration is associated with higher profits for larger firms.  However this is not the case for smaller firms. 
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According to Section 4.5, it was found that last year profitability is not statistically significant 
(under a FE specification); and therefore does not support the proposition that profitability is a 
leading indicator when determining market concentration.  However, given the endogeneity of 
market concentration and profitability (see Jacquemin, Ghellinck et al. 1980; Chou 1988), a lagged 
HHI will be included as a determinant of firm profitability – as this infers that a relationship exists.  
 
According to Schmalensee (1989), correlations among accounting rates of return are generally high; 
and the results do not appear to be sensitive to which measure of profitability is chosen.  This is 
consistent with the correlation matrix presented in Table A1-4 where ROA and ROE are highly 
correlated at 0.653, and ROS and ROA (which is marginally lower) at 0.608.  Therefore using a 
lagged profitability variable as an explanatory variable has been excluded from the model to ensure 
that it has not been incorrectly specified; and thus ensuring that autocorrelation is not present.  
 
MES will be used as a proxy for economies of scale, which is considered a barrier to entry, as 
discussed under Section 5.2.6.  MES is included in the market concentration model (refer to Section 
4.5) and will also be used as an independent variable in the profitability model.  Two measures of 
MES have been calculated using firms in both the 50th and 75th percentile of industry sales; at the 
four-digit SIC (industry type).  Primarily MES in the 50th percentile will be included in the model.  
However in order to ensure that the model is robust, MES at the 75th percentile will be substituted 
and the results interpreted accordingly.  It is anticipated that an increase in MES will result in an 
increase in ROS. 
 
Industry growth (GR) will be used as a proxy of market demand.  Industry growth is calculated as 
the percentage change in industry revenue generated (i.e. year-on-year).  It is important to note that 
demand at the country level will also be captured by the GDP per capita variable, which measures 
the wealth of the wallet.  It is expected that industry growth will be positively correlated with the 
profitability. 
 
As discussed in Section 5.2.4, the asset-to-sales ratio is often used as a proxy for measuring initial 
capital requirements (see Appendix A1.4 for technical definition).   It is important to note that when 
using ROA as a dependent variable, the ASSETS variable will be highly correlated.  Intuitively, an 
increase in the value of assets reported on the balance sheet will result in an increase in depreciation 
expenditure.  An increase in the cost of doing business (CODB) will result in a reduction in firm 
profitability.  Therefore, it is anticipated that the asset-to-sales ratio will be negatively correlated 
with all measures of profitability. 
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Table 5-3: Summary statistics of independent variables [for profitability] 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
EU_MEMBER 0.88 0.33 0 1 
EURO_MEMBER 0.19 0.39 0 1 
GDP_PER_CAPITA 21.2 6.43 1.37 56.39 
POPULATION 44.62 26.2 0.35 82.54 
CPI 92.76 17.45 0.25 150.73 
BOND_YIELD 6.78 4.45 2.1 269.99 
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 0.17 0.2 0 1 
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 0.36 0.92 0 121.29 
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 0.44 0.35 0 3.28 
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 0.46 0.39 0 9.92 
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_ZONE 0.08 0.12 0 1 
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE 0.23 0.21 0 1 
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE 0.38 0.37 0 30.74 
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE 0.43 0.4 0 30.74 
MES_50TH_PERCENTILE 0.36 0.4 -0.05 1 
MES_70TH_PERCENTILE 0.49 0.41 -1.67 1.05 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0 0.23 -0.03 30.61 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO 0.05 0.64 0 98.62 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS 0.48 4.11 0 259.09 
SOLVENCY_RATIO 43.85 27.34 -99.72 100 
Source: the author 
 
Makino, Isobe et al. (2004) bring attention to the importance of country effects when modelling 
firm performance.  The levels of economic wealth, economic stability, economic sustainability, 
consumer confidence and overall size of the market, as previously discussed in Chapter 4, measures 
the health of a country.157  Generally speaking, if a country’s economic climate is healthy and 
prosperous, it is likely that a large proportion of all industries are also healthy and prosperous, given 
that a country is ultimately the sum of all industries [and it’s citizens].  Therefore, GDP per capita 
will be used as a proxy for structural characteristics that directly affect a firm’s environment – both 
internal and external – which has been defined in detail in Appendix A1.4.158  The summary 
statistics are presented in Table 5-3 of all the independent variables employed in this Chapter. 
 
                                                 
157 Hence, the economic health of a country impacts the health of an industry and vice versa. 
158 In order to ensure further robustness and sensitivity of the results, the consumer price index and the long-term government bond yield will also be 
substituted in the models estimated. 
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Table 5-4: Mean profitability by geographic sector [and time period] 
Geographic sector Time period ROS ROA ROE 
EURO-ZONE (a) Pre-1992 9.2 6.2 17.5 
(b) Single-market 8.0 4.8 12.8 
(c) Euro-era 7.3 2.8 6.7 
CONTINENTAL-ZONE (a) Pre-1992 6.9 5.7 14.0 
(b) Single-market 8.5 4.8 11.7 
(c) Euro-era 8.1 2.2 2.8 
UK-ZONE (a) Pre-1992 10.3 7.7 17.9 
(b) Single-market 8.8 5.3 12.8 
(c) Euro-era 3.9 -1.6 -7.5 
Source: the author 
 
The mean has been calculated for each of the profitability variables: ROS, ROA and ROE – by 
geographical sector and time period, as per Table 5-4.  All three profitability measures have 
declined across all three zones over the three time periods; with the exception of ROS in the 
continental-zone [during the single-market time period].  As expected, firm profitability has 
significantly declined during the euro-era time period.  This is consistent with the models 
articulated in Section 3.2 and 3.4, where firm profitability is anticipated to decrease as competition 
increases throughout Europe.  Interestingly, the UK-zone [which is not an EMU member] is the 
geographic sector most heavily impacted.  These results suggest that there have been spill over 
implications that have affected the non-euro participating countries; ultimately placing tremendous 
pressure on UK firms to be more competitive.159 
 
The mean profitability [by year] for the euro-zone is further illustrated in Figure 5-2. All three 
profitability measures are generally moving in the same direction. This is not surprising given the 
nature and derivation of the selected measures.  What is noticeable is that the ROS has remained 
fairly consistent over the last two decades.  This may due to the efficiency hypothesis mentioned 
earlier, which suggests that firms are in the business of making a profit.  Therefore, they must find 
alternative ways to optimise their business model to ensure a reasonable return is provided to 
shareholders. 
 
                                                 
159 As highlighted by Lambson (1992), profit rates will differ across industries; and therefore the models generated in Chapter 6 endeavor to consider 
industry and country-related effects. 
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Figure 5-2: Mean profitability – ROS, ROA and ROE [for the euro-zone] 
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The market concentration of each firm [by year] has been classified low (HHI < 1,000), medium 
(HHI > 1,000 and HHI <= 2,000) or high (HHI > 2,000); according to the eight different market 
definitions.  This is consistent with the categories identified in Section 3.5 – as per the EU merger 
guidelines.  The mean profitability for ROS, ROA and ROE has been calculated by time period and 
is illustrated [specifically for the euro-zone] in Figure 5-3.160  Firm profitability is consistently 
decreasing throughout each time period – with the exception of those firms that are classified in the 
‘low’ market concentration category during the single-market era.  This may be the result of firms 
leveraging profit opportunities during a politically and economically significant EU policy 
consolidation [and transformation] period. 
                                                 
160 The market definition graphically displayed is based on the four digit SIC (by country).  The eight different market definitions provide a very 
similar illustration – with few exceptions.   
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Figure 5-3: Mean profitability and market concentration [for the euro-zone] 
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5.4 Estimation techniques 
Typically, the empirical studies mentioned in Section 5.2 have attempted to control for potential 
determinants of profitability by estimating a simple cross-industry regression.161  The LM test was 
run to ascertain whether the RE regression is a more suitable fit than a simple OLS regression.  As 
discussed in Section 4.4, the null hypothesis in the LM test stipulates is that the variances across 
entities are equal to zero [i.e. there is no significant difference across the units].  The results 
generated reject the null hypothesis and therefore conclude that RE is appropriate.  Hence, there is 
evidence of significant differences across firms implying that a RE profitability model should be 
generated in favour of OLS. 
 
In the profitability models generated, the RE and FE estimation techniques employ year dummy 
variables in order to control for unobserved effects that vary over time.   Hence, a joint test was 
undertaken to ascertain if the dummies for all the years are equal to zero.  As a result, the null 
hypothesis was rejected for both the RE and FE model; which identified that time dummies are 
required. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.4, the Hausman test evaluates the significance of an estimator in contrast 
to an alternative estimator (see Hausman 1978).  Hence, the Hausman test identifies whether the 
coefficient estimates of a FE specification are different from a RE specification.  In all three 
different definitions of profitability, the FE estimates are significantly different from zero; which 
supports that the proposition that FE methodology is the appropriate specification. 
 
The profitability models generated show evidence of heteroskedasticity, which suggests that the 
variance of the disturbance is not constant.  As mentioned in Section 4.4, this does not affect the 
parameter estimates (i.e. the coefficients should be unbiased), however it does bias the variance of 
the estimated parameters; and therefore the t-values of the estimated coefficients cannot be trusted.  
                                                 
161 For example, yi = β0 + β2Hi + β’Xi +εi, where y is a measure of profitability (i.e. firm performance) such as the Lerner index or ROA.  The 
variable Hi denotes a measure of (industry) market concentration such as the HHI.  Furthermore, Xi denotes a set of variables that measures factors 
thought to affect profits such as barriers to entry, the intensity of R&D, buyer concentration or product differentiation.  The literature has 
consistently identified that β > 0, which suggests that the positive coefficient generated can be presented as evidence that market power is being 
exploited by firms whom are participants in highly concentrated industries.  The implication of such a relationship infers that if the casual 
relationship captured indicates that market structure causes high margin and profits, indicating that it would be desirable to break firms up; thus 
reducing market concentration, a reduction in firm profits and finally an increase in consumer welfare. 
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As a result, the profitability models are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard error, 
which allows the standard errors to provide t-statistics that are asymptotically Z distributed. 
 
There is also evidence of serial correlation in the profitability models according to the LM test.  
Hence, the serial correlation causes the standard error of the coefficients to be smaller than they 
actually are; including a higher R-squared.  The results generated by the profitability models reject 
the null hypothesis and therefore conclude that first-order autocorrelation exists.  This will be 
corrected by the Arellano-Bond test undertaken in Section 5.5.   
 
The model specification proposed follows a FE methodology; and is determined by Equation (5.2–
A).  Furthermore, the postulated sign (+/-) is also illustrated below. 
 (5.4–A) 
Where; 
EU_MEMBER = European Union membership dummy for country k (-), 
EURO_MEMBER = European Monetary Union membership dummy for country k (-), 
GDP_PER_CAPITA = Gross domestic product (per capita) for country k (+), 
HHI = Lagged Herfindahl-Hirschman index for industry j (+), 
MES = Minimum efficient scale for industry j (+), 
GR = Revenue growth of industry j (+), 
ASSETS = Asset-to-sales ratio of firm i (-), and 
u = Unobserved fixed effects of firm i (+/-). 
 
There are two dummy variables that have been included in Equation (5.4–A), which capture a 
country’s membership in the European Union (EU_MEMBER) and the European Monetary Union 
(EURO_MEMBER). The EU_MEMBER variable can be viewed as a measure of the barriers to 
entry relating to the single-market programme.  Whereas the EURO_MEMBER variable is an 
indicator of the level of transaction costs that firms incur due to the removal of currency risk 
incurred on the balance sheet and income statement.  Both of these dummy variables have been 
covered in comprehensive detail in Appendix A1.4, which have also been included as an 
explanatory variable in the market concentration models estimated in Section 4.5.  The correlation 
matrix of the independent variables selected to be included in the model is shown in Table 5-5. 
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Table 5-5: Correlation coefficients of independent variables [for profitability] 
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EU_MEMBER 1                    
EURO_MEMBER 0.0836 1                   
GDP_PER CAPITA 0.2106 -0.0722 1                  
POPULATION 0.1904 0.0601 0.0427 1                 
CPI 0.0551 0.4409 0.3611 -0.0817 1                
BOND_YIELD -0.1074 -0.5073 -0.4218 -0.0172 -0.833 1               
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY -0.1353 0.0715 -0.1675 -0.3211 0.0517 0.0153 1              
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY -0.0255 0.0404 -0.0307 -0.0598 0.0131 0.0041 0.1055 1             
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY -0.099 0.1071 -0.1422 -0.2808 -0.0062 0.0146 0.3008 0.178 1            
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY -0.08 0.1039 -0.105 -0.2256 0.0047 -0.0021 0.2198 0.1477 0.8218 1           
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_ZONE 0.0074 -0.2105 0.1012 -0.0349 -0.0168 0.0749 0.5481 0.0355 0.041 0.0193 1          
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE -0.0083 -0.1801 0.053 -0.0707 -0.0523 0.0936 0.2921 0.1213 0.2809 0.2267 0.4888 1         
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE -0.0014 -0.1159 0.0293 -0.0291 -0.0541 0.078 0.1208 0.1672 0.5648 0.4785 0.1987 0.4506 1        
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE -0.006 -0.1137 0.0401 -0.0309 -0.051 0.0686 0.0482 0.1348 0.4794 0.6436 0.14 0.3482 0.8048 1       
MES_50TH_PERCENTILE -0.1058 0.049 -0.1709 -0.2744 -0.0526 0.0681 0.1907 0.0751 0.6478 0.7795 -0.0345 0.1608 0.3781 0.5424 1      
MES_75TH_PERCENTILE -0.0893 0.0598 -0.1672 -0.2733 -0.0504 0.06 0.1886 0.078 0.7062 0.8361 -0.0402 0.1833 0.414 0.5648 0.8756 1     
INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0.0015 -0.0064 -0.0002 0.0019 -0.0015 0.0006 0.0103 0.0023 0.0162 0.016 0.0084 0.0076 0.0088 0.0088 -0.001 0.0116 1    
ASSET_SALES_RATIO 0.0016 0.0146 -0.018 -0.0108 0.0142 -0.0076 0.0123 0.0137 -0.0029 -0.015 -0.0029 -0.0093 -0.0167 -0.0284 -0.0188 -0.0206 0.0006 1   
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS 0.01 0.0503 0.0103 0.0196 0.0446 -0.0406 0.0107 0.0052 -0.0312 -0.0555 -0.012 -0.0333 -0.0501 -0.0727 -0.0617 -0.0645 -0.0002 0.0519 1  
SOLVENCY_RATIO 0.001 -0.0648 0.0806 -0.0137 0.0267 -0.0121 0.0084 -0.01 -0.0345 -0.0096 0.1101 0.0843 0.0358 0.0544 -0.0289 -0.039 -0.0073 -0.0323 -0.1361 1 
Source: the author 
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5.5 Results 
The coefficients estimated under a FE specification for Equation (5.4–A) are summarised in Table 
5-6. 162  The three alternative profitability measures are shown as follows: ROA, ROE and ROS.163 
All the models generated highlight that being a member of the EU is statistically significant.  The 
results suggest that just by being a member of the EU will result in an increase in firm profitability 
(i.e. ROS) of 3.21%; assuming that the firm is located in a country who is a participant. 
 
Intuitively, one might anticipate that an increase in profits in an industry is due to a reduction in 
competition, as firms are able to extract more revenue from consumers due to lack of market 
activity [e.g. as there are no competing products].  However the increase in ROS may be due to an 
increase in competition placing cost pressures on firms.  Hence, firms will attempt to reallocate 
resources by exploiting and maximising potential cost savings within the organisational structure.  
In other words, the focus (and expectations from the owners i.e. shareholders) on a firm’s profit 
could potentially drive the removal of non-value adding activities from the cost of doing business.  
This inturn may drive an improvement in [profit] margins within the firm and hence an increase (or 
maintenance of) profit levels pre the enhanced competitive activity. 
 
In addition to countries holding a membership in the European Union, also being a member of the 
EMU generates a statistically significant result.164  The EURO_MEMBER coefficients estimated 
suggest that as a member of the currency union, firm profitability has increased by 4.23% – which 
is made up of 3.21% (capturing the EU impact) plus 1.04% (capturing the EMU impact).165 As a 
member of the EMU, a country must also be a member of the EU.  Therefore, a firm that is located 
in a country that is a participant in the currency union (i.e. the euro) will receive a double uplift in 
profit, according to results shown in Table 5-6.  A reduction in the number of currencies handled by 
a firm will result in a decrease in the provisions taken up on the balance sheet, due to removal of the 
potential liability relating to currency risk.  Hence this transposes into a reduction in expenses 
                                                 
162 In addition to a FE robust specification with augmented time dummy variables, OLS (with and without time dummies) and RE with time dummy 
variables will also be estimated using the variables defined in Equation (5.4–A).  This is to ensure that the results are consistent with the extensive 
empirical research discussed in Section 5.2.  Appendix A3.1 shows the output generated for an OLS specification augmented with (and without) 
time dummy variables and the panel model specification for both random and fixed effects (with time dummy variables). 
163 (1979b) outlines a simultaneous causality model of industrial organisation, examining the robustness of empirical results using four alternative 
measures of profitability: the PCM, ROS, ROE and ROA.  The results indicate that barriers to entry variables influence profitability through their 
influence on concentration, irrespective of which type of profitability measure is utilised. 
164 Although this is with the exception of ROS under an OLS specification, as shown in Appendix A3.1. 
165 However it is important to note that when time dummies are excluded in the OLS specification, the coefficients estimated for the 
EURO_MEMBER variable are negative; as shown in Appendix A3.1. 
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recorded on a firm’s income statement; which ultimately increases a firm’s profitability if the cost 
saving is not passed onto customers. 
  
Table 5-6: Profitability model – panel with fixed effects (FE) 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 2.11*** 6.38*** 3.21*** 
 (6.16) (5.17) (5.04) 
EURO_MEMBER 1.74*** 5.17*** 1.02** 
 (5.81) (3.77) (2.41) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (0.10) (-0.14) (1.36) 
LAGGED_HHI 1.00** 3.90** 2.14*** 
 (2.51) (2.21) (3.65) 
MINIMIUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 0.10 2.48 -0.30 
 (0.26) (1.38) (-0.58) 
INDUSTRY GROWTH 0.30* 0.85 0.15 
 (1.66) (1.01) (0.81) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.83* -1.51* -2.96** 
 (-1.76) (-1.88) (-2.01) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R-squared 0.0392 0.0176 0.0270 
Adj. R-squared 0.0389 0.0172 0.0267 
Number of firms 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
 
GDP per capita is not significant when taking into consideration firm fixed effects, as shown in 
Table 5-6.166  When omitting GDP per capita, the model does not change substantially.167  The 
results are also consistent when substituting GDP per capita for the population variable, as defined 
in Appendix A1.4.168  Also, when including CPI and the government bond yield as control variables 
in the profitability model, EU_MEMBER and EURO_MEMBER continue to remain strongly 
statistically significant.169  Finally, it is important to note that all the country variables are highly 
correlated and therefore excluded from the model; with the exception of GDP per capita as it is used 
as a control variable capturing time-varying country specific characteristics.  This is consistent with 
Bayoumi, Laxton et al. (2004) who explore differences in competition and the impact on GDP per 
capita, which is viewed as an all-encompassing measure of macroeconomic health. 
                                                 
166 GDP per capita appears to be strongly significant across all OLS and RE models specified in Appendix A3.1 (see Table A3-1) 
167 Refer to Appendix A3.2 for the model without the GDP_PER_CAPITA variable: see Table A3-2. 
168 Refer to Appendix A3.2 for the model with the POPULATION variable (which replaces the GDP_PER_CAPITA variable): see Table A3-3. 
169 Refer to Appendix A3.2 for the model including the POPULATION and BOND_YIELD variables: see Table A3-4.  It is also important to note that 
all combinations of GDP per capita, CPI and government bond yield has a marginal impact on the results generated.  The EU_MEMBER and 
EURO_MEMBER variables continue to remain strongly statistically significant. 
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Firm size and market concentration are the most commonly used structural indicators of 
profitability; and both are thought to be positively correlated with market power and margins (Davis 
and Garcés 2010).  The more highly concentrated a market, the higher the expected profitability 
given that there are not any players in the market to challenge the minimum efficient size of the 
firm.  The FE model shows that market concentration at the four-digit SIC level (industry type) is 
positive and statistically significant, as shown in Table 5-6.  The results estimated under a FE 
specification are consistent with Cowling and Waterson (1976) who find that lagged market 
concentration is statistically significant when estimating PCMs.170  The EU_MEMBER and EURO 
MEMBER variables remain statistically significant when substituting the HHI with the alternative 
market definitions at the three-digit SIC level (industry group), two-digit SIC level (major group), 
and one-digit SIC level (division) across countries and zones; and four-digit SIC level (industry 
type) across zones.171 
 
MES calculated at the 50th percentile is not statistically significant as shown in Table 5-6.172  In 
contrast, when substituting MES at the 50th percentile for MES at the 75th percentile, the minimum 
efficient scale variable does not change in terms of statistical significance. 173  Interestingly, when 
omitting HHI as an explanatory variable, ROE and ROS becomes statistically significant at under a 
FE specification.174 As highlighted by Kwoka (1981, p. 452), “…an industry’s ability to coordinate 
behaviour and raise price-cost margins may be determined not by twenty, eight or even four firms, 
but by the leading two”. 
 
The ROE and ROS results suggest that those firms that make up the top twenty-five percent of the 
market explain more of the variation in profitability than those firms that sit in the middle [i.e. on 
average].  Hence, the contrasting MES results suggest that economies of scale do matter when 
reviewing the profitability of a firm.  Finally, it is also important to note that even when the MES at 
the 75th percentile is substituted in the model, the EU_MEMBER and EURO_MEMBER variables 
continue to remain statistically significant across all the different model specifications estimated for 
ROA, ROE and ROS. 
                                                 
170 Phillips (1972), Shepherd (1972a), Hitiris (1978), Hirsch (1990) and Coate (1991) also find a positive and strongly significant relationship between 
market concentration and profitability.  
171 Refer to Appendix A3.3 for models estimated using the seven alternative market definitions of HHI: one-digit SIC by country (see Table A3-5), 
two-digit SIC by country (see Table A3-6), three-digit SIC by country (see Table A3-7), one-digit SIC by zone (see Table A3-8), two-digit SIC by 
zone (see Table A3-9), three-digit SIC by zone (see Table A3-10), and four-digit SIC by zone (see Table A3-11). 
172 Although MES at the 50th percentile is statistically significant in the OLS and RE models generated: see Appendix A3.1. 
173 Refer to Appendix A3.4 for the model estimated with MES at the 75th percentile as a proxy for economies of scale: see Table A3-12. 
174 Refer to Appendix A3.4 for the model estimated.  It is important to note that only ROE becomes statistically significant when omitting HHI when 
including MES at the 50th percentile: see Table A3-13. 
 143 
Industry growth is positively correlated with firm profitability, however it is not statistically 
significant in any of the models generated in Appendix A3.1.  Furthermore, there is no 
improvement in explanatory power of the model when substituting for lagged values of industry 
growth.175  This suggests that industry growth does not appear to be an effective proxy for market 
demand.  Furthermore, market demand may be captured at the country level by GDP per capita, 
given that this variable is a measure of the wealth of the wallet.  Hence, the richer a country appears 
to be, the more likely the citizens are to spend their monies in the market place.  It is also important 
to note that when substituting for lagged industry growth, or omitting industry growth completely 
from the model, the EU_MEMBER and EURO_MEMBER variables continue to remain statistically 
significant for all measures of profitability.176 
 
The asset-to-sales ratio is negative and statistically significant across all of the models generated.177  
Intuitively, when a firm acquires new assets, this results in an increase in the market [or book] value 
of the assets recorded on the company balance sheet.  Conversely, depreciation is then recorded on 
the income statement that results in a decrease in ROS due to the increase in the cost of doing 
business.178  In terms of the ROA measure, an increase in the asset value results in an increase in 
the denominator of the ratio.  This is in addition to the increase in expenses recorded on the income 
statement, which ultimately reduces the profit available for distribution to shareholders.  
Furthermore, this also applies to the ROE measure, which includes profit reported by a firm in the 
numerator. 
 
When substituting the asset-to-sales ratio for ‘absolute’ assets, the initial capital requirements proxy 
remains statistically significant, with the exception of ROA in a RE specification.179  Theoretically, 
the depreciation expense and the market value of an asset are inversely related irrespective of the 
accounting treatment selected by the firm.  Depreciation is accounted for as an expense in the profit 
generated, which is why there is a strong relationship with the dependent variable.  In addition to 
this, the market value of the firm assets is included in the denominator of the ROA measure, which 
means that serial correlation is present. 
 
                                                 
175 Refer to Appendix A3.5 for the model estimated with lagged industry growth: see Table A3-14.  Interestingly, lagged industry growth generates 
negative coefficients, suggesting that last year industry growth reduces current year profitability. 
176 Refer to Appendix A3.5 for the model estimated without the INDUSTRY_GROWTH variable: see Table A3-15. 
177 The asset-to-sales ratio is not statistically significant under a RE model specification for the ROS variable, which does not take into consideration 
firm fixed effects.   Also, the coefficient is positive (rather than negative) under OLS with and without time augmented dummies when estimating 
for ROS.  Refer to Appendix A3.1 for the output of results. 
178 Furthermore, depreciation reduces the value of the assets on the balance sheet over the lifecycle of the asset purchased. 
179 Refer to Appendix A3.6 for the model estimated using absolute assets as a proxy of initial capital requirements: see Table A3-16. 
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The asset-to-sales ratio is the preferred proxy for initial capital requirements; given the direct 
relationship between ‘absolute’ assets and profitability.  Furthermore, the sales value included in the 
denominator of the asset-to-sales ratio provides context of firm size when assessing cross-industry 
differences.  Finally, it is also important to note that even when the ‘absolute’ assets variable is 
included in the model as the alternative measure, the EU_MEMBER and EURO_MEMBER 
variables remain statistically significant across all different model specifications estimated for 
ROA, ROE and ROS. 
 
The solvency ratio is a measure of the health of a firm, as discussed in Section 2.5.180  When 
including the solvency ratio in the model, the additional variable becomes statistically significant 
across all model specifications.181  Due to the presence of autocorrelation and multicollinearity in 
the model, the solvency ratio has been excluded.  However, it is important to note that the inclusion 
of this firm variable does not impact the statistical significance of the EU_MEMBER and 
EURO_MEMBER variables.182 
 
There is a simultaneity problem relating to firm profitability, market concentration, and barriers to 
entry; given that they are all considered endogenous.  The Hausman test confirms that lagged HHI, 
the asset-to-sales ratio and MES are endogenous (refer to Hausman 1978).  In order to improve the 
efficiency of the model shown in Table 5-6, the Arellano-Bond test is undertaken to identify 
estimates that remove the existence of endogeneity (see Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and 
Bover 1995); as discussed in Section 4.5.  The results are shown in Table 5-7 for all three 
profitability variables estimated: ROA, ROE and ROS. 
 
Under the Hansen test, ROE fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are 
exogenous.  The lag structure is optimised at 19 lags that are both differenced and within levels, 
generating a p-value of 0.578.  Under this lag structure, the EURO_MEMBER remains statistically 
significant, whereas the EU_MEMBER variable is no longer statistically significant. 
                                                 
180 The solvency ratio is a commonly used measure used to identify a company's ability to meet its long-term obligations.  The solvency ratio 
measures the size of a company's after-tax income (excluding non-cash depreciation expenses) as compared to the firm's total debt obligations.  
The health of the firm can be measured by a firm’s solvency.  
181 Refer to Appendix A3.7 for the model estimated with the SOLVENCY_RATIO variable: see Table A3-17.  Although this is with the exception of 
ROE in an OLS specification – without augmented time dummies. 
182 The current ratio measures the ability of a firm to meet its immediate obligations.  When including the current ratio in the model, it becomes 
statistically significant across all models estimated, with the exception of ROE in an OLD specification (including and excluding time dummy 
variables).  Due to the presence of autocorrelation and multicollinearity in the model, much like the solvency ratio, the current ratio has been 
excluded.  However, it is important to note that the inclusion of the current ratio does not impact the statistical significance of the EU_MEMBER 
and EURO_MEMBER variables. 
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Under the Hansen J test, ROA and ROS fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments as a 
group are exogenous.  The lag structure is optimised at 20 and 17 lags (i.e. 20 lags differenced and 
20 lags in levels) for ROA at a p-value of 0.566; and 18 lags (both differenced and within levels) 
for ROS at a p-value of 0.923. 
 
Table 5-7: Profitability model – generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS 
Model type Difference GMM System GMM Difference GMM 
EU_MEMBER 0.695* 6.955 0.933 
 (1.676) (1.419) (1.055) 
EURO_MEMBER 1.198* 4.834* -2.724* 
 (1.701) (1.726) (-1.770) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA 0.549*** -0.211 0.538** 
 (4.223) (-1.247) (2.206) 
LAGGED_HHI 15.46 -43.39 -24.88 
 (1.630) (-0.681) (-0.634) 
MINIMIUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 15.76 31.19 -62.53 
 (0.809) (0.867) (-1.493) 
INDUSTRY GROWTH 0.644 1.651 0.189 
 (1.579) (1.171) (0.490) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -2.175 -78.16 -89.40** 
 (-0.274) (-1.182) (-2.449) 
AR (2) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sargan/Hansen p-value 0.566 0.578 0.923 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 63,784 73,991 63,784 
Number of firms 9,452 10,456 9,452 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
 
The EU_MEMBER and EURO_MEMBER variables remain statistically significant under the ROA 
model estimated.  In contrast, the EU_MEMBER variable is no longer significant under the ROS 
model estimated.  Interestingly, the EURO_MEMBER variable remains statistically significant; 
however the sign of the coefficient is negative.  This suggests that the introduction of the euro has 
in fact resulted in a reduction in firm profitability, which is consistent with the Cournot model 
discussed in Section 3.2.  One may infer that due to an increase in competition across those 
countries participating in the currency union, this has resulted in a reduction in the profit margins 
generated by firms. 
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
The basic model of SCP is founded in the discipline of IO.  The SCP framework presumes a casual 
link between the structure of the market, the nature of competition, and market outcomes in terms 
of prices, output and profits.  According to the SCP paradigm, firm performance is dependent upon 
its conduct in matters such as pricing practices, investment policy, and research and development.  
It then translates that firm conduct is then dependent on industry structure; which includes levels of 
market concentration, degrees of product differentiation and barriers to entry (Scherer and Ross 
1990).  Therefore structural characteristics of industries affect both the conduct (i.e. strategy) of 
firms and their respective performance (Bain 1968). 
 
Within the SCP paradigm, the traditionally tested hypothesis which was pioneered by the American 
economist Joe S. Bain, is as follows: given the pricing behaviour expected under a monopoly or 
efficient oligopoly, the average profit return realised by firms in a highly concentrated industry will 
tend to be significantly higher than those in less concentrated industries.  Hence, the SCP approach 
argues that a concentrated market structure is associated with higher prices and profits (Carbó, 
Humphrey et al. 2009).  The models estimated in Section 5.5 suggest that lagged HHI is a leading 
indicator that influences the level of profits a firm generates.  Lagged HHI is positive and 
statistically significant; which consequently supports the aforementioned proposition articulated by 
Bain. 
 
Most importantly, the models estimated in Table 5-6 highlight that a common currency does matter 
in the context of firm profitability.  Assuming that the introduction of a single market has resulted 
in an increase in competition, as shown by the reduction in market concentration by those countries 
participating in the currency union.  This would suggest that this has placed additional (i.e. 
extensive) pressure on firms to become more structurally efficient and effective.  As a result, firms 
are forced to review and optimise their cost of doing business, and hence maximising their return to 
shareholders and investors.  In other words, firms are becoming more competitive by exploiting 
opportunities in the market place.  Further coupled with the reduction in transaction costs; a firm’s 
CODB has theoretically reduced.  The question that remains unanswered is whether this cost saving 
has been passed onto consumers; and has the removal of managing multiple currencies created a 
more open market measured by factor and labour mobility. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion and policy inferences 
6.1 Recapitulation and findings 
The EMU in Europe was created for a variety of political and economic reasons.  From an 
economic perspective, the EMU was conceived as a complement and component of the EU single 
market.  Exchange rate risks and transaction costs that were associated with different national 
currencies, constituted barriers to ‘intra-EU’ trade, which the single market programme was 
designed to eliminate.  The removal of physical, technical and monetary barriers was expected to 
boost trade and financial integration amongst the member states (European Commission 1990). 
 
The countries or regions choosing to participate in a currency arrangement define the borders of a 
specific OCA.  The EMU, which is ‘purported’ to be an OCA, has been galvanised by anticipated 
macroeconomic benefits.  However, most economists agree that there is difficulty in quantifying the 
costs and benefits of a currency union.  Thus, Chapter 2 features the broad range of research that 
has attempted to investigate these costs and benefits at the macroeconomic level – with particular 
emphasis on financial integration, OCA qualification and international trade implications.  Most 
importantly, what is evident is that the microeconomic impact has been largely ignored – 
specifically the impact on industries and firms. 
 
Section 2.1 provides a brief historical summary of the motivation to launch the euro.  The 
significant stages of EMU implementation are outlined, which highlights the unprecedented social, 
political and financial structure of the single currency.  One of the most important objectives of the 
EMU was to enhance competition across the EU, which commenced with the SMP.  This was to be 
accomplished by the removal barriers to trade and eventually currency transaction costs; where the 
costs savings are re-invested by the member states – stimulating economic activity and increasing 
competition.  In addition, and quite importantly, the Lisbon agenda [launched in March 2000] was a 
comprehensive 10-year strategy covering product, labour and capital market reforms; aimed at 
transforming the EU into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world (see European Commission 2005). 
 
Section 2.2 outlines the theory of OCAs, which is motivated by macroeconomic benefits – 
consequently driving microeconomic value through enhanced competition in an economy. OCA 
theorem continues to remain the implicit reference framework to assess the real consequences of 
monetary integration, which was initiated by Robert Mundell in 1961.  The theory of OCAs asserts 
that a single currency zone must have symmetry across shocks and structures.  In terms of OCA 
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properties, optimality is explored with respect to mobility of factors of production and labour, 
including price and wage flexibility; trade openness (see McKinnon 1963); industrial diversification 
in production and consumption (see Kenen 1969); fiscal transfer management structures; 
homogeneity of preferences; and solidarity of monetary management (i.e. a shared vision) between 
member states.  There is still much debate about whether member states of the EMU qualify under 
the OCA criteria. 
 
Section 2.3 discusses the extensive body of work on international trade and its impact on currency 
unions.  Andrew K. Rose is the most prominent economist who has shone a light on this area of 
research.  The overwhelming majority of the empirical analysis infers that the effect that the EMU 
in Europe has had on trade is significant and economically important.  Section 2.5 focuses on the IO 
empirical literature, which is concerned with the microeconomic implications of competition. The 
SCP paradigm surmises that market performance is the success of a market in producing benefits 
for consumers.  Market structure consists of those factors that determine the competitiveness of a 
market, which ultimately affects market performance through the conduct (i.e. behaviour) of firms.   
 
The SCP paradigm is the premise for which competition (specifically the existence of a market 
power) is assessed across markets, countries and regions.  Competition which is typically measured 
through market concentration (structure), can foster collusion (conduct); and as a result monopoly 
pricing (performance).  Interestingly, the comprehensive body of work that exists precludes a 
specific focus of the impact of the euro on competition. 
 
Chapter 3 explores competition and the impact on market structure.  Section 3.1 briefly highlights 
four key market structures: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, monopoly and 
oligopoly; that are used extensively in microeconomics to explain the theory of a firm and 
corresponding role in the competitive process.  Section 3.2 encapsulates the Cournot oligopoly 
model to identify the equilibrium number of firms.  An important feature of market structure is 
industry concentration, where the number and size distribution of firms within a specified market 
indicates the depth of concentration.  The microeconomic model defined in Section 3.2 is expressed 
in context to the EU in Section 3.3.  In essence, the price transparency introduced as a result of the 
EMU is believed to enhance competition [and reduce market concentration] across the member 
states.  
 
All concentration measures vary in sophistication, seeking to translate the information on the 
number and size distribution of firms (presented by a concentration curve) into a single value.  
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Section 3.4 discusses in detail the HHI, which is the most commonly used indicator of market 
concentration.  Market participants are assumed to be indicative of competitive conditions when 
represented by extraneous (low) values when calculating concentration indices. Generally, 
concentration indices would be larger the fewer the number of firms and the more unequal the 
distribution of market shares among them. Hence, market concentration makes reference to the 
structural characteristics of the business sector and is the degree to which production in an industry 
or economy is dominated by a few large firms.  Traditionally, market concentration was assumed to 
be a symptom of market failure.  However in today’s context, it is mostly seen as an indicator of 
superior economic performance.   
 
The most direct route to market concentration is where the consolidation of production occurs 
resulting in fewer firms due to M&A.  Firm consolidations that strengthen or create a dominant 
player in the market is central to merger policy theory.  Competition policy in the EU primarily 
aims to prevent negative effects being incurred on welfare.  Competition is empirically assessed by 
government authorities globally through the estimation of market concentration pertaining to a 
defined economy [i.e. industry sector].  The HHI plays a significant role in EU antitrust legislation 
– reinforcing its validity as an important indicator if competition as is discussed in Section 3.5.  The 
empirical literature pertaining to competition and the EMU in Europe is scarce.  The minimal 
research that does exist is discussed briefly in Section 3.6.  The banking sector has been extensively 
explored namely due to the financial integration implications of the euro.  
 
Chapter 4 employs the HHI (an indicator of market structure) that is calculated across eight 
different market definitions to assess the implications of the European OCA on competition.  The 
HHI is a function of firm, industry and country characteristics, and hence the determinants of 
market concentration are summarised under Section 4.2.  This includes the extensive body of 
research that has been published over the last sixty years relating to the structural variables that 
influence a firm’s conduct.  
 
Circa 1980, most industrial economists approached market concentration as an important 
determinant of the manner in which firms establish pricing and other competitive weapons.  
However, very little regard was given to the fundamental determinants of market concentration 
itself.  Market structure was somehow presumed to be a consequence of a few basic conditions; 
such as economies of scale (relative to the size of the market) and exogenous consumer preferences.  
These two assumptions were not thought to be fundamentally important, with the exception of 
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economics of scale – if found to be relatively large, would most likely result in a few firms existing 
in the defined market; and as a result, may confer a degree of monopoly power. 
 
In order to assess the impact on competition of the introduction of the euro [on member states], the 
HHI is calculated in Section 4.3 across eight different market definitions.  The mean HHI increased 
during the euro-era, suggesting that competition has in fact reduced as a result of the EMU.  
However the concentration curves generated suggest that the cumulative market share [of the top 
ten firms] has shifted to the right, implying an increase in competition.  This is despite the increase 
in the number of firms across Europe.  However, it is important to note that the rate of growth at 
which this occurred during the euro-era has reduced significantly. 
 
Section 4.3 also proposes a market concentration model that includes the following firm and 
industry level determinants: initial capital requirements, lagged profitability, lagged industry 
growth, economies of scale; and country indicators measuring the economic wealth, stability and 
sustainability.  Two dummy variables were also included in order to capture each country’s 
membership in the EU and EMU. 
 
The market concentration model is constructed in Section 4.5 using six different estimation 
techniques; in order to ensure that the robustness and sensitivity of the model has been optimised.183  
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test identified that the RE model is a more suitable fit than 
OLS estimation.  The Hausman test confirmed that the coefficients generated under a FE model are 
more efficient that that of a RE estimation.  Hence, the model of best fit is of a FE estimation.  
Irrespective of which estimation method is applied, the EURO_MEMBER variable is statistically 
significant across all eight different market definitions.  When including instrumental variables to 
the model in order to remove the endogeneity of the asset-to-sales ratio and MES, the 
EURO_MEMBER variable remains statistically significant.  However, an extremely long lag 
structure is required to meet the requirements of the Arellano-Bond test; using both difference 
GMM and system GMM.   Section 4.6 concludes that the EMU has clearly stimulated competition 
positively across the European region. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 5 explores the impact on firm profitability resulting from the introduction of the 
euro.  The model for firm profitability is defined in Section 5.2.  An extensive body of research is 
discussed in detail that outline firm, industry and country characteristics that affect firm 
                                                 
183 The estimation techniques include (1) OLS with augmented time dummies, (2) OLS without augmented time dummies, (3) Panel with RE, (4) 
Panel with FE, (5) Difference GMM, and (6) System GMM. 
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profitability.  Section 5.3 provides a correlation matrix of the eight different geographic definitions 
of market concentration and three firm profitability metrics – ROS, ROA and ROE.  The findings 
suggest a mostly positive relationship; with respect to the country-defined HHI. 
 
The concentration-efficiency nexus is further discussed, followed by the mean profitability 
summarised by geographic sector [and time period].  All three profitability measures have mostly 
declined across all three zones over the three time periods.  The mean profitability [by year] for the 
euro-zone is further illustrated, which show unsurprisingly that they are closely correlated.  The 
market concentration of each firm [by year] is further classified into three categories: low HHI, 
medium HHI or high HHI.  The corresponding mean profitability for ROS, ROA and ROE is 
illustrated by time period [specifically for the euro-zone].  This shows that firm profitability is 
consistently decreasing throughout each time period.  
 
Section 5.4 proposes a firm profitability model that includes the following independent variables 
(i.e. determinants): GDP per capita, lagged HHI, MES, industry growth and asset-to-sales ratio. 
Two dummy variables are also included in order to capture each country’s EU and EMU 
membership. 
 
The profitability model is constructed and the findings are discussed in Section 5.5.  The models 
(OLS, OLS + t, panel with FE and panel with RE) were generated for the three profitability 
measures: ROS, ROA and ROE.  This reason for this was to ensure that the robustness and 
sensitivity of results had been taken into consideration.  Initially, all models highlighted that being a 
member of the EU and EMU results in an increase in firm profitability. However, when generating 
the profitability model using GMM estimation, only the EURO_MEMBER variable is statistically 
significant across all three profitability measures.  Also, the ROS variable becomes negative; 
suggesting that firm profitability has decreased as a result of member states participating in the 
EMU.  
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6.2 Recent events and policy considerations 
The European economy, together with the rest of the world, is experiencing challenging times.  The 
European single currency system has come under unprecedented strain during the past three years; 
and there is little reason to assume that this will diminish, in any significant way, in the near future 
(Baimbridge, Burkitt et al. 2012).  In 2007, the instability that originated in the US subprime 
mortgage market spread into financial markets and impacted economies all around the world.  As a 
result, the GFC has exposed a number of unsustainable imbalances that accumulated over the first 
decade of the euro.  In Europe, countries have been affected by a sovereign debt crisis, with Iceland, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, Spain and Italy [in particular] at risk.   
 
The EMU continues to face a number of challenges, with member states and their banks facing 
difficulties in meeting debt obligations.  This has caused a downturn in demand, and as a result, 
globally depressed stock markets.  The austerity measures implemented by member states have led 
to large-scale unemployment and citizen unrest.  This has raised the question once again if the euro 
zone is an OCA – given that the solidarity criterion is strained.  As a result, the future of the euro 
[as it stands] is uncertain. 
 
The economic challenges currently facing the PIIGS nations have reignited the debate regarding the 
efficacy of a single currency adopted by the EU member states.  Many critics suggest that the 
persistent economic disparities between the participants of the euro-zone should lead to the 
dismantling of the euro.  This would enable those countries to independently employ a monetary 
policy during challenging economic periods.  Given the speculation regarding the potential break-
up of the EMU, serious consideration must be given to the implications pertaining to market 
structure; and hence competition.184 
 
Empirical research regarding the impact of the euro has been extensive at the macroeconomic level.  
However the impact pertaining to firms across industries have been ignored.  Ultimately, the 
macroeconomic assertions are the sum of the microeconomic activity: firms generate revenue, jobs 
and industry growth – fundamentally dictating the economic health of a country.  The results 
modelled in this thesis demonstrate that the euro has had a direct impact on competition, through a 
reduction in market concentration and an increase in firm profitability.   
 
                                                 
184 Eichengreen (2010) considers the implications of breaking up the euro; discussing the barriers to exit at length. 
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Economists, policy-makers and governments need to identify opportunities in which to harvest 
competition; rather than dismantling the euro.  Given ‘our’ generation of globalisation and 
interconnectedness (i.e. no country is an island); the suggestion that individual currencies would 
have resulted in a different outcome in the euro-zone is very difficult to imagine.  The members of 
the EMU have a responsibility to preserve the progress made over the last decade: ensuring that 
open markets are a breeding ground for healthy competition. 
 
As stated by Blanchard (2004) “…Europe has done better than is often perceived; that there has 
been and continues to be a steady process of reform in the product and financial markets, that this 
process is likely to continue; that it has and will continue to lead to reforms in the labour market, 
although not without tensions along the way”.  However he does go on to ask “Is the outlook really 
so rosy? There are always reasons to worry”. 
 
6.3 Limitations of the study  
Firstly, and above all, the main limitation stems from the fact that it is not possible to assess what 
would have happened in the absence of the EMU.  Secondly, it is not clear whether market 
concentration is the cause of high profits; as high levels of market concentration and profits may be 
the result of superior performance by a few efficient and effective firms.185  As stated by Phillips 
(1976, p. 248), “…better theory, better data, and above all, better econometrics are needed before 
policy can be based on anything other than in-depth institutional studies of particular markets”.   
                                                 
185 This is discussed at length in survey of empirical literature undertaken by Phillips (1986); where the superior skill, foresight and industry of a firm 
may be reflected in lower costs, better products, and consequently high profits and market share. 
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APPENDIX A1: Data sources and variable construction 
A1.1 Country, zone and industry 
In order to assess the impact of the introduction of the euro on participating countries, three 
geographic zones have been created as follows: euro, continental, and the UK.  The countries that 
are included in each of the zones are listed in Table A1-1; which also summarises the year of entry 
into the EU and the EMU.  The euro-zone includes eleven countries that were participants in the 
launch of the euro in 1999 [i.e. founding members].  Furthermore, there are sixteen countries that 
are classified under the continental-zone as they are a member of the EU and not the EMU; or they 
joined the currency union after 1999.186  Finally, the UK has been separated into the UK-zone; 
given the economic maturity of the country in contrast to those classified in the continental-zone. 
Table A1-1: Summary of countries 
          Year of entry    Year of entry  
Country EU EMU Zone  Country EU EMU Zone 
Austria 1995 1999 Euro  Latvia 2004 2014 Continental 
Belgium 1952 1999 Euro  Lithuania 2004  Continental 
Bulgaria 2007  Continental  Luxembourg 1952 1999 Euro 
Cyprus 2004 2008 Continental  Malta 2004 2008 Continental 
Czech Republic 2004  Continental  Netherlands 1952 1999 Euro 
Denmark 1973  Continental  Poland 2004  Continental 
Estonia 2004 2011 Continental  Portugalb 1986 1999 Euro 
Finland 1995 1999 Euro  Romania 2007  Continental 
Francea 1952 1999 Euro  Slovakia 2004 2009 Continental 
Germanya 1952 1999 Euro  Slovenia 2004 2007 Continental 
Greeceb 1981 2001 Continental  Spainb 1986 1999 Euro 
Hungary 2004  Continental  Sweden 1995  Continental 
Irelandb 1973 1999 Euro  Switzerland   Continental 
Italyab 1952 1999 Euro  United Kingdoma 1973  UK 
a Germany, France, Italy and the UK are commonly referred to as the Big 4 
b Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain are typically referred to as the PIIGS nations 
Source: the author 
 
The PIIGS nations are an acronym used to refer to five nations, which were considered weaker 
economically following the financial crisis: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain – as notated 
in Table A1-1.187  Germany, France, Italy and the UK are often referred to as the ‘Big 4’ due to the 
size of their respective economies. 
                                                 
186 It is important to note that Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia joined the euro after 2007.  Furthermore, Switzerland has been included 
given the close geographical proximity to those countries participating in the currency union. 
187 This is due to the PIIGS nations being unable to employ independent monetary policy; in order assist in minimising the economic downturn that 
has directly affected these countries. 
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All firms in the OSIRIS dataset are allocated a SIC code.  A SIC code is a method used to 
categorise industries and services.  The code is a number that corresponds to a defined industry 
type.  The SIC code can be used to find specific business types and retrieve industry and firm 
statistics.  In the late 1930’s, the Central Statistical Board of the United States created the SIC code 
structure; which was last reviewed and revised in 1987. 
 
The SIC code system groups all forms of industry and services into ten broad divisions (i.e. level 
one) as shown in Table A1-2.  Each of these divisions is subdivided into major groups, industry 
groups and specific industry types.  For example, ‘silver ores’ is categorised under the industry 
group ‘gold and silver ores’, which falls under the ‘metal mining’ major group, which in turn is 
classified under the ‘mining’ division. 
 
Table A1-2: Summary of standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 
    Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four digit SIC 
   Major group 
(Level 2) 
Industry group 
(Level 3) 
Industry type 
(Level 4) 
D
iv
is
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n 
(L
ev
el
 1
): 
O
ne
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ig
it 
S
IC
 
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 5 20 27 
B Mining 4 20 28 
C Construction 3 13 21 
D Manufacturing 20 132 381 
E Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 10 34 58 
F Wholesale Trade 2 18 63 
G Retail Trade 8 34 53 
H Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 7 28 41 
I Services 14 53 115 
J Public Administration 5 6 8 
 Total 78 358 795 
Source: the author 
 
The SIC code consists of a four-digit number that is assigned to each unique industry or service 
type.  First, the SIC system assigns a two-digit number (01 to 99) to each major industry group (i.e. 
level two).  The system then assigns two additional digits to each industry group and type [i.e. level 
three].  For example, ‘silver ores’ is classified under SIC code 1044.  The major group determines 
the first two digits (10), the ‘gold and silver ores’ industry group determines the third digit (4) and 
the specific industry type determines the last digit (4). 
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A1.2 Market definition 
The market is defined by the geographical location and industry classification of each firm.  The 
country in which a firm is located defines the geographical location.  There are two geographical 
locations allocated to each firm.  The first is the country where the firm is located; the second is the 
zone [that is assigned to each country], as defined by Table A1-1.  There are four industry codes [or 
sectors] assigned to each firm.  The industry sectors are defined by the SIC code allocated to a firm, 
as summarised by Table A1-2 in Appendix A1.1.  Hence, the SIC code assigned to each firm are a 
division (one-digit SIC), major group (two-digit SIC), industry group (three-digit SIC), and industry 
type (four-digit SIC); and is listed in Table A1-3 [in Appendix A1.3]. 
 
To summarise, this means that there are two geographical sectors (locations) and four industry 
sectors (classifications) that are assigned to each firm.  Hence, by combining each geographical and 
industry sector, there are eight markets that have been defined as follows: 
1) Country (by division): one-digit SIC 
2) Country (by major group): two-digit SIC 
3) Country (by industry group): three-digit SIC 
4) Country (by industry type): four-digit SIC 
5) Zone (by division): one-digit SIC 
6) Zone (by major group): two-digit SIC 
7) Zone (by industry group): three-digit SIC 
8) Zone (by industry type): four-digit SIC 
 
A1.3 Time period and data sources 
The variables to be included in the models estimated in Chapters 4 and 6 are summarised under 
Table A1-3.  The variables have been separated into three groups as follows: firm (i), industry (j), 
and country (k).  The time frame encompasses twenty-one years of annualised data from 1987 to 
2007.  Furthermore, the dataset has been classified into three time-periods as follows: 
 Pre-1992: 1987 to 1991 (five years); 
 Single-market: 1992 to 1998 (seven years); and 
 Euro-era: 1999 to 2007 (nine years). 
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Table A1-3: Summary of variables 
Variable name Variable description Measure Data source 
FIRM (i) VARIABLES 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 
SIC_DIVISION Division (Level 1): one -digit SIC Market definition OSIRIS 
SIC_MAJOR_GRP Major Group (Level 2): two-digit SIC Market definition OSIRIS 
SIC_INDUSTRY_GRP Industry Group (Level 3): three-digit SIC Market definition OSIRIS 
SIC_INDUSTRY_TYPE Industry Type (Level 4): four-digit SIC Market definition OSIRIS 
Income Statement and Balance Sheet 
SALES Operating revenue/turnover Variable input OSIRIS 
PROFIT (Absolute) profit Profitability Constructed variable 
ROS Return on sales [i.e. profit margin] Profitability OSIRIS 
ROE Return on ordinary shareholders’ equity Profitability OSIRIS 
ROA Return on total assets Profitability OSIRIS 
ASSETS (Absolute) assets Initial Capital 
Requirements 
Constructed variable 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO Assets-to-sales ratio Initial Capital 
Requirements 
Constructed variable 
CURRENT_RATIO Current ratio Liquidity OSIRIS 
SOLVENCY_RATIO Solvency ratio Solvency OSIRIS 
INDUSTRY (j) VARIABLES 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY HHI by country (by division) Market structure Constructed variable 
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY HHI by country (by major group) Market structure Constructed variable 
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY HHI by country (by industry group) Market structure Constructed variable 
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY HHI by country (by industry type) Market structure Constructed variable 
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_ZONE HHI by zone (by division) Market structure Constructed variable 
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE HHI by zone (by major group) Market structure Constructed variable 
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE HHI by zone (by industry group) Market structure Constructed variable 
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE HHI by zone (by industry type) Market structure Constructed variable 
Market share 
MSHARE_1DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY Market share by country (by division) Market structure Constructed variable 
MSHARE_2DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY Market share by country (by major 
group) 
Market structure Constructed variable 
MSHARE_3DIGIT_ SIC_COUNTRY Market share by country (by industry 
group) 
Market structure Constructed variable 
MSHARE_4DIGIT_ SIC_COUNTRY Market share by country (by industry 
type) 
Market structure Constructed variable 
MSHARE_1DIGIT_ SIC_ZONE Market share by zone (by division) Market structure Constructed variable 
MSHARE_2DIGIT_ SIC_ZONE Market share by zone (by major group) Market structure Constructed variable 
MSHARE_3DIGIT_ SIC_ZONE Market share by zone (by industry 
group) 
Market structure Constructed variable 
MSHARE_4DIGIT_ SIC_ZONE Market share by zone (by industry type) Market structure Constructed variable 
Industry Growth 
GROWTH_4DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY Industry growth by country (by industry 
type) 
Market demand Constructed variable 
Minimum efficient scale 
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Table A1-3: Summary of variables 
Variable name Variable description Measure Data source 
MES_50_PERCENTILE MES at the 50th percentile Economies of scale Constructed variable 
MES_75_PERCENTILE MES at the 75th percentile Economies of scale Constructed variable 
COUNTRY (k) VARIABLES 
EU_MEMBER Member of the European Union (EU) Dummy variable Yes = 1, No = 0 
EURO_MEMBER Member of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) 
Dummy variable Yes = 1, No = 0 
GEOGRAPHIC_ZONE Continental, Euro or UK Market definition Constructed variable 
BOND_YIELD Government bond  yield Sustainability Datastream 
CPI Consumer price index Stability Datastream 
FDI Foreign direct investment (FDI) Sustainability World bank 
GDP Gross domestic product (GDP)  Size and Wealth World bank 
GDP_PER_CAPITA GDP per capita Wealth (of the wallet) World bank 
GDS Gross domestic savings Confidence World bank 
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) Sustainability World bank 
HFCE Household final consumption 
expenditure (HFCE) 
Confidence World bank 
MARKET_CAP Market capitalisation Sustainability World bank 
PORTFOLIO_EQUITY Portfolio equity Sustainability World bank 
PORTFOLIO_INVEST Portfolio investment Sustainability World bank 
POPULATION Population Size World bank 
TAX_REVENUE Tax revenue Wealth World bank 
TRADE Trade Protectionism World bank 
UNEMPLOYMENT Unemployment rate Health (general) World bank 
Source: the author 
 
A1.4 Definition of variables 
The total operating revenue/turnover (SALES variable) of a firm is the sum of net sales and other 
revenues; and has been extracted by firm (and by year) from OSIRIS.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index variables are constructed using the SALES variable as per Equation (3.4–A) – refer to Section 
4.3 for a detailed definition. 
The SALES variable is also used to calculate the market share and industry growth assigned to each 
firm.  The MARKET SHARE variable is defined as the sales of the firm divided by the total sales of 
the specified market as per Equation (3.3–A).  The specified market is grouped into each of the 
eight market definitions used to calculate the HHI.  Whereas the INDUSTRY GROWTH variable is 
only calculated at the four-digit SIC at the country level using the SALES variable as follows: 
[current year sales] less [previous year sales], and then divided by [previous year sales].  
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The minimum efficient scale variables are constructed using the MARKET_SHARE variable 
calculated for each firm.  The 50th percentile of market share is then estimated for each four-digit 
SIC code within each country; and allocated to each firm (MES_50_PERCENTILE variable).  The 
75th percentile of market share is also estimated for each four-digit SIC code within each country; 
and allocated to each firm (MES_75_PERCENTILE variable).  This is consistent with the empirical 
literature discussed in Section 4.2.  
 
There are three measures of profitability that have been extracted by firm (and by year) from 
OSIRIS as follows: return on sales, return on total assets and return on ordinary shareholders’ 
equity.  Dividing the profit before tax by the operating revenue, and then multiplying by one 
hundred calculates the profit margin (ROS variable).  The return on total assets (ROA variable) is 
calculated by the profit or loss of a firm for a specified year divided by the firm’s total assets in the 
same year; and then multiplying it by one hundred.  The return on ordinary shareholders’ equity 
(ROE variable) is calculated by dividing the profit or loss of a firm for a specified year divided by 
the firm’s shareholders funds in the same year; then multiplying it by one hundred.  The fourth 
profitability measure: Absolute profit (PROFIT variable) has been constructed by multiplying the 
ROS by the SALES variable. 
 
As shown in Table A1-4, ROA is highly positively correlated with both ROE and ROS – which is 
consistent with Gale and Branch (1982).  The reason for this is because in order to calculate the 
ROA, ROE and ROS; the profit of a firm is included in the numerator of all three equations as 
defined in Section 5.2.1.  However, interestingly ROE and ROS are less correlated than: (1) ROE 
and ROA, and (2) ROA and ROS. 
 
Initial capital requirements (i.e. high start-up costs) will deter firms from initial market entry.  Most 
of these costs are sunk costs, which cannot be recovered if a firm exits a market.188  Initial start-up 
costs are commonly proxied using the asset-to-sales ratio of a firm (for example, see Chou 1988).  
The asset-to-sales ratio is calculated by dividing total assets by sales revenues.  The asset-to-sales 
ratio is often used to compare the value of a firms assets relative to the amount of revenues a firm 
can generate using their assets.  The numerator of the assets to sales formula, total assets, is 
averaged over the time period that is being evaluated; and can be located on a firm’s balance sheet.  
The denominator, sales revenues, is located on a firms’ income statement.  It is important to note 
                                                 
188 For example, marketing and advertising costs (i.e. fixed costs) are considered sunk costs. 
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that the asset-to-sales ratio does not look at a firm's net income (or profit).  It only looks at sales, 
which may or may not relate to a firm's actual profit. 
 
Absolute assets (ASSETS variable) have been constructed by dividing return on assets (ROA) by the 
absolute profit (PROFIT) variable.  Furthermore, the asset-to-sales ratio (ASSET_TO_SALES 
variable) has been constructed by dividing absolute assets (ASSETS) by the SALES variable.  This is 
consistent with the methodology discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.189 
 
The current ratio (CURRENT_RATIO variable) is a measure of liquidity and has been extracted by 
firm (and by year) from OSIRIS.190  The current ratio is calculated by dividing the current assets by 
the current liabilities.  An increase in the current ratio of a firm is likely to have an inverse 
relationship with competition, given that extraordinary cash is being retained on the balance sheet; 
rather than passing this cash onto consumers as a cost saving.  This may infer that anti-competitive 
behaviour exists, as firms do not feel compelled to reduce their profit margin due to a lack of 
competition; discussed extensively in Chapter 5. 
 
The solvency ratio (SOLVENCY_RATIO variable) is a measure of long-term liquidity; and has been 
extracted by firm (and by year) from OSIRIS.191  Dividing the shareholder funds by the total assets, 
and multiplying by one hundred calculates the solvency ratio.  Much like the current ratio of a firm, 
the solvency ratio is likely to have an inverse relationship with competition.  Hence, the owners 
may be retaining extraordinary cash rather than reducing the price of the goods or services offered. 
Ultimately this suggests the presence of anti-competitive behaviour. 
 
 On the other hand, if a firm becomes insolvent, this removes the firm from the market as a 
competitor; which means that there is a larger piece of the pie to be shared amongst the remaining 
market participants.  Therefore the remaining competitors may potentially increase prices in the 
market given that there are less cost pressures to keep product costs down.  Ultimately, this anti-
competitive behaviour will reduce competition and increase market concentration.  
 
Two dummy variables have been created which captures a country’s membership in the EU 
(EU_MEMBER) and the EMU (EURO_MEMBER). The dummy variables are used as a proxy to 
                                                 
189 (1969) and (2009) use ‘absolute’ assets as a proxy for initial capital requirements when modelling market concentration.  Alternatively, (1999) uses 
capital intensity as an explanatory variable (i.e. assets divided by the number of employees). 
190 Liquidity is the ability of a firm to meet its immediate financial obligations 
191 Solvency is the ability of a firm to meet its long-term financial obligations 
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identify whether any costs or benefits are currency union specific or alternatively, market related.  
Hence, each firm is assigned these two dummy variables based on the country in which the firm is 
geographically located and grouped under the country (j) variables.  Therefore, if the country in 
which the firm is geographically located (for a specified year) is a member of the EU, the 
EU_MEMBER variable is assigned a value of one; alternatively a value of zero is allocated. 
Furthermore, if the country in which the firm is geographically located (for a specified year) is a 
member of the EMU, the EURO_MEMBER variable is assigned a value of one; alternatively a value 
zero is allocated. 
 
The consumer price index (CPI variable) dataset has been extracted from DataStream for all 
countries defined in Table A1-1.  The dataset has been manually adjusted to ensure that the index is 
equal to 100 in the year 2000 for all countries.  The consumer price index (CPI) is a measure that 
examines the weighted average of prices of a basket of goods and services (i.e. transportation, food 
and medical care) that households acquire, use or pay for consumption.192  The CPI is considered a 
social and economic indicator; that is constructed to measure changes over time in the general level 
of consumer prices.  A core responsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB) is price stability. 
According to the ECB, this means that annual price increases measured by the harmonised index of 
consumer prices (HICP), of less than [but close to] 2 per cent is required over the medium term. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI variable) is the net inflows (new investment inflows minus 
disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors; which is consequently divided by 
GDP.  The net inflows are the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital: as shown in the balance of payments.  Furthermore, the FDI variable 
captures the net inflows of investment required to acquire a lasting management interest: 10 percent 
or more of voting stock in an enterprise operating in an economy (other than that of the investor). 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is typically used to measure the size and wealth of an economy.193 
GDP is a measure of economic activity for a country as a whole; and refers to the market value of 
all final goods and services produced within a country in a given time period.  Furthermore, GDP is 
considered the most comprehensive measure of the economic health of a nation.   
 
Gross domestic product (GDP variable) at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy; plus any product taxes, and minus any subsidies not included in 
                                                 
192 The primary purpose of the CPI is to measure: (a) changes in the purchasing power of money incomes, (b) changes in living standards (i.e. the cost 
of living), and (c) price inflation experienced by households. 
193 Population statistics can also be used as a proxy for the size of an economy: see POPULATION variable. 
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the value of the products. GDP is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets (or for depletion and degradation of natural resources).  The data extracted from 
the World Bank is in constant 2000 US dollars, which has been converted from domestic currencies 
using 2000 official exchange rates.  Furthermore, GDP has been adjusted for CPI. 
 
GDP per capita measures the wealth of the wallet and therefore is also a proxy for country 
(economies of scale) size.  GDP per capita (GDP_PER_CAPITA variable) is gross domestic 
product divided by mid-year population.  GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products.  Furthermore, GDP is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  The data extracted from the 
World Bank is in constant 2000 US dollars.  GDP per capita is not a measurement of the standard of 
living in an economy.  However, it is often used as such an indicator.194  This is based on the 
rationale that all citizens would benefit from their country's increased economic production.  
Furthermore, GDP per capita is not a measure of personal income, as GDP may increase while real 
incomes for the majority of citizens decline.   
 
The major reason for using GDP per capita as an indicator of standard of living is that it is 
measured frequently, widely, and consistently.  The justification for using GDP per capita as a 
standard-of-living proxy is not because it is a good indicator of the absolute level of standard of 
living, but that living standards tend to move in-line with GDP per capita.  As a result, changes in 
living standards are quickly and easily detected through changes in GDP. 
 
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF variable) includes land improvements such as fences, ditches, 
drains; plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the 
like: including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings.195  Furthermore, according to the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA), 
net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation.196  The data extracted from the 
World Bank is in constant 2000 US dollars. 
 
                                                 
194 For example, see Easterlin (2000); Kakwani (1993); Ringen (1991). 
195 Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is formerly known gross domestic fixed investment (GDFI). 
196 The System of National Accounts (SNA) is the internationally agreed standard set of recommendations on how to compile measures of economic 
activity; approved by the Statistical Commission of the United Nations. Hence, the SNA describes a coherent, consistent and integrated set of 
macroeconomic accounts: in the context of a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and accounting rules.  
 163 
Just because an economy is classified wealthy (as indicated by the levels of GDP), does not 
automatically infer that it will continue to generate the same levels of wealth in the future.  
Therefore, GFCF is a useful measure in ascertaining economic sustainability.  Intuitively, firms will 
not spend their cash flow on technology and equipment if there is no return on future capital 
investment.  Therefore, investors must have an optimistic view that there is potential future revenue 
to be generated from investing monies in the short to medium-term; which will ultimately ensure 
the long-term financial viability of a firm. 
 
In contrast, firms may also invest in capital expenditure in spite of a pessimistic economic 
perspective; however, this is only when the strategic plan of a firm dictates that it is appropriate.  If 
a firm has concerns regarding the future potential revenue to be generated, the senior leadership 
team (and the Board, where relevant) must re-evaluate the strategic plan.  The assessment of a 
firm’s strategy should identify potential risks in the market; and plans to mitigate any negative 
impact must be implemented.  This approach ensures that firms are pro-active, rather than re-active 
to market forces.  As a result, both a positive and negative view regarding a firms potential to 
generate future revenue streams can ultimately result in additional financial investment in 
technology and equipment; and hence an increase in the GFCF.197 
 
 
                                                 
197 Interestingly, GFCF is highly negatively correlated with GDP and GDP_PER_CAPITA.  Hence, there is an inverse relationship between the wealth 
of an economy and the capital investment undertaken by firms and governments. 
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Table A1-4: Correlation coefficient of firm (i) and country (k) variables 
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EU_MEMBER 1.000                      
EURO_MEMBER 0.072 1.000                     
CURRENT_RATIO -0.003 0.016 1.000                    
ROS 0.006 0.012 0.022 1.000                   
ROA 0.011 -0.019 0.020 0.608 1.000                  
ROE 0.007 -0.022 -0.004 0.389 0.653 1.000                 
SOLVENCY_RATIO -0.036 -0.113 0.362 0.016 0.110 0.004 1.000                
CPI -0.027 0.302 0.032 -0.009 -0.065 -0.051 0.042 1.000               
FDI -0.035 -0.054 -0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.060 0.131 1.000              
GDP 0.140 0.007 0.055 -0.084 -0.043 -0.026 0.048 -0.022 -0.203 1.000             
GDP_PER_CAPITA 0.292 -0.225 0.024 -0.075 -0.050 -0.037 0.095 0.159 0.217 0.245 1.000            
GDS -0.046 0.334 -0.005 0.037 0.023 0.010 -0.103 -0.043 0.180 -0.419 0.109 1.000           
GFCF -0.196 0.439 -0.006 0.077 0.020 0.019 -0.119 0.256 0.033 -0.419 -0.536 0.429 1.000          
HFCE 0.032 -0.228 0.012 -0.028 -0.018 -0.004 0.098 -0.005 -0.198 0.441 -0.278 -0.902 -0.254 1.000         
MARKET_CAP 0.140 -0.381 -0.011 -0.014 0.033 0.022 0.179 -0.050 0.305 0.130 0.439 -0.346 -0.438 0.264 1.000        
PORTFOLIO_EQUITY 0.047 -0.031 0.010 -0.025 -0.006 -0.009 0.062 -0.085 0.067 0.269 0.116 -0.098 -0.135 0.180 0.323 1.000       
PORTFOLIO_INVEST 0.011 -0.134 0.020 -0.027 -0.037 -0.029 0.055 0.178 -0.005 0.161 0.101 -0.147 -0.077 0.214 0.167 0.434 1.000      
POPULATION 0.130 0.082 0.046 -0.064 -0.029 -0.016 0.005 -0.120 -0.278 0.971 0.078 -0.363 -0.309 0.417 0.008 0.247 0.108 1.000     
TAX_REVENUE 0.059 -0.471 -0.064 0.022 0.013 0.013 0.103 0.019 0.259 -0.205 0.327 -0.326 -0.392 0.178 0.618 0.107 0.055 -0.313 1.000    
TRADE -0.170 0.166 -0.005 0.023 0.008 0.000 0.009 0.218 0.424 -0.544 0.104 0.665 0.306 -0.578 -0.126 -0.102 -0.070 -0.595 -0.008 1.000   
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.031 0.242 -0.003 0.060 0.061 0.036 -0.108 -0.280 -0.336 0.023 -0.550 0.117 0.155 -0.055 -0.449 -0.086 -0.151 0.193 -0.495 -0.273 1.000  
BOND_YIELD -0.032 -0.456 -0.032 0.027 0.067 0.050 0.007 -0.671 -0.080 -0.091 -0.256 -0.176 -0.226 0.213 0.039 -0.079 -0.032 -0.036 0.114 -0.189 0.188 1.000 
Source: the author 
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Common measures of consumer confidence include gross domestic savings (GDS) and household 
final consumption expenditure (HFCE).  Gross domestic savings (GDS variable) are calculated as 
GDP minus final consumption expenditure (total consumption).  The data extracted from the World 
Bank is the weighted average of gross domestic savings.  Household final consumption expenditure 
(HFCE variable), formerly private consumption, is the market value of all goods and services; 
including durable products (such as cars, washing machines, and home computers), purchased by 
households.198  The data extracted from the World Bank is in constant 2000 US dollars. 
 
Consumer confidence measures the degree of optimism that consumers feel about the overall state 
of the economy and the perception of future wealth yet to be generated.199  If an individual is 
feeling positive about the future of the economy, they are more likely to relax the purse strings and 
part with their hard-earned cash.  In addition, spending activity is determined by how confident an 
individual feels about the stability of their incomes.  Therefore, if the economy expands causing 
consumer confidence to be higher, consumers will most likely be making more purchases.  As a 
result, HFCE will increase.  Alternatively, if the economy contracts (or is in bad shape), consumer 
confidence is lower and therefore more money is saved i.e. less money is spent on commodities.  
Hence, GDS will increase. 
 
As shown in Table A1-4, HFCE and GDS are highly negatively correlated; as the more monies that 
are saved by an individual will result in fewer monies spent on consumer goods and services in an 
economy.  In contrast, the more monies spent on consumer goods in an economy, the less monies 
there are available to save.  Hence, HFCE and GDS intuitively have an inverse relationship.  GDP 
and HFCE are strongly positively correlated, whereas GDP and GDS are strongly negatively 
correlated.  This implies that an increase in the wealth of an economy (represented by GDP) is 
likely to result in an increase in household expenditure (represented by HFCE) and inturn generates 
a reduction of savings (represented by GDS); as consumers do not feel as compelled to save their 
monies for a “rainy day” as they are feeling positive about the future of the economy. 
 
                                                 
198 HFCE excludes purchases of dwellings, however includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings.  Payments and fees to governments to 
obtain permits and licenses are included.  Furthermore, the HFCE include expenditures of non-profit institutions serving households. 
199 This is in the context of an individual’s personal financial situation. 
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Interestingly, the relationship between GDP and HFCE appears slightly stronger than the 
relationship between GDP and GDS.  This suggests that individuals are marginally more likely to 
spend their income than save when taking into consideration the health of an economy.  It is also 
important to note that HFCE and POPULATION are strongly positively correlated.  This supports 
the notion that an increase in population statistics will result in an increase in the expenditure 
incurred by households across an economy.  Furthermore, GDS is highly positively correlated with 
GFCF.  Hence, the more funds that are placed in financial institutions by individuals (in the form of 
savings) will mean that there is more cash available to be distributed by lenders in the form of 
capital investment. 
 
Market capitalisation (MARKET_CAP variable), also known as market value, is the share price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.200  Portfolio equity (PORTFOLIO_EQUITY 
variable) includes net inflows from equity securities other than those classified as direct 
investment.201  Portfolio investment (PORTFOLIO_INVEST variable) excludes liabilities 
constituting foreign authorities' reserves covering transactions in equity securities and debt 
securities.202  All three annual datasets have been obtained from the World Bank; and can be used 
as an indicator of economic sustainability. 
 
As shown in Table A1-4, GDP per capita and market capitalisation are strongly positively 
correlated.  This suggests that the more money that an individual accumulates, the more likely they 
are to invest their funds into shares on the stock exchange.  In contrast, market capitalisation and 
GFCF are strongly (and almost equally to GDP) negatively correlated.  This could imply that the 
more money that is invested in the share market, the less money there is available to purchase 
equipment and machinery.  However given that market capitalisation and GFCF are measures of 
sustainability (and to a further extent consumer confidence) of an economy, the net result is neutral.  
In other words, investors have the option to either invest in shares or invest in capital; both of which 
support the notion that future expected returns are to be generated from either alternative.  
Otherwise investors would deposit their money into an interest-baring (savings) account, which 
would result in significantly less return and risk.  Hence there is clearly a strong relationship 
between GDP per capita, market capitalisation and GFCF. 
 
                                                 
200 Market capitalisation is measured annually and the weighted average is used.  Market capitalisation includes listed domestic companies defined as 
domestically incorporated companies (that are listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year).  Investment companies, mutual funds, 
and other collective investment vehicles are excluded. 
201 Portfolio equity includes shares, stocks, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors. 
202 Portfolio investment is measured annually. 
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Investors will purchase shares (and other instruments) when feeling optimistic regarding the 
potential (of a firm) to generate future revenue streams.203  Therefore, market capitalisation, and 
portfolio equity and investment; plus the optimistic outlook of shareholders is directly (positively) 
related through an assessment of the strength and sustainability of an economy.  As shown in Table 
A1-4, PORTFOLIO_EQUITY and PORTFOLIO_INVEST are also strongly positively correlated.  
This suggests that when there is an increase in the funds available for investment, both portfolio 
types increase; all albeit at differing rates, which is most likely due to the risk-return proposition 
long held in finance theorem. 
 
The population (POPULATION variable) is based on the de facto definition of population, which 
includes all residents regardless of their legal status or citizenship.  This dataset has been obtained 
from the World Bank.  Population statistics can be used as a proxy for measuring the size of an 
economy; they are also used as a basic indicator of the health of a community.  New residents 
moving into a country are important drivers of economic growth; and can increase social diversity.  
However, an increase in the population can also deplete natural resources, whilst changing 
demographics can increase pressure on public services.  This is extremely important, as a 
sustainable community is one where a country is able to accommodate population growth and 
changing demographics – without negatively impacting quality of life or depleting non-renewable 
natural resources.  As shown in Table A1-4, POPULATION and GDP variables are highly 
positively correlated.  This suggests that the number of participants in a defined geographic region 
has a positive and direct relationship to the wealth of the economy.  
 
Trade (TRADE variable) is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product.204  This dataset has been obtained from the World Bank.  
Typically, trade data is used as a key performance indicator of the level of protectionism (i.e. free 
trade) within an economy.  Protectionism is the economic policy of restraining trade between 
countries through methods (such as tariffs on imported goods, restrictive quotas, and other 
government regulations); which is designed to encourage fair competition between imports and 
commodities produced domestically, according to advocates.  Proponents believe that protectionism 
policies (or doctrines) safeguard firms and workers within a country by restricting or regulating 
trade with foreign nations. Protectionism represents the barriers to entry in a specified economy. 
Hence, where free trade exists, the (government) barriers to entry are kept at a minimum.   
 
                                                 
203 The increase in demand will consequently drive the price up to a higher value (of the relevant debt or equity instrument). 
204 The TRADE variable is measured annually and the weighted average is used. 
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Unemployment (UNEMPLOYMENT variable) refers to the share of the labour force that is without 
work, but available for and seeking employment.205  This dataset has been obtained from the World 
Bank.  Unemployment is a direct measure of the health of an economy.  Hence, there is a strong 
negative relationship between GDP per capita and unemployment (as shown in Table A1-4).  It 
follows that the more people within an economy that are employed, the more money they will be 
bringing home to their families.  This demonstrates that a reduction in the unemployment rate 
within a country will result in an increase in the size of the wallet of an individual.  In addition to 
this, the less money in an individual’s wallet, the less likely they are to invest in the share market.  
Hence, there is also a strong negative relationship between unemployment and market capitalisation 
(see MARKET_CAP).  
 
Tax revenue (TAX_REVENUE variable) refers to compulsory transfers to the central government 
for public purposes.206  Tax revenue is treated as negative revenue where refunds and corrections 
have been erroneously collected.  This dataset has been obtained from the World Bank.  The less 
money that is earned (or generated) by an individual will result in a reduction in income taxes paid; 
which explains why there is a strong negative correlation with TAX_REVENUE and 
UNEMPLOYMENT.  On the other hand, there is also a highly positive correlation between 
TAX_REVENUE and MARKET_CAP.  This suggests that when money is invested on the share 
market, a positive return to a shareholder will generate a tax bill; which consequently results in 
additional revenue for the taxation office. 
 
The government bond yield (BOND_YIELD variable) for each country has been extracted from 
Datastream.  The government bond yield can be used as a proxy to measure sustainability.  The 
more demand there is for a county’s sovereign currency; the more optimistic the buyers of that 
currency are in relation to the future economic outlook of that country.  Therefore, owners of 
foreign currency are less likely to retain cash that does not carry any future value.  The consumer 
price index (CPI) can be used as a proxy of economic stability.  CPI and the government bond yield 
are highly negatively correlated.  This supports the notion that an increase in inflation in an 
economy will result in the erosion of the government bond yield.  Furthermore, this also supports 
the notion that a government’s monetary policy has a direct and inverse relationship with prices 
relating to a specified basket of goods and services.  Table A1-5 presents the summary statistics of 
all the variables listed in Table A1-3.207 
                                                 
205 It is important to note that definitions of labour force and unemployment differ by country. 
206 Furthermore, certain compulsory transfers are excluded. For example: fines, penalties, and most social security contributions. 
207 Excluding the eight different market share variables (which are available upon request) 
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Table A1-5: Summary statistics of variables 
 Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FI
R
M
 (i
) V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S 
SALES 1150.82 5331.07 -3821 260137.2 
PROFIT 10416.77 68314.18 -2678470 3777193 
ROS 0.01 0.02 -0.1 0.1 
ROE 0.01 0.07 -1 0.99 
ROA 0 0.02 -0.1 0.1 
ASSETS 4785.77 41099.53 0 2590923 
ASSETS_SALES_RATIO 0 0.06 0 9.86 
CURRENT_RATIO 2.53 5.64 0 99.89 
SOLVENCY_RATIO 43.85 27.34 -99.72 100 
IN
D
U
S
TR
Y 
(j)
 V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S 
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 172.28 201.21 0 1000 
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 357.34 915.8 0 121288.8 
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 439.48 353.64 0 3283.12 
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_COUNTRY 455.16 385.72 0 9920.25 
HHI_1DIGIT_SIC_ZONE 81.04 119.32 0 1000 
HHI_2DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE 233.57 207.11 0 1000 
HHI_3DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE 379.56 372 0 30736.75 
HHI_4DIGIT_SIC_ ZONE 431.46 397.21 0 30736.75 
MES_50TH_PERCENTILE 0.21 0.33 -3.39 4.39 
MES_75TH_PERCENTILE 0.3 0.36 -3.39 4.39 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0 0.23 -0.03 30.61 
%_CHANGE_NO_OF_FIRMS 0.1 0.49 -1 14 
C
O
U
N
TR
Y
 (k
) V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S 
EU_MEMBER 0.88 0.33 0 1 
EURO_MEMBER 0.19 0.39 0 1 
BOND_YIELD 0.01 0 0 0.27 
CPI 0.09 0.02 0 0.15 
FDI 4.55 21.52 -15.03 564.92 
GDP 968553.7 617927.8 1893.48 2080000 
GDP_PER_CAPITA 0.02 0.01 0 0.06 
GDS 20.38 5.14 7.65 53.22 
GFCF 19.69 3.03 6.17 36.43 
HFCE 59.34 5.96 32.01 83.18 
MARKET_CAP 86.13 55.16 0.02 479.74 
PORTFOLIO_EQUITY 16871.95 34041.19 -100000 279000 
PORTFOLIO_INVEST 8302.47 65108.76 -168000 256000 
POPULATION 44619.91 26201.51 351 82541 
TAX_REVENUE 22.21 6.43 8.03 55.71 
TRADE 65.76 28.9 35.39 319.55 
UNEMPLOYMENT 7.94 3.17 0.6 23.9 
Source: the author 
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APPENDIX A2: Market concentration models 
A2.1 OLS models for market concentration 
Table A2-1: Market concentration model – country and zone (OLS without t) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -123.38*** -200.81*** -92.07*** -30.66*** 6.92* 17.80*** 96.72*** 124.31*** 
 (-12.42) (-7.06) (-12.78) (-6.06) (1.91) (3.09) (11.19) (12.31) 
EURO_MEMBER 11.44*** 138.53*** 49.48*** 44.20*** -35.70*** -59.02*** -71.82*** -83.82*** 
 (6.94) (6.36) (20.00) (21.34) (-49.58) (-38.13) (-27.07) (-30.48) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -4.14*** 0.57 -1.25*** 2.18*** 1.52*** 2.91*** 6.50*** 9.66*** 
 (-19.85) (0.55) (-5.57) (13.03) (20.50) (16.87) (25.55) (35.83) 
CPI 2.60*** 5.92*** 0.21 -0.13 1.18*** 1.43*** 1.33*** 0.95*** 
 (23.90) (2.84) (1.61) (-1.14) (23.01) (14.18) (8.57) (5.91) 
BOND_YIELD 8.81*** 42.93** 0.66 -1.81*** 5.53*** 8.29*** 11.48*** 9.30*** 
 (12.82) (2.28) (0.77) (-2.59) (14.90) (13.27) (12.17) (9.47) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 60.09*** 214.69*** 490.91*** 628.14*** -1.14 72.06*** 292.77*** 471.13*** 
 (36.60) (20.32) (190.59) (386.30) (-1.36) (42.06) (106.60) (172.88) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 8.85** 18.99*** 25.92*** 28.40*** 2.80 4.89* 6.90 11.36 
 (2.24) (3.02) (2.87) (3.61) (0.86) (1.78) (1.02) (1.21) 
LAGGED_ROS 502.25*** 1,416.00*** -108.39** -507.33*** 143.52*** 45.45 -243.19*** -631.94*** 
 (17.03) (3.25) (-2.18) (-10.77) (7.29) (1.36) (-4.01) (-10.19) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO 16.07 371.57 39.36** -3.52 -4.79 -10.36 -36.98*** -83.99*** 
 (1.08) (1.24) (2.01) (-0.27) (-1.63) (-1.04) (-2.69) (-2.89) 
Time (t) dummies No No No No No No No No 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0878 0.0082 0.4246 0.6224 0.0672 0.0733 0.1993 0.3728 
Adjusted R2 0.0877 0.0080 0.4246 0.6223 0.0671 0.0732 0.1992 0.3727 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-2: Market concentration model – country and zone (OLS with t) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -113.81*** -223.57*** -95.10*** -34.57*** 18.24*** 38.13*** 118.47*** 144.09*** 
 (-11.36) (-7.70) (-13.00) (-6.65) (5.10) (6.77) (14.03) (14.51) 
EURO_MEMBER 6.01*** 108.20*** 64.46*** 51.89*** -50.75*** -84.11*** -105.99*** -118.26*** 
 (2.66) (7.96) (21.75) (21.05) (-55.33) (-42.73) (-35.69) (-37.92) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -4.45*** -4.01*** 0.14 2.79*** 0.44*** 1.20*** 3.90*** 6.97*** 
 (-17.02) (-5.60) (0.53) (14.51) (5.05) (6.14) (13.39) (22.18) 
CPI 2.30*** -6.96*** 3.30*** 1.13*** -0.46*** -0.87*** -2.68*** -3.46*** 
 (7.94) (-2.62) (10.07) (4.18) (-4.46) (-4.01) (-7.38) (-9.15) 
BOND_YIELD 11.67*** 31.85 -7.91*** -9.02*** 8.68*** 9.49*** 8.18*** 8.50*** 
 (10.75) (0.95) (-5.94) (-8.85) (14.95) (10.89) (6.24) (6.12) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 61.04*** 223.40*** 486.05*** 625.33*** 1.53* 75.40*** 297.06*** 476.24*** 
 (36.84) (20.51) (187.00) (381.35) (1.84) (43.93) (108.78) (176.35) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 9.39** 19.32*** 25.38*** 27.96*** 3.61 6.30** 8.52 12.97 
 (2.43) (3.31) (2.85) (3.61) (1.13) (2.06) (1.19) (1.34) 
LAGGED_ROS 525.26*** 1,317.09*** -97.39* -507.96*** 158.17*** 74.88** -216.68*** -616.56*** 
 (17.60) (3.13) (-1.96) (-10.76) (7.96) (2.21) (-3.62) (-10.05) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO 16.62 379.98 35.96** -5.47 -3.04 -8.24 -33.97*** -80.25*** 
 (1.08) (1.26) (2.00) (-0.42) (-1.54) (-0.79) (-2.68) (-2.96) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0916 0.0102 0.4283 0.6238 0.0888 0.0866 0.2058 0.3776 
Adjusted R2 0.0912 0.0098 0.4280 0.6237 0.0884 0.0862 0.2055 0.3773 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.2 RE models for market concentration 
Table A2-3: Market concentration model – country and zone (panel with RE) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -13.43 -70.70** -16.30 -13.29 4.91* 7.48 11.94 10.13 
 (-0.94) (-2.31) (-1.44) (-1.40) (1.68) (1.24) (1.04) (0.90) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.93*** 7.80 -16.71*** -4.27 -14.22*** -16.70*** -20.56*** -26.09*** 
 (-8.59) (0.52) (-3.41) (-0.99) (-9.94) (-5.36) (-4.50) (-5.65) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -5.18*** -10.97*** -4.44*** -1.36*** 0.80*** 0.43 1.85*** 4.47*** 
 (-6.83) (-4.52) (-7.23) (-2.77) (4.12) (1.11) (3.11) (7.12) 
CPI -0.23 -12.29*** -0.86* -1.35*** 0.32*** -0.06 -0.31 -0.45 
 (-0.65) (-3.85) (-1.91) (-3.31) (2.74) (-0.24) (-0.76) (-1.04) 
BOND_YIELD 8.32*** 18.14 -0.52 -1.71 3.04*** 2.41** 5.75*** 5.30*** 
 (7.23) (0.69) (-0.31) (-1.21) (4.43) (2.50) (3.28) (3.08) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 34.88*** 183.58*** 358.23*** 471.81*** 4.90*** 49.62*** 189.25*** 316.98*** 
 (8.24) (11.28) (41.85) (62.63) (3.51) (10.68) (26.98) (41.42) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.95*** 8.10 4.71*** 7.06*** 0.32 3.19 6.39* 8.66* 
 (5.61) (1.30) (2.87) (3.23) (0.82) (1.25) (1.66) (1.84) 
LAGGED_ROS -18.86 877.80** 9.29 -66.16 -6.58 -4.15 -13.52 -95.92* 
 (-0.76) (1.98) (0.19) (-1.40) (-0.43) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-1.69) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -14.35 287.67 42.03*** 24.31 -5.76** 19.14 -21.66 -38.47 
 (-1.21) (1.00) (2.88) (1.59) (-2.04) (0.67) (-0.78) (-1.30) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
Number of firms 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.3 Market concentration model – asset-to-sales 
Table A2-4: Market concentration – lagged asset-to-sales 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -7.20 -26.34 -2.28 -1.84 4.32 5.85 6.39 1.95 
 (-0.51) (-0.91) (-0.19) (-0.19) (1.56) (0.94) (0.54) (0.17) 
EURO_MEMBER -24.93*** -57.79*** -28.95*** -20.88*** -11.25*** -11.20*** -16.07*** -23.20*** 
 (-6.45) (-2.59) (-5.46) (-4.41) (-7.67) (-3.51) (-3.12) (-4.45) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -1.96 -3.57 -1.65 -2.36 0.27 0.00 -3.99** -4.25** 
 (-1.17) (-0.92) (-1.03) (-1.60) (0.70) (0.00) (-2.51) (-2.40) 
CPI -0.60* -14.21*** -1.55*** -1.72*** 0.35*** -0.02 0.24 0.34 
 (-1.66) (-4.00) (-3.20) (-3.94) (2.96) (-0.09) (0.55) (0.74) 
BOND_YIELD 7.65*** 20.44 0.26 -0.05 2.54*** 1.61 6.27*** 6.29*** 
 (6.35) (0.80) (0.15) (-0.03) (3.79) (1.61) (3.40) (3.46) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.62*** 72.72* 310.07*** 413.91*** 6.82*** 47.26*** 141.17*** 242.32*** 
 (6.52) (1.80) (32.78) (46.46) (5.01) (9.73) (16.54) (25.34) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.46*** 4.81 3.82** 5.18*** 0.12 3.73 7.76* 8.55* 
 (5.22) (0.73) (2.57) (2.93) (0.76) (1.42) (1.87) (1.90) 
LAGGED_ROS -31.35 191.84 25.33 17.57 -7.54 -6.51 9.49 -18.25 
 (-1.35) (0.52) (0.53) (0.38) (-0.61) (-0.24) (0.19) (-0.35) 
LAGGED_ASSET_SALES_RATIO -8.71 1,235.95 107.45*** 97.24*** -5.43 111.18*** 48.33 58.80 
 (-0.56) (1.05) (3.57) (3.45) (-1.10) (3.30) (0.51) (0.66) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 66,550 66,550 66,550 66,550 66,550 66,550 66,550 66,550 
R2 0.0527 0.0035 0.1442 0.2436 0.0448 0.0461 0.0344 0.0680 
Adjusted R2 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 9,528 
Number of firms 0.0523 0.0031 0.1439 0.2433 0.0444 0.0457 0.0340 0.0676 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-5: Market concentration – asset-to-sales [omitted] 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -7.54 -25.65 -2.09 -1.51 4.38 5.98 6.81 2.18 
 (-0.53) (-0.89) (-0.17) (-0.16) (1.58) (0.97) (0.58) (0.19) 
EURO_MEMBER -24.93*** -57.64*** -28.90*** -20.94*** -11.33*** -11.30*** -16.47*** -23.69*** 
 (-6.47) (-2.59) (-5.47) (-4.43) (-7.76) (-3.55) (-3.21) (-4.55) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -1.92 -3.52 -1.64 -2.39 0.27 0.03 -4.08** -4.29** 
 (-1.15) (-0.91) (-1.02) (-1.63) (0.72) (0.04) (-2.57) (-2.42) 
CPI -0.59 -14.09*** -1.55*** -1.73*** 0.34*** -0.02 0.24 0.33 
 (-1.63) (-4.00) (-3.21) (-3.97) (2.93) (-0.07) (0.55) (0.72) 
BOND_YIELD 7.66*** 20.43 0.19 -0.10 2.53*** 1.56 6.28*** 6.24*** 
 (6.36) (0.80) (0.11) (-0.07) (3.77) (1.56) (3.41) (3.44) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.54*** 72.20* 309.40*** 413.02*** 6.83*** 46.97*** 140.61*** 241.54*** 
 (6.52) (1.79) (32.77) (46.47) (5.03) (9.70) (16.47) (25.29) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.45*** 4.78 3.80** 5.21*** 0.13 3.72 7.76* 8.56* 
 (5.17) (0.73) (2.57) (2.92) (0.78) (1.42) (1.87) (1.90) 
LAGGED_ROS -29.18 150.28 16.27 -4.17 -6.86 -7.92 -6.89 -34.72 
 (-1.32) (0.43) (0.36) (-0.09) (-0.58) (-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.70) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 66,923 66,923 66,923 66,923 66,923 66,923 66,923 66,923 
R2 0.0529 0.0032 0.1435 0.2422 0.0452 0.0450 0.0343 0.0676 
Adjusted R2 9,548 9,548 9,548 9,548 9,548 9,548 9,548 9,548 
Number of firms 0.0526 0.0028 0.1431 0.2419 0.0449 0.0446 0.0339 0.0673 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.4 Market concentration model – absolute assets 
Table A2-6: Market concentration – absolute assets (OLS without t) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -123.34*** -200.26*** -92.00*** -30.70*** 6.91* 17.76*** 96.60*** 124.07*** 
 (-12.42) (-7.06) (-12.77) (-6.07) (1.91) (3.08) (11.18) (12.30) 
EURO_MEMBER 11.27*** 138.04*** 49.33*** 44.45*** -35.65*** -58.81*** -71.32*** -82.95*** 
 (6.83) (6.34) (19.91) (21.45) (-49.52) (-37.95) (-26.82) (-30.11) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -4.15*** 0.44 -1.26*** 2.18*** 1.53*** 2.92*** 6.51*** 9.70*** 
 (-19.89) (0.44) (-5.63) (13.04) (20.53) (16.91) (25.62) (35.97) 
CPI 2.60*** 5.94*** 0.21 -0.12 1.18*** 1.44*** 1.34*** 0.97*** 
 (23.86) (2.85) (1.60) (-1.08) (23.02) (14.23) (8.63) (6.01) 
BOND_YIELD 8.80*** 42.90** 0.65 -1.80*** 5.53*** 8.30*** 11.50*** 9.34*** 
 (12.81) (2.28) (0.76) (-2.58) (14.91) (13.29) (12.19) (9.51) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 60.33*** 214.77*** 491.08*** 627.76*** -1.20 71.74*** 292.03*** 469.88*** 
 (36.71) (20.27) (190.36) (384.29) (-1.44) (41.78) (106.02) (172.01) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 8.86** 19.08*** 25.93*** 28.40*** 2.80 4.88* 6.88 11.33 
 (2.24) (3.03) (2.87) (3.61) (0.86) (1.78) (1.02) (1.20) 
LAGGED_ROS 496.70*** 1,444.75*** -109.91** -496.62*** 145.05*** 53.62 -225.28*** -603.35*** 
 (16.85) (3.25) (-2.21) (-10.51) (7.35) (1.60) (-3.69) (-9.69) 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS 0.41*** 1.65 0.40** -0.56*** -0.12*** -0.49*** -1.20*** -2.12*** 
 (4.92) (1.27) (2.28) (-3.44) (-4.23) (-6.21) (-10.26) (-13.34) 
Time (t) dummies No No No No No No No No 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0880 0.0080 0.4246 0.6224 0.0673 0.0735 0.1997 0.3735 
Adjusted R2 0.0878 0.0078 0.4245 0.6224 0.0671 0.0733 0.1995 0.3734 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-7: Market concentration – absolute assets (OLS with t) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -113.76*** -223.06*** -95.04*** -34.63*** 18.23*** 38.08*** 118.33*** 143.82*** 
 (-11.35) (-7.70) (-12.99) (-6.66) (5.10) (6.76) (14.01) (14.49) 
EURO_MEMBER 5.83*** 107.97*** 64.34*** 52.18*** -50.71*** -83.89*** -105.46*** -117.34*** 
 (2.58) (7.93) (21.70) (21.17) (-55.29) (-42.58) (-35.45) (-37.58) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -4.45*** -4.12*** 0.12 2.79*** 0.44*** 1.20*** 3.91*** 7.01*** 
 (-17.05) (-5.72) (0.48) (14.55) (5.06) (6.17) (13.44) (22.28) 
CPI 2.30*** -6.89*** 3.30*** 1.14*** -0.46*** -0.87*** -2.67*** -3.44*** 
 (7.93) (-2.62) (10.08) (4.21) (-4.45) (-3.98) (-7.36) (-9.12) 
BOND_YIELD 11.67*** 31.85 -7.90*** -9.03*** 8.68*** 9.48*** 8.16*** 8.47*** 
 (10.76) (0.95) (-5.94) (-8.86) (14.95) (10.88) (6.23) (6.10) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 61.29*** 223.39*** 486.19*** 624.91*** 1.48* 75.10*** 296.33*** 475.00*** 
 (36.96) (20.48) (186.75) (379.37) (1.77) (43.65) (108.18) (175.46) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 9.40** 19.40*** 25.39*** 27.96*** 3.61 6.29** 8.50 12.93 
 (2.43) (3.31) (2.85) (3.61) (1.13) (2.06) (1.19) (1.34) 
LAGGED_ROS 519.57*** 1,347.57*** -98.32** -496.73*** 159.37*** 82.72** -198.85*** -588.16*** 
 (17.42) (3.14) (-1.98) (-10.49) (7.99) (2.44) (-3.30) (-9.55) 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS 0.42*** 1.64 0.34** -0.60*** -0.08*** -0.46*** -1.17*** -2.08*** 
 (5.02) (1.26) (1.98) (-3.72) (-3.27) (-5.98) (-10.33) (-13.50) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0917 0.0099 0.4283 0.6239 0.0888 0.0868 0.2062 0.3783 
Adjusted R2 0.0913 0.0095 0.4280 0.6238 0.0884 0.0864 0.2058 0.3780 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-8: Market concentration – absolute assets (panel with RE) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -13.59 -70.19** -16.15 -13.24 4.83* 7.43 11.81 9.96 
 (-0.96) (-2.30) (-1.43) (-1.39) (1.65) (1.23) (1.03) (0.89) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.86*** 7.96 -16.78*** -4.28 -14.19*** -16.67*** -20.49*** -26.02*** 
 (-8.57) (0.53) (-3.42) (-1.00) (-9.90) (-5.35) (-4.48) (-5.64) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -5.18*** -11.10*** -4.46*** -1.37*** 0.79*** 0.42 1.86*** 4.49*** 
 (-6.83) (-4.56) (-7.25) (-2.79) (4.11) (1.09) (3.13) (7.16) 
CPI -0.23 -12.24*** -0.86* -1.34*** 0.32*** -0.05 -0.31 -0.45 
 (-0.63) (-3.85) (-1.90) (-3.30) (2.76) (-0.22) (-0.76) (-1.05) 
BOND_YIELD 8.33*** 18.15 -0.53 -1.71 3.05*** 2.42** 5.75*** 5.31*** 
 (7.24) (0.69) (-0.31) (-1.21) (4.44) (2.50) (3.28) (3.09) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 34.83*** 183.30*** 358.26*** 471.84*** 4.87*** 49.58*** 189.21*** 317.02*** 
 (8.23) (11.28) (41.84) (62.64) (3.49) (10.68) (26.97) (41.43) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.94*** 8.13 4.71*** 7.06*** 0.31 3.19 6.39* 8.66* 
 (5.61) (1.30) (2.87) (3.23) (0.82) (1.25) (1.66) (1.84) 
LAGGED_ROS -17.11 894.56** 8.51 -66.03 -5.67 -2.87 -12.35 -94.74* 
 (-0.69) (2.00) (0.17) (-1.40) (-0.37) (-0.11) (-0.22) (-1.67) 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS -0.36*** 0.04 0.31 0.08 -0.19*** -0.16 -0.29** -0.40** 
 (-2.93) (0.04) (1.37) (0.39) (-3.87) (-1.26) (-1.98) (-2.50) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
Number of firms 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-9: Market concentration – absolute assets (panel with FE) 
Geographical sector BY COUNTRY BY ZONE 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -10.77 -29.50 -7.70 -7.74 4.35 6.26 7.44 3.66 
 (-0.73) (-0.93) (-0.64) (-0.77) (1.48) (1.01) (0.62) (0.32) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.33*** -58.71** -29.85*** -20.70*** -11.62*** -9.37*** -11.74** -18.39*** 
 (-6.78) (-2.28) (-5.42) (-4.21) (-7.62) (-2.83) (-2.18) (-3.39) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.18 -3.56 -1.78 -2.34 0.25 -0.38 -3.90** -4.33** 
 (-1.30) (-0.95) (-1.08) (-1.55) (0.64) (-0.46) (-2.35) (-2.33) 
CPI -0.65* -13.21*** -1.47*** -1.62*** 0.39*** -0.00 0.28 0.39 
 (-1.71) (-3.75) (-2.95) (-3.60) (3.13) (-0.01) (0.64) (0.83) 
BOND_YIELD 7.68*** 15.89 0.75 0.53 2.78*** 1.68 6.07*** 6.20*** 
 (6.14) (0.59) (0.42) (0.35) (3.96) (1.64) (3.20) (3.33) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.68*** 99.77*** 304.61*** 399.74*** 6.70*** 46.19*** 138.97*** 236.70*** 
 (5.55) (4.11) (27.74) (38.54) (4.25) (8.29) (14.71) (22.24) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.42*** 3.78 2.84*** 4.30*** 0.14 3.13 6.27* 7.31* 
 (5.33) (0.58) (2.59) (2.74) (0.83) (1.21) (1.65) (1.68) 
LAGGED_ROS -46.98* 256.42 40.54 17.99 -9.89 -8.02 40.29 21.52 
 (-1.82) (0.54) (0.77) (0.36) (-0.62) (-0.29) (0.67) (0.35) 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS -0.37*** -1.47 0.34 0.25 -0.19*** -0.12 -0.14 -0.05 
 (-2.72) (-1.46) (1.34) (1.01) (-3.85) (-0.91) (-0.90) (-0.32) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0535 0.0031 0.1383 0.2291 0.0449 0.0448 0.0342 0.0642 
Adjusted R2 0.0531 0.0026 0.1379 0.2287 0.0445 0.0444 0.0337 0.0638 
Number of firms 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
 
 
 
 
 179 
A2.5 Market concentration model – lagged ROS 
Table A2-10: Market concentration – ROS (two year lag) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -9.46 -53.18*** -8.47 -9.25 3.79 3.83 2.80 1.32 
 (-0.65) (-2.59) (-0.72) (-0.95) (1.27) (0.61) (0.23) (0.11) 
EURO_MEMBER -27.53*** -32.64*** -29.74*** -20.73*** -12.13*** -10.28*** -10.01* -16.36*** 
 (-6.78) (-4.78) (-5.11) (-4.06) (-7.41) (-2.85) (-1.74) (-2.83) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.38 -1.84 -1.20 -1.79 0.22 -0.44 -3.62** -4.18** 
 (-1.36) (-0.56) (-0.71) (-1.17) (0.51) (-0.51) (-2.11) (-2.16) 
CPI -0.84** -10.61*** -1.55*** -1.77*** 0.40*** 0.04 0.31 0.33 
 (-2.06) (-3.60) (-2.97) (-3.81) (3.00) (0.14) (0.68) (0.69) 
BOND_YIELD 8.42*** -9.51 1.22 0.51 2.90*** 2.02* 6.03*** 6.03*** 
 (6.19) (-1.28) (0.65) (0.32) (3.85) (1.83) (2.98) (3.10) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 28.67*** 125.42*** 309.54*** 405.51*** 6.28*** 44.51*** 140.29*** 238.94*** 
 (5.48) (10.79) (27.30) (38.17) (3.81) (7.66) (14.40) (21.70) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.39 16.87*** 5.53** 7.89*** -0.54 9.93*** 15.66*** 19.38*** 
 (-0.18) (5.45) (2.28) (3.14) (-1.38) (4.87) (6.36) (6.02) 
LAGGED_ROS -29.83 -75.67 71.50 24.28 3.32 3.09 31.91 -18.20 
 (-1.10) (-0.17) (1.25) (0.44) (0.27) (0.11) (0.44) (-0.25) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -38.21 1,442.83 80.86** 99.06** -11.14 49.50** -43.85 -8.81 
 (-0.95) (0.99) (1.97) (2.06) (-1.13) (2.33) (-0.39) (-0.09) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 56,442 56,442 56,442 56,442 56,442 56,442 56,442 56,442 
R2 0.0574 0.0031 0.1486 0.2487 0.0437 0.0444 0.0362 0.0688 
Adjusted R2 8,367 8,367 8,367 8,367 8,367 8,367 8,367 8,367 
Number of firms 0.0570 0.0026 0.1482 0.2483 0.0433 0.0440 0.0358 0.0683 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-11: Market concentration – ROS (three year lag) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -10.80 -38.47** -12.70 -11.03 4.08 3.10 7.08 2.48 
 (-0.68) (-2.13) (-0.96) (-0.98) (1.26) (0.47) (0.57) (0.21) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.66*** -37.40*** -30.67*** -22.69*** -13.09*** -11.78*** -12.09** -18.13*** 
 (-6.30) (-5.28) (-4.96) (-4.14) (-7.60) (-3.04) (-1.97) (-2.94) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -1.49 -0.58 -0.57 -1.03 0.05 -0.24 -3.91** -3.85* 
 (-0.82) (-0.20) (-0.32) (-0.65) (0.12) (-0.24) (-2.13) (-1.87) 
CPI -0.86** -8.67*** -1.30** -1.68*** 0.51*** 0.01 0.58 0.33 
 (-1.96) (-3.20) (-2.34) (-3.39) (3.59) (0.03) (1.20) (0.65) 
BOND_YIELD 9.89*** 5.04 1.06 0.75 2.88*** 0.91 5.65** 5.58** 
 (6.61) (0.77) (0.50) (0.41) (4.26) (0.77) (2.40) (2.55) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.56*** 142.85*** 308.14*** 401.55*** 5.59*** 41.16*** 135.07*** 231.82*** 
 (4.84) (6.05) (25.25) (34.83) (3.14) (6.66) (13.23) (19.46) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -75.09** -32.98 3.61 82.17* -15.97* -7.52 7.42 72.55** 
 (-2.10) (-0.64) (0.07) (1.69) (-1.91) (-0.32) (0.23) (2.11) 
LAGGED_ROS -18.79 -746.97 -25.89 -96.96 18.67 -13.26 -79.41 -99.59 
 (-0.65) (-0.96) (-0.41) (-1.55) (1.58) (-0.42) (-0.70) (-0.87) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -43.09 328.69 77.13* 95.23* -10.12 40.90* -90.54 -51.20 
 (-0.98) (1.19) (1.86) (1.96) (-1.08) (1.66) (-0.61) (-0.39) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 48,542 48,542 48,542 48,542 48,542 48,542 48,542 48,542 
R2 0.0601 0.0024 0.1467 0.2456 0.0463 0.0408 0.0323 0.0630 
Adjusted R2 7,485 7,485 7,485 7,485 7,485 7,485 7,485 7,485 
Number of firms 0.0596 0.0019 0.1462 0.2452 0.0458 0.0403 0.0317 0.0625 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-12: Market concentration – ROS (four year lag) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -7.14 -19.20 -16.66 -12.33 3.55 -0.13 9.99 6.10 
 (-0.44) (-0.65) (-1.23) (-1.07) (1.04) (-0.02) (0.86) (0.52) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.36*** -50.50*** -31.37*** -25.34*** -13.83*** -10.98*** -12.37* -20.92*** 
 (-5.77) (-4.19) (-4.73) (-4.36) (-7.47) (-2.61) (-1.87) (-3.17) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.93 -0.92 0.39 0.12 0.00 -0.08 -3.83* -3.85* 
 (-0.47) (-0.24) (0.21) (0.07) (0.01) (-0.07) (-1.92) (-1.74) 
CPI -0.74* -11.53*** -1.16** -1.63*** 0.56*** -0.04 0.63 0.34 
 (-1.76) (-3.07) (-2.07) (-3.30) (3.93) (-0.13) (1.22) (0.63) 
BOND_YIELD 12.35*** 24.91 0.65 1.20 2.71*** -0.14 4.19 4.75* 
 (7.18) (0.92) (0.27) (0.58) (3.61) (-0.10) (1.53) (1.95) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.18*** 153.78*** 307.67*** 396.37*** 5.56*** 38.06*** 134.97*** 230.64*** 
 (4.36) (4.74) (23.50) (31.74) (2.98) (5.84) (12.66) (18.04) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -38.15* 25.21 1.20 115.99*** -10.34 -5.67 43.54* 130.17*** 
 (-1.67) (0.60) (0.02) (2.63) (-1.42) (-0.21) (1.96) (4.44) 
LAGGED_ROS -29.01 -363.14 -50.79 -147.20** 8.01 -18.22 -107.03 -173.60* 
 (-1.05) (-0.62) (-0.84) (-2.47) (0.60) (-0.52) (-1.06) (-1.69) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -43.97 1,479.69 143.64*** 134.77*** -13.69 66.72*** -36.07 -10.54 
 (-0.91) (0.99) (3.57) (3.15) (-1.12) (3.39) (-0.29) (-0.10) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,702 41,702 41,702 41,702 41,702 41,702 41,702 41,702 
R2 0.0656 0.0034 0.1449 0.2389 0.0457 0.0361 0.0278 0.0569 
Adjusted R2 6,573 6,573 6,573 6,573 6,573 6,573 6,573 6,573 
Number of firms 0.0650 0.0028 0.1443 0.2384 0.0451 0.0356 0.0272 0.0563 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-13: Market concentration – ROS [omitted] 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -9.90 -35.95 -8.84 -7.51 4.00 4.68 2.89 1.48 
 (-0.71) (-1.43) (-0.76) (-0.77) (1.47) (0.77) (0.26) (0.14) 
EURO_MEMBER -25.41*** -60.53*** -29.15*** -21.15*** -11.12*** -9.51*** -13.27*** -21.22*** 
 (-6.95) (-2.71) (-5.63) (-4.57) (-7.78) (-3.11) (-2.67) (-4.21) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -1.84 -2.97 -1.73 -2.48* 0.36 -0.21 -4.09*** -4.60*** 
 (-1.16) (-0.87) (-1.08) (-1.69) (0.95) (-0.27) (-2.59) (-2.61) 
CPI -0.57 -13.49*** -1.51*** -1.80*** 0.33*** -0.14 0.24 0.34 
 (-1.59) (-4.12) (-3.17) (-4.08) (2.87) (-0.55) (0.57) (0.78) 
BOND_YIELD 7.17*** 8.92 0.68 0.58 2.53*** 1.11 5.85*** 5.86*** 
 (6.22) (0.43) (0.40) (0.39) (3.87) (1.15) (3.35) (3.39) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.42*** 95.72*** 297.49*** 395.31*** 6.92*** 47.90*** 135.80*** 234.68*** 
 (5.88) (4.66) (28.27) (39.03) (4.55) (9.01) (14.83) (22.99) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.31*** 4.18 2.16** 3.51** 0.21 3.22 5.41 6.65* 
 (5.30) (0.71) (2.09) (2.48) (1.21) (1.31) (1.62) (1.70) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -18.97 712.43 117.52*** 138.95*** -6.48 45.62*** 17.63 54.36 
 (-1.00) (1.02) (3.51) (3.17) (-1.42) (3.14) (0.36) (1.23) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 68,642 68,642 68,642 68,642 68,642 68,642 68,642 68,642 
R2 0.0501 0.0031 0.1270 0.1969 0.0443 0.0463 0.0325 0.0620 
Adjusted R2 9,687 9,687 9,687 9,687 9,687 9,687 9,687 9,687 
Number of firms 0.0497 0.0027 0.1266 0.1966 0.0440 0.0459 0.0321 0.0617 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.6 Market concentration model – lagged ROE 
Table A2-14: Market concentration – lagged ROE  
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -11.76 -33.42 -8.94 -7.63 4.45 4.09 6.97 4.25 
 (-0.80) (-1.06) (-0.75) (-0.76) (1.52) (0.63) (0.60) (0.38) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.24*** -59.17** -30.08*** -20.37*** -11.15*** -9.30*** -11.36** -16.44*** 
 (-6.70) (-2.33) (-5.45) (-4.13) (-7.10) (-2.76) (-2.10) (-3.03) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.39 -2.80 -1.86 -2.65* 0.21 -0.29 -3.90** -4.11** 
 (-1.43) (-0.80) (-1.13) (-1.77) (0.53) (-0.36) (-2.35) (-2.23) 
CPI -0.69* -13.48*** -1.57*** -1.73*** 0.34*** -0.03 0.23 0.24 
 (-1.82) (-3.79) (-3.14) (-3.84) (2.71) (-0.11) (0.53) (0.53) 
BOND_YIELD 7.39*** 15.07 0.62 0.41 2.61*** 1.55 6.19*** 5.94*** 
 (5.93) (0.56) (0.34) (0.26) (3.72) (1.51) (3.28) (3.21) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 28.02*** 99.70*** 304.99*** 398.86*** 6.45*** 46.16*** 137.03*** 233.89*** 
 (5.54) (4.00) (27.75) (38.37) (4.01) (8.24) (14.43) (22.12) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.41*** 3.49 1.91* 3.46** 0.17 3.20 5.63 6.74* 
 (4.96) (0.57) (1.90) (2.56) (1.02) (1.28) (1.63) (1.69) 
LAGGED_ROE -7.75* -21.06 -12.67 -11.26 -5.10** 0.60 -5.82 -6.40 
 (-1.67) (-0.83) (-1.30) (-1.15) (-2.08) (0.12) (-0.67) (-0.66) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -25.13 808.59 82.87** 90.47** -8.34 58.01*** 2.49 24.43 
 (-1.05) (1.01) (2.28) (2.57) (-1.42) (3.09) (0.04) (0.41) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,468 61,468 61,468 61,468 61,468 61,468 61,468 61,468 
R2 0.0531 0.0032 0.1358 0.2233 0.0421 0.0455 0.0327 0.0613 
Adjusted R2 9,226 9,226 9,226 9,226 9,226 9,226 9,226 9,226 
Number of firms 0.0527 0.0028 0.1354 0.2230 0.0417 0.0451 0.0322 0.0609 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-15: Market concentration – lagged ROE and lagged ROS 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -11.21 -31.29 -8.46 -8.05 4.32 6.22 7.76 5.18 
 (-0.75) (-0.98) (-0.70) (-0.79) (1.45) (0.99) (0.66) (0.45) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.65*** -59.03** -29.74*** -20.17*** -11.63*** -9.51*** -11.22** -16.98*** 
 (-6.77) (-2.28) (-5.34) (-4.06) (-7.49) (-2.80) (-2.06) (-3.09) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.31 -4.02 -1.90 -2.42 0.23 -0.40 -3.96** -4.30** 
 (-1.36) (-1.05) (-1.14) (-1.59) (0.58) (-0.48) (-2.36) (-2.30) 
CPI -0.68* -13.50*** -1.50*** -1.63*** 0.37*** -0.00 0.31 0.39 
 (-1.75) (-3.71) (-2.98) (-3.61) (2.93) (-0.01) (0.70) (0.83) 
BOND_YIELD 7.53*** 15.63 0.73 0.48 2.72*** 1.74* 6.28*** 6.30*** 
 (6.00) (0.57) (0.40) (0.31) (3.86) (1.69) (3.29) (3.38) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 28.43*** 101.86*** 307.37*** 401.20*** 6.56*** 46.12*** 138.76*** 235.36*** 
 (5.57) (4.06) (27.73) (38.26) (4.07) (8.18) (14.60) (22.14) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.44*** 3.57 2.64** 4.10*** 0.17 3.02 6.21 7.14* 
 (5.04) (0.55) (2.51) (2.74) (0.96) (1.18) (1.63) (1.66) 
LAGGED_ROS -51.18* 224.25 57.09 36.05 -6.85 -8.56 34.89 29.97 
 (-1.69) (0.43) (0.93) (0.62) (-0.36) (-0.26) (0.49) (0.41) 
LAGGED_ROE -1.69 -60.54 -18.25 -13.97 -3.37 3.91 -10.07 -7.54 
 (-0.32) (-1.47) (-1.51) (-1.16) (-1.25) (0.65) (-0.90) (-0.60) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -35.84 1,075.04 64.84** 70.97** -9.52 60.73*** -9.43 8.17 
 (-1.05) (0.92) (2.19) (2.56) (-1.31) (3.33) (-0.11) (0.11) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60,089 60,089 60,089 60,089 60,089 60,089 60,089 60,089 
R2 0.0539 0.0033 0.1400 0.2303 0.0432 0.0454 0.0340 0.0631 
Adjusted R2 8,967 8,967 8,967 8,967 8,967 8,967 8,967 8,967 
Number of firms 0.0535 0.0028 0.1396 0.2299 0.0427 0.0449 0.0336 0.0627 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.7 Market concentration model – lagged ROA 
Table A2-16: Market concentration – lagged ROA (including assets) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -11.27 -32.73 -8.27 -7.28 4.60 4.18 6.62 2.96 
 (-0.77) (-1.05) (-0.69) (-0.73) (1.59) (0.65) (0.56) (0.26) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.03*** -59.74** -30.20*** -20.77*** -11.13*** -9.17*** -11.63** -17.42*** 
 (-6.72) (-2.34) (-5.52) (-4.26) (-7.22) (-2.77) (-2.18) (-3.24) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.27 -2.46 -1.80 -2.60* 0.25 -0.30 -3.81** -4.11** 
 (-1.37) (-0.70) (-1.10) (-1.74) (0.62) (-0.37) (-2.32) (-2.24) 
CPI -0.67* -13.48*** -1.54*** -1.71*** 0.36*** -0.03 0.19 0.23 
 (-1.79) (-3.83) (-3.10) (-3.82) (2.96) (-0.11) (0.44) (0.51) 
BOND_YIELD 7.54*** 15.00 0.63 0.42 2.69*** 1.53 5.95*** 5.80*** 
 (6.06) (0.56) (0.35) (0.27) (3.86) (1.50) (3.16) (3.14) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.52*** 97.16*** 302.80*** 398.01*** 6.69*** 46.48*** 137.78*** 235.86*** 
 (5.57) (3.99) (27.78) (38.64) (4.27) (8.38) (14.62) (22.27) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.41*** 3.68 2.14** 3.69*** 0.16 3.31 5.73* 6.93* 
 (5.38) (0.59) (2.09) (2.58) (0.97) (1.31) (1.65) (1.71) 
LAGGED_ROA -48.28* 128.31 -21.48 -67.35 -43.82*** -15.58 -47.79 -90.35 
 (-1.85) (0.33) (-0.36) (-1.14) (-2.83) (-0.46) (-0.78) (-1.41) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -22.84 759.06 102.50*** 107.22*** -8.50 48.70*** 1.45 22.72 
 (-1.00) (1.03) (3.73) (3.90) (-1.49) (3.36) (0.02) (0.43) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 62,880 62,880 62,880 62,880 62,880 62,880 62,880 62,880 
R2 0.0528 0.0032 0.1348 0.2232 0.0436 0.0452 0.0329 0.0626 
Adjusted R2 9,321 9,321 9,321 9,321 9,321 9,321 9,321 9,321 
Number of firms 0.0524 0.0027 0.1345 0.2229 0.0432 0.0448 0.0325 0.0621 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-17: Market concentration – lagged ROA (excluding assets) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (By zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -8.43 -32.36 -5.36 -6.53 5.34** 5.84 4.24 -2.06 
 (-0.58) (-1.21) (-0.46) (-0.68) (2.01) (0.89) (0.36) (-0.19) 
EURO_MEMBER -23.36*** -56.78*** -5.50 7.60 -8.15*** -8.06*** 5.96 -2.19 
 (-6.36) (-2.72) (-1.04) (1.29) (-5.74) (-2.78) (1.18) (-0.43) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.09 -2.53 -2.89* -2.62* 0.29 0.29 -4.88*** -4.60*** 
 (-1.33) (-0.70) (-1.80) (-1.65) (0.76) (0.37) (-3.07) (-2.69) 
CPI -0.66* -14.27*** -2.59*** -2.38*** 0.09 -0.02 -0.87** -0.61 
 (-1.96) (-4.17) (-5.49) (-5.34) (0.82) (-0.09) (-2.01) (-1.36) 
BOND_YIELD 7.32*** 16.81 -2.81 -4.82** 1.61*** 1.99* 4.24** 3.64** 
 (6.61) (0.74) (-1.63) (-1.98) (2.69) (1.77) (2.45) (2.10) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 25.69*** 72.90* 300.49*** 404.26*** 6.40*** 46.04*** 134.87*** 235.07*** 
 (6.38) (1.95) (32.81) (44.19) (4.78) (9.67) (15.57) (25.11) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -2.50 -1.91 5.28*** 6.59*** 0.41*** 1.36 2.90** 3.67** 
 (-1.56) (-0.79) (3.83) (4.31) (2.76) (1.38) (2.04) (2.37) 
LAGGED_ROA -50.60*** 92.53 -94.36* -93.55* -50.73*** -21.08 -186.69** -158.82** 
 (-2.67) (0.43) (-1.75) (-1.68) (-4.29) (-0.82) (-2.41) (-2.57) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75,759 75,759 75,759 75,759 75,759 75,759 75,759 75,759 
R2 0.0542 0.0030 0.1227 0.1769 0.0437 0.0516 0.0303 0.0590 
Adjusted R2 10,587 10,587 10,587 10,587 10,587 10,587 10,587 10,587 
Number of firms 0.0539 0.0027 0.1224 0.1766 0.0434 0.0513 0.0300 0.0587 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.8 Market concentration model – lagged ROA and ROS 
Table A2-18: Market concentration – lagged ROA and ROS (including assets) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -10.78 -28.47 -7.61 -7.56 4.46 6.22 7.62 4.06 
 (-0.73) (-0.90) (-0.63) (-0.75) (1.51) (1.00) (0.63) (0.35) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.33*** -57.93** -29.75*** -20.62*** -11.52*** -9.44*** -11.27** -17.95*** 
 (-6.77) (-2.25) (-5.39) (-4.20) (-7.54) (-2.84) (-2.10) (-3.31) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.18 -3.63 -1.79 -2.36 0.26 -0.39 -3.88** -4.34** 
 (-1.30) (-0.96) (-1.09) (-1.56) (0.64) (-0.48) (-2.33) (-2.33) 
CPI -0.66* -13.39*** -1.45*** -1.61*** 0.38*** -0.01 0.30 0.38 
 (-1.72) (-3.74) (-2.91) (-3.57) (3.10) (-0.04) (0.67) (0.82) 
BOND_YIELD 7.67*** 15.71 0.78 0.51 2.78*** 1.70* 6.10*** 6.19*** 
 (6.13) (0.58) (0.43) (0.33) (3.95) (1.65) (3.21) (3.33) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.83*** 100.93*** 304.99*** 400.10*** 6.74*** 46.35*** 139.56*** 237.28*** 
 (5.57) (4.15) (27.72) (38.48) (4.26) (8.30) (14.78) (22.27) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.43*** 4.01 2.87*** 4.33*** 0.15 3.13 6.34* 7.39* 
 (5.40) (0.60) (2.59) (2.74) (0.89) (1.21) (1.65) (1.68) 
LAGGED_ROS -48.31 647.82 111.37 96.14 7.29 -31.58 156.87 138.14 
 (-1.27) (0.86) (1.49) (1.37) (0.31) (-0.82) (1.62) (1.43) 
LAGGED_ROA -6.17 -746.35 -129.95 -149.21* -37.84 41.26 -224.21** -224.10** 
 (-0.15) (-1.18) (-1.51) (-1.79) (-1.49) (0.84) (-2.16) (-2.12) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -35.96 1,072.17 64.74** 71.05** -9.79 60.71*** -9.24 8.47 
 (-1.05) (0.92) (2.18) (2.56) (-1.33) (3.32) (-0.11) (0.11) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,540 61,540 61,540 61,540 61,540 61,540 61,540 61,540 
R2 0.0533 0.0033 0.1386 0.2297 0.0445 0.0452 0.0344 0.0645 
Adjusted R2 9,069 9,069 9,069 9,069 9,069 9,069 9,069 9,069 
Number of firms 0.0529 0.0028 0.1382 0.2293 0.0440 0.0447 0.0340 0.0640 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-19: Market concentration – lagged ROA and ROS (excluding assets) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -7.67 -25.14 -1.81 -1.28 4.41 5.93 6.84 2.48 
 (-0.54) (-0.87) (-0.15) (-0.13) (1.59) (0.96) (0.58) (0.22) 
EURO_MEMBER -24.88*** -56.83** -28.69*** -20.73*** -11.21*** -11.25*** -15.84*** -22.98*** 
 (-6.45) (-2.56) (-5.42) (-4.39) (-7.65) (-3.52) (-3.09) (-4.42) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -1.96 -3.60 -1.62 -2.37 0.27 0.02 -3.99** -4.25** 
 (-1.17) (-0.93) (-1.01) (-1.61) (0.70) (0.03) (-2.51) (-2.40) 
CPI -0.59 -14.11*** -1.52*** -1.70*** 0.35*** -0.01 0.25 0.35 
 (-1.62) (-4.00) (-3.15) (-3.90) (2.94) (-0.04) (0.56) (0.76) 
BOND_YIELD 7.68*** 20.40 0.22 -0.08 2.54*** 1.60 6.27*** 6.29*** 
 (6.36) (0.79) (0.13) (-0.05) (3.78) (1.60) (3.40) (3.46) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.68*** 72.23* 309.74*** 413.48*** 6.83*** 47.11*** 141.12*** 242.12*** 
 (6.53) (1.78) (32.74) (46.41) (5.02) (9.70) (16.52) (25.31) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.46*** 4.90 3.82** 5.20*** 0.13 3.72 7.80* 8.59* 
 (5.18) (0.74) (2.57) (2.92) (0.82) (1.42) (1.87) (1.90) 
LAGGED_ROS -23.99 422.75 67.13 63.25 10.19 -20.49 86.62 62.34 
 (-0.75) (0.74) (1.06) (1.04) (0.62) (-0.58) (1.15) (0.82) 
LAGGED_ROA -12.76 -528.87 -88.60 -99.12 -36.42* 24.86 -163.13* -171.28* 
 -7.67 -25.14 -1.81 -1.28 4.41 5.93 6.84 2.48 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 66,626 66,626 66,626 66,626 66,626 66,626 66,626 66,626 
R2 0.0529 0.0032 0.1437 0.2429 0.0451 0.0452 0.0345 0.0679 
Adjusted R2 9,531 9,531 9,531 9,531 9,531 9,531 9,531 9,531 
Number of firms 0.0526 0.0028 0.1434 0.2426 0.0447 0.0448 0.0341 0.0675 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.9 Market concentration model – lagged industry growth 
 Table A2-20: Market concentration – industry growth (two year lag) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -6.90 -18.08 -11.69 -9.66 4.09 4.74 9.13 1.65 
 (-0.45) (-0.59) (-0.90) (-0.86) (1.38) (0.76) (0.81) (0.15) 
EURO_MEMBER -24.58*** -54.97*** -29.10*** -22.05*** -11.79*** -10.56*** -14.29*** -20.40*** 
 (-6.43) (-2.65) (-5.25) (-4.41) (-7.85) (-3.22) (-2.67) (-3.75) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -1.30 -1.83 -1.80 -2.25 0.24 -0.11 -4.09** -3.82** 
 (-0.79) (-0.49) (-1.06) (-1.45) (0.60) (-0.13) (-2.41) (-2.02) 
CPI -0.69* -14.41*** -1.30** -1.63*** 0.47*** -0.10 0.33 0.23 
 (-1.73) (-3.73) (-2.47) (-3.36) (3.73) (-0.38) (0.74) (0.48) 
BOND_YIELD 8.27*** 26.97 0.04 0.88 2.67*** 0.55 5.15** 5.71*** 
 (6.27) (0.95) (0.02) (0.51) (4.42) (0.53) (2.50) (2.90) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 27.03*** 128.29*** 298.44*** 389.76*** 6.82*** 43.90*** 133.93*** 228.30*** 
 (5.28) (5.70) (26.32) (35.98) (4.19) (7.71) (13.90) (20.64) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0.22 -1.83 3.61** 4.95** 0.01 3.18 4.92 6.52 
 (0.52) (-0.30) (2.08) (2.36) (0.05) (1.04) (1.28) (1.41) 
LAGGED_ROS -41.42* 295.73 32.99 5.18 -14.46 -6.43 47.28 26.65 
 (-1.66) (0.61) (0.62) (0.10) (-0.89) (-0.23) (0.77) (0.43) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -33.25 1,093.74 69.05** 75.36** -9.65 61.43*** -7.10 9.82 
 (-1.00) (0.92) (2.11) (2.49) (-1.32) (3.52) (-0.08) (0.13) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 57,986 57,986 57,986 57,986 57,986 57,986 57,986 57,986 
R2 0.0515 0.0034 0.1269 0.2088 0.0461 0.0410 0.0285 0.0545 
Adjusted R2 8,779 8,779 8,779 8,779 8,779 8,779 8,779 8,779 
Number of firms 0.0511 0.0029 0.1265 0.2084 0.0457 0.0406 0.0280 0.0540 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-21: Market concentration – industry growth (three year lag) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -4.40 10.88 -15.76 -12.77 3.05 1.81 8.83 1.75 
 (-0.28) (0.26) (-1.15) (-1.04) (1.03) (0.28) (0.88) (0.17) 
EURO_MEMBER -23.79*** -65.02*** -29.90*** -25.35*** -11.69*** -10.44*** -16.36*** -23.54*** 
 (-6.21) (-2.63) (-5.35) (-4.99) (-7.66) (-3.19) (-3.04) (-4.29) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.57 -1.82 -0.94 -1.87 0.33 0.14 -4.09** -3.93** 
 (-0.34) (-0.45) (-0.54) (-1.17) (0.86) (0.16) (-2.33) (-2.04) 
CPI -0.79* -15.91*** -1.53*** -1.84*** 0.49*** -0.15 0.27 0.25 
 (-1.87) (-3.70) (-2.79) (-3.58) (3.96) (-0.57) (0.60) (0.50) 
BOND_YIELD 9.78*** 51.82 -1.16 0.28 2.35*** -0.86 3.43 4.48** 
 (6.70) (1.23) (-0.53) (0.14) (3.59) (-0.76) (1.49) (2.14) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 26.53*** 131.86*** 294.12*** 379.10*** 6.96*** 41.97*** 130.21*** 221.36*** 
 (5.09) (4.50) (25.15) (33.50) (4.23) (7.28) (13.32) (19.34) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.65 2.98 4.75** 5.97** -0.17 0.82 2.59 4.82* 
 (-0.76) (1.08) (2.09) (2.27) (-0.58) (1.03) (1.48) (1.80) 
LAGGED_ROS -39.67* 339.26 34.28 -1.32 -20.86 -3.37 47.04 44.75 
 (-1.68) (0.67) (0.64) (-0.03) (-1.26) (-0.12) (0.76) (0.71) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -41.43 1,339.05 82.61** 85.92** -12.21 53.36*** -26.10 -7.49 
 (-1.11) (0.94) (2.12) (2.37) (-1.31) (2.93) (-0.27) (-0.08) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,299 54,299 54,299 54,299 54,299 54,299 54,299 54,299 
R2 0.0538 0.0041 0.1204 0.1924 0.0461 0.0371 0.0236 0.0467 
Adjusted R2 8,437 8,437 8,437 8,437 8,437 8,437 8,437 8,437 
Number of firms 0.0534 0.0037 0.1199 0.1920 0.0456 0.0366 0.0232 0.0462 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-22: Market concentration – industry growth (four year lag) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER 5.53 -27.77 -7.59 -7.36 1.82 -0.26 8.09 3.12 
 (0.37) (-1.49) (-0.55) (-0.59) (0.63) (-0.04) (0.87) (0.35) 
EURO_MEMBER -23.91*** -40.34*** -31.25*** -27.72*** -12.35*** -11.26*** -19.39*** -26.10*** 
 (-6.11) (-4.53) (-5.53) (-5.36) (-7.95) (-3.40) (-3.56) (-4.77) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA 0.32 -1.29 -0.20 -1.55 0.62* 0.92 -4.06** -4.15** 
 (0.19) (-0.29) (-0.11) (-0.95) (1.71) (0.96) (-2.23) (-2.11) 
CPI -0.92** -14.35*** -1.38*** -1.63*** 0.47*** -0.31 0.20 0.46 
 (-2.51) (-3.45) (-2.60) (-3.32) (3.78) (-1.12) (0.41) (0.92) 
BOND_YIELD 10.71*** -5.48 -0.19 0.93 2.38*** -1.63 3.04 3.95* 
 (6.94) (-1.17) (-0.08) (0.46) (3.44) (-1.33) (1.26) (1.88) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 25.23*** 109.02*** 284.63*** 368.99*** 6.96*** 40.11*** 124.99*** 217.22*** 
 (4.73) (7.00) (23.36) (30.98) (4.16) (6.84) (12.44) (18.25) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -1.23 3.79*** 1.82** 2.93*** -0.28 1.31*** 1.35 2.96*** 
 (-1.23) (2.58) (2.46) (3.34) (-0.74) (3.33) (1.62) (3.31) 
LAGGED_ROS -34.53 182.04 28.44 -6.53 -20.21 4.34 49.23 44.17 
 (-1.50) (0.35) (0.53) (-0.12) (-1.20) (0.16) (0.77) (0.67) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -34.89 1,355.40 88.58** 89.43** -10.81 55.15*** -23.32 -8.65 
 (-1.04) (0.93) (2.09) (2.38) (-1.33) (3.33) (-0.24) (-0.09) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50,646 50,646 50,646 50,646 50,646 50,646 50,646 50,646 
R2 0.0574 0.0039 0.1103 0.1774 0.0485 0.0323 0.0196 0.0413 
Adjusted R2 8,116 8,116 8,116 8,116 8,116 8,116 8,116 8,116 
Number of firms 0.0570 0.0034 0.1098 0.1770 0.0481 0.0319 0.0191 0.0408 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.10 Market concentration model – minimum efficient scale (MES) 
Table A2-23: Market concentration – MES at the 50th percentile [omitted] 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -10.33 -28.05 -4.77 -3.80 4.49 6.77 8.90 6.08 
 (-0.69) (-0.88) (-0.34) (-0.30) (1.52) (1.12) (0.77) (0.57) 
EURO_MEMBER -27.62*** -63.59** -43.64*** -38.81*** -11.94*** -11.49*** -18.06*** -29.14*** 
 (-7.06) (-2.56) (-7.05) (-6.43) (-7.84) (-3.45) (-3.29) (-5.09) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.39 -4.40 -4.43** -5.82*** 0.21 -0.77 -5.09*** -6.37*** 
 (-1.41) (-1.16) (-2.36) (-3.17) (0.53) (-0.93) (-3.06) (-3.42) 
CPI -0.62 -13.24*** -1.08* -1.11** 0.39*** 0.05 0.46 0.68 
 (-1.62) (-3.68) (-1.94) (-2.09) (3.17) (0.17) (1.01) (1.40) 
BOND_YIELD 7.88*** 16.57 3.24 3.79* 2.83*** 2.04** 7.19*** 8.11*** 
 (6.25) (0.62) (1.55) (1.94) (4.02) (1.97) (3.81) (4.33) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.26*** 3.21 1.05 1.95 0.10 2.86 5.45 5.92 
 (4.58) (0.49) (1.14) (1.42) (0.58) (1.12) (1.46) (1.41) 
LAGGED_ROS -48.12* 242.29 46.93 25.46 -10.65 -8.33 41.99 25.19 
 (-1.85) (0.52) (0.82) (0.45) (-0.67) (-0.29) (0.68) (0.39) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -37.03 1,071.37 53.41 55.78* -9.93 58.87*** -13.65 0.05 
 (-1.09) (0.91) (1.60) (1.75) (-1.37) (3.26) (-0.16) (0.00) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0482 0.0031 0.0186 0.0149 0.0435 0.0353 0.0163 0.0159 
Adjusted R2 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
Number of firms 0.0478 0.0027 0.0182 0.0145 0.0431 0.0349 0.0159 0.0154 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-24: Market concentration – MES at the 75th percentile 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -12.31 -28.34 -22.14* -26.88*** 4.04 4.06 1.28 -6.43 
 (-0.84) (-0.89) (-1.94) (-2.76) (1.38) (0.66) (0.11) (-0.60) 
EURO_MEMBER -25.71*** -63.32** -26.92*** -16.59*** -11.50*** -8.88*** -10.72** -17.10*** 
 (-6.66) (-2.49) (-5.33) (-3.93) (-7.51) (-2.70) (-2.02) (-3.21) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.28 -4.38 -3.53** -4.61*** 0.23 -0.63 -4.69*** -5.71*** 
 (-1.37) (-1.17) (-2.42) (-3.80) (0.59) (-0.76) (-2.81) (-3.06) 
CPI -0.65* -13.24*** -1.33*** -1.45*** 0.39*** 0.01 0.35 0.50 
 (-1.71) (-3.70) (-2.78) (-3.46) (3.12) (0.03) (0.78) (1.09) 
BOND_YIELD 7.73*** 16.55 1.94 2.06 2.79*** 1.84* 6.62*** 7.17*** 
 (6.18) (0.62) (1.14) (1.47) (3.97) (1.79) (3.55) (3.95) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 45.22*** 6.48 395.16*** 525.14*** 10.44*** 61.74*** 173.47*** 284.61*** 
 (7.25) (0.10) (30.38) (38.61) (5.76) (10.44) (14.76) (21.60) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.63*** 3.26 4.29 6.26* 0.19 3.37 6.87 8.26 
 (4.72) (0.50) (1.56) (1.69) (1.16) (1.17) (1.51) (1.48) 
LAGGED_ROS -50.37* 241.97 27.25 -0.69 -11.17 -11.40 33.35 11.01 
 (-1.95) (0.52) (0.52) (-0.01) (-0.71) (-0.41) (0.55) (0.18) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -31.03 1,072.23 105.82*** 125.43*** -8.54 67.06*** 9.36 37.80 
 (-0.89) (0.91) (4.60) (6.38) (-1.14) (3.40) (0.11) (0.45) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0599 0.0031 0.1936 0.3361 0.0459 0.0503 0.0405 0.0766 
Adjusted R2 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
Number of firms 0.0595 0.0027 0.1933 0.3358 0.0455 0.0499 0.0401 0.0762 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A2.11 Market concentration model – number of firms (% change) 
Table A2-25: Market concentration – number of firms (% change) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -10.33 -28.08 -4.79 -3.83 4.50 6.77 8.90 6.06 
 (-0.69) (-0.88) (-0.34) (-0.31) (1.52) (1.12) (0.77) (0.57) 
EURO_MEMBER -27.62*** -62.97** -43.17*** -38.11*** -11.96*** -11.45*** -17.87*** -28.76*** 
 (-7.06) (-2.54) (-6.96) (-6.29) (-7.85) (-3.44) (-3.26) (-5.02) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.39 -4.36 -4.41** -5.78*** 0.21 -0.77 -5.07*** -6.35*** 
 (-1.41) (-1.15) (-2.33) (-3.13) (0.53) (-0.93) (-3.05) (-3.41) 
CPI -0.62 -13.37*** -1.18** -1.27** 0.40*** 0.04 0.41 0.60 
 (-1.62) (-3.70) (-2.13) (-2.38) (3.19) (0.13) (0.91) (1.23) 
BOND_YIELD 7.88*** 16.09 2.88 3.25* 2.84*** 2.01* 7.05*** 7.82*** 
 (6.26) (0.60) (1.38) (1.68) (4.03) (1.94) (3.72) (4.18) 
%_CHANGE_NO_OF_FIRMS 0.21 -64.48*** -49.38*** -72.63*** 1.38** -4.92*** -20.09*** -39.76*** 
 (0.18) (-2.96) (-16.65) (-18.24) (2.51) (-3.77) (-8.32) (-14.43) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.26*** 3.13 0.99 1.87 0.11 2.86 5.43 5.88 
 (4.58) (0.48) (1.14) (1.43) (0.58) (1.12) (1.46) (1.41) 
LAGGED_ROS -48.16* 255.63 57.15 40.49 -10.93 -7.31 46.15 33.41 
 (-1.86) (0.54) (1.00) (0.72) (-0.69) (-0.26) (0.75) (0.52) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -37.01 1,065.60 49.00 49.29 -9.80 58.43*** -15.44 -3.51 
 (-1.09) (0.91) (1.46) (1.53) (-1.36) (3.23) (-0.19) (-0.05) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0482 0.0033 0.0288 0.0377 0.0436 0.0357 0.0175 0.0203 
Adjusted R2 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
Number of firms 0.0478 0.0028 0.0283 0.0373 0.0432 0.0352 0.0171 0.0198 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A2-26: Market concentration – number of firms (% change) and MES (50th percentile) 
Geographical sector PANEL WITH FE (by country) PANEL WITH FE (by zone) 
Industry sector One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC One-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
EU_MEMBER -10.63 -28.83 -7.84 -7.80 4.41 6.29 7.49 3.70 
 (-0.72) (-0.91) (-0.65) (-0.77) (1.50) (1.01) (0.62) (0.32) 
EURO_MEMBER -26.30*** -59.72** -29.86*** -20.83*** -11.61*** -9.37*** -11.74** -18.45*** 
 (-6.77) (-2.30) (-5.42) (-4.23) (-7.62) (-2.83) (-2.18) (-3.39) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -2.13 -3.73 -1.82 -2.41 0.28 -0.37 -3.88** -4.34** 
 (-1.27) (-0.99) (-1.10) (-1.60) (0.70) (-0.44) (-2.34) (-2.34) 
CPI -0.65* -13.44*** -1.47*** -1.64*** 0.39*** -0.01 0.28 0.38 
 (-1.71) (-3.74) (-2.95) (-3.64) (3.13) (-0.03) (0.64) (0.82) 
BOND_YIELD 7.67*** 15.57 0.76 0.50 2.78*** 1.67 6.07*** 6.18*** 
 (6.14) (0.58) (0.42) (0.33) (3.96) (1.63) (3.20) (3.32) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 30.10*** 74.19** 303.24*** 393.76*** 8.01*** 47.41*** 139.66*** 234.91*** 
 (5.75) (2.21) (26.48) (36.54) (4.82) (8.02) (14.04) (21.06) 
%_CHANGE_NO_OF_FIRMS 4.84*** -53.08** -2.76 -12.09*** 2.62*** 2.37 1.38 -3.65 
 (3.58) (-2.07) (-0.96) (-4.43) (4.26) (1.43) (0.45) (-1.26) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 1.45*** 3.58 2.82*** 4.25*** 0.15 3.14 6.27* 7.30* 
 (5.47) (0.55) (2.58) (2.74) (0.89) (1.21) (1.65) (1.68) 
LAGGED_ROS -49.63* 252.01 42.36 21.28 -11.32 -9.62 39.34 21.96 
 (-1.93) (0.54) (0.80) (0.42) (-0.72) (-0.34) (0.65) (0.36) 
ASSETS_TO_SALES -35.41 1,069.56 65.16** 70.28** -9.38 60.96*** -8.00 9.02 
 (-1.03) (0.91) (2.17) (2.50) (-1.28) (3.34) (-0.09) (0.12) 
Time (t) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 61,722 
R2 0.0537 0.0033 0.1383 0.2297 0.0451 0.0451 0.0342 0.0642 
Adjusted R2 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 9,081 
Number of firms 0.0533 0.0029 0.1379 0.2294 0.0447 0.0446 0.0337 0.0638 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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APPENDIX A3: Firm profitability models 
A3.1 OLS and panel models for firm profitability 
Table A3-1: Profitability model – OLS and panel 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.79*** 11.96*** 3.69*** 2.34*** 7.59*** 2.28*** 2.31*** 7.22*** 3.51*** 2.11*** 6.38*** 3.21*** 
 (21.49) (15.12) (10.85) (13.12) (9.53) (6.59) (8.07) (6.84) (6.31) (6.16) (5.17) (5.04) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.22*** -3.82*** -0.18 0.69*** 1.92*** 1.35*** 1.65*** 4.22*** 1.24*** 1.74*** 5.17*** 1.02** 
 (-12.18) (-8.30) (-1.11) (5.03) (3.25) (6.06) (7.12) (4.45) (3.47) (5.81) (3.77) (2.41) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.21*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (-14.97) (-10.11) (-17.27) (-5.28) (-3.25) (-13.58) (-4.31) (-1.57) (-4.05) (0.10) (-0.14) (1.36) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.41* -1.48 -3.89*** 0.07 -2.52** -4.30*** 0.60* 0.18 0.47 1.00** 3.90** 2.14*** 
 (1.76) (-1.44) (-7.35) (0.31) (-2.45) (-8.02) (1.86) (0.13) (0.87) (2.51) (2.21) (3.65) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.44*** 3.02*** -1.49*** 1.52*** 3.35*** -1.33*** 0.77*** 2.70** -1.03** 0.10 2.48 -0.30 
 (7.84) (3.72) (-4.08) (8.32) (4.14) (-3.61) (2.80) (2.35) (-2.45) (0.26) (1.38) (-0.58) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.02 0.34 0.22 -0.10 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.71 0.17 0.30* 0.85 0.15 
 (-0.13) (0.49) (0.58) (-0.68) (0.04) (0.37) (1.58) (0.92) (0.90) (1.66) (1.01) (0.81) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.27*** 1.41** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.39** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.83* -1.51* -2.96** 
 (-2.60) (-3.11) (2.03) (-2.57) (-3.03) (2.01) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-0.59) (-1.76) (-1.88) (-2.01) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0126 0.0286 0.0132 0.0226    0.0392 0.0176 0.0270 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0125 0.0283 0.0129 0.0222    0.0389 0.0172 0.0267 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A3.2 Profitability model – GDP per capita, population, CPI and bond yield 
Table A3-2: Profitability – GDP per capita (omitted) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 2.40*** 8.10*** 0.69** 1.88*** 6.43*** -0.10 2.04*** 6.76*** 3.16*** 2.11*** 6.39*** 3.20*** 
 (14.67) (11.25) (2.23) (11.03) (8.70) (-0.30) (7.42) (6.61) (5.88) (6.16) (5.18) (5.02) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.19*** -3.73*** -0.11 0.82*** 2.24*** 2.01*** 1.76*** 4.37*** 1.44*** 1.73*** 5.24*** 0.80* 
 (-11.81) (-8.10) (-0.66) (5.93) (3.76) (9.11) (7.49) (4.57) (4.01) (5.74) (3.98) (1.93) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.40* -1.53 -3.92*** 0.06 -2.56** -4.36*** 0.63** 0.22 0.53 1.00** 3.90** 2.13*** 
 (1.69) (-1.48) (-7.31) (0.25) (-2.48) (-8.05) (1.96) (0.16) (0.99) (2.51) (2.21) (3.63) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.65*** 3.63*** -1.02*** 1.57*** 3.49*** -1.05*** 0.86*** 2.84** -0.88** 0.10 2.49 -0.32 
 (9.01) (4.47) (-2.77) (8.61) (4.32) (-2.84) (3.14) (2.49) (-2.09) (0.26) (1.38) (-0.63) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.36 0.23 -0.10 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.71 0.17 0.30* 0.85 0.16 
 (-0.08) (0.52) (0.63) (-0.68) (0.04) (0.37) (1.58) (0.92) (0.89) (1.66) (1.01) (0.81) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.28** -0.23*** 1.45** -0.29** -0.28*** 1.42** -0.26* -0.37* -0.35 -0.83* -1.51* -2.96** 
 (-2.50) (-2.74) (2.07) (-2.54) (-2.92) (2.04) (-1.71) (-1.74) (-0.58) (-1.76) (-1.88) (-2.01) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0057 0.0017 0.0083 0.0284 0.0131 0.0203    0.0392 0.0176 0.0269 
Adjusted R2 0.0056 0.0016 0.0082 0.0281 0.0128 0.0199    0.0389 0.0172 0.0266 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-3: Profitability – population 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 2.66*** 8.76*** 3.13*** 2.32*** 7.56*** 2.59*** 2.21*** 7.05*** 3.47*** 1.60*** 5.57*** 2.57*** 
 (15.33) (11.47) (9.59) (12.84) (9.64) (7.73) (7.85) (6.73) (6.34) (4.52) (4.21) (3.92) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.16*** -3.66*** 0.14 0.93*** 2.52*** 2.65*** 1.81*** 4.47*** 1.55*** 1.79*** 5.34*** 0.87** 
 (-11.53) (-7.94) (0.85) (6.61) (4.18) (11.92) (7.67) (4.61) (4.30) (5.88) (4.01) (2.09) 
POPULATION -0.01*** -0.02** -0.08*** -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.02*** -0.02 -0.05*** -0.46*** -0.75 -0.57*** 
 (-4.45) (-2.47) (-24.58) (-7.18) (-4.07) (-26.32) (-4.15) (-1.45) (-6.46) (-4.44) (-1.63) (-3.31) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.35 -1.64 -4.31*** -0.01 -2.75*** -4.81*** 0.56* 0.10 0.36 1.05*** 3.98** 2.19*** 
 (1.51) (-1.58) (-8.03) (-0.06) (-2.66) (-8.86) (1.72) (0.07) (0.66) (2.64) (2.26) (3.74) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.54*** 3.34*** -2.08*** 1.37*** 2.98*** -2.27*** 0.71** 2.59** -1.22*** 0.15 2.57 -0.26 
 (8.32) (4.06) (-5.60) (7.47) (3.63) (-6.08) (2.54) (2.22) (-2.85) (0.38) (1.43) (-0.51) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.37 0.26 -0.10 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.71 0.17 0.30* 0.86 0.17 
 (-0.06) (0.53) (0.70) (-0.63) (0.06) (0.46) (1.58) (0.92) (0.90) (1.69) (1.02) (0.85) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.28** -0.24*** 1.40** -0.30** -0.30*** 1.36** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.85* -1.54* -2.98** 
 (-2.51) (-2.80) (2.03) (-2.56) (-2.98) (1.99) (-1.75) (-1.77) (-0.59) (-1.80) (-1.91) (-2.03) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0059 0.0018 0.0161 0.0290 0.0134 0.0292    0.0397 0.0176 0.0273 
Adjusted R2 0.0058 0.0017 0.0160 0.0287 0.0130 0.0288    0.0394 0.0173 0.0270 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-4: Profitability – CPI and bond yield 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.65*** 12.11*** 3.43*** 1.77*** 6.27*** 1.41*** 1.75*** 4.76*** 2.34*** 1.98*** 4.82*** 2.21*** 
 (15.10) (10.62) (6.96) (6.91) (5.32) (2.85) (4.62) (3.05) (3.16) (4.65) (2.64) (2.66) 
EURO_MEMBER -0.41*** -2.36*** -0.04 0.50*** 1.01 0.83*** 1.36*** 3.19*** 0.48 1.69*** 4.90*** 0.64 
 (-3.20) (-4.10) (-0.19) (3.14) (1.44) (3.19) (5.46) (2.95) (1.29) (5.27) (3.19) (1.46) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.10*** -0.39*** -0.35*** -0.07*** -0.26*** -0.34*** -0.13*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 0.10 0.06 0.26* 
 (-9.50) (-8.34) (-18.43) (-6.58) (-4.97) (-15.70) (-5.65) (-3.28) (-6.67) (1.15) (0.13) (1.89) 
CPI -0.08*** -0.23*** 0.02 -0.14*** -0.30*** -0.07*** -0.14*** -0.40*** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.42*** -0.25*** 
 (-12.42) (-8.33) (1.47) (-9.88) (-4.89) (-2.95) (-7.02) (-4.33) (-6.11) (-6.49) (-3.90) (-6.80) 
BOND_YIELD -0.05 -0.45*** 0.23*** -0.08* -0.20 0.22*** -0.13** -0.28 -0.18* -0.20*** -0.55 -0.34*** 
 (-1.24) (-2.64) (3.54) (-1.68) (-0.85) (2.65) (-2.07) (-0.98) (-1.77) (-2.75) (-1.62) (-2.95) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.40* -1.41 -3.67*** 0.15 -2.19** -3.97*** 0.56* 0.14 0.41 0.91** 3.69** 2.01*** 
 (1.65) (-1.34) (-6.88) (0.64) (-2.07) (-7.38) (1.69) (0.10) (0.74) (2.23) (2.03) (3.34) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.29*** 2.64*** -1.93*** 1.47*** 3.20*** -1.68*** 0.72** 2.59** -1.22*** 0.03 2.41 -0.45 
 (6.85) (3.17) (-5.23) (7.87) (3.84) (-4.53) (2.53) (2.17) (-2.82) (0.07) (1.28) (-0.86) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.39 0.24 -0.09 0.10 0.16 0.29 0.84 0.23 0.35* 1.01 0.21 
 (-0.03) (0.49) (0.58) (-0.52) (0.12) (0.41) (1.61) (0.98) (1.03) (1.66) (1.06) (0.96) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.27** -0.26*** 1.35** -0.28** -0.30*** 1.34** -0.25* -0.36* -0.38 -0.80* -1.38* -2.97** 
 (-2.51) (-2.84) (2.00) (-2.56) (-2.99) (1.98) (-1.76) (-1.82) (-0.61) (-1.71) (-1.78) (-1.98) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72,854 70,875 72,854 72,854 70,875 72,854 72,854 70,875 72,854 72,854 70,875 72,854 
R2 0.0118 0.0042 0.0149 0.0303 0.0137 0.0247    0.0410 0.0181 0.0278 
Adjusted R2 0.0117 0.0041 0.0148 0.0300 0.0134 0.0243    0.0406 0.0177 0.0274 
Number of firms       10,038 9,947 10,038 10,038 9,947 10,038 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A3.3 Profitability model – Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
Table A3-5: Profitability – HHI by country (one-digit SIC) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.77*** 12.21*** 5.08*** 2.39*** 8.08*** 3.68*** 2.31*** 7.29*** 3.58*** 2.09*** 6.37*** 3.11*** 
 (21.17) (14.88) (14.95) (13.30) (9.81) (10.68) (8.04) (6.69) (6.37) (6.09) (5.04) (4.86) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.20*** -3.90*** -0.49*** 0.70*** 1.80*** 1.15*** 1.67*** 4.24*** 1.27*** 1.73*** 5.15*** 0.98** 
 (-12.08) (-8.49) (-3.01) (5.07) (3.06) (5.20) (7.18) (4.49) (3.53) (5.78) (3.77) (2.29) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.34*** -0.23*** -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.17*** -0.07*** -0.09 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.06 0.16 
 (-14.71) (-9.86) (-14.80) (-4.86) (-2.78) (-10.46) (-4.19) (-1.44) (-3.83) (0.08) (-0.15) (1.32) 
LAGGED_HHI -0.01 1.62 9.86*** 0.45* 3.14** 10.07*** 0.31 1.23 1.35 0.08 1.62 -0.91 
 (-0.04) (1.21) (19.45) (1.71) (2.32) (19.54) (0.60) (0.46) (1.31) (0.10) (0.40) (-0.68) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.69*** 2.01*** -4.51*** 1.53*** 1.61*** -4.62*** 1.03*** 2.70*** -0.91** 0.39 3.58* 0.37 
 (14.70) (3.96) (-24.64) (13.45) (3.19) (-25.37) (4.33) (2.72) (-2.44) (1.03) (1.94) (0.74) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.00 0.28 0.00 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 0.25 0.71 0.17 0.30* 0.87 0.17 
 (-0.03) (0.40) (0.01) (-0.69) (-0.11) (-0.27) (1.61) (0.92) (0.89) (1.68) (1.03) (0.88) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.28*** 1.39** -0.30** -0.30*** 1.37** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.82* -1.47* -2.94** 
 (-2.60) (-3.08) (2.02) (-2.57) (-2.97) (2.00) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-0.59) (-1.75) (-1.86) (-2.00) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0164 0.0287 0.0132 0.0262    0.0390 0.0175 0.0266 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0163 0.0283 0.0129 0.0258    0.0387 0.0171 0.0263 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-6: Profitability – HHI by country (two-digit SIC) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.78*** 12.02*** 3.89*** 2.34*** 7.70*** 2.53*** 2.29*** 7.22*** 3.51*** 2.09*** 6.30*** 3.16*** 
 (21.48) (15.20) (11.41) (13.15) (9.67) (7.30) (8.01) (6.83) (6.30) (6.08) (5.09) (4.97) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.21*** -3.88*** -0.35** 0.70*** 1.79*** 1.12*** 1.66*** 4.22*** 1.25*** 1.73*** 5.13*** 0.99** 
 (-12.09) (-8.45) (-2.14) (5.06) (3.05) (5.02) (7.15) (4.46) (3.48) (5.77) (3.74) (2.35) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.21*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (-14.92) (-10.11) (-17.10) (-5.25) (-3.29) (-13.54) (-4.37) (-1.56) (-4.06) (0.08) (-0.15) (1.34) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.04* 0.06 0.50** 0.02 0.03 0.47** 0.04 0.11 0.09** 0.04 0.17 0.08* 
 (1.80) (0.55) (2.45) (0.93) (0.24) (2.47) (1.50) (1.09) (2.11) (1.29) (1.38) (1.80) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.68*** 2.10*** -3.97*** 1.55*** 1.82*** -4.05*** 1.04*** 2.76*** -0.85** 0.40 3.63** 0.33 
 (14.71) (4.20) (-21.36) (13.79) (3.65) (-22.04) (4.40) (2.80) (-2.29) (1.03) (1.97) (0.66) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.29 0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 0.25 0.71 0.18 0.30* 0.87 0.17 
 (-0.04) (0.42) (0.22) (-0.67) (-0.07) (-0.04) (1.61) (0.92) (0.91) (1.68) (1.03) (0.87) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.27*** 1.42** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.40** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.82* -1.48* -2.94** 
 (-2.60) (-3.11) (2.03) (-2.57) (-3.02) (2.01) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-0.60) (-1.75) (-1.87) (-2.00) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0113 0.0286 0.0131 0.0209    0.0390 0.0175 0.0266 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0112 0.0283 0.0128 0.0205    0.0387 0.0171 0.0263 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-7: Profitability – HHI by country (three-digit SIC) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.81*** 12.09*** 3.78*** 2.34*** 7.70*** 2.39*** 2.31*** 7.26*** 3.52*** 2.11*** 6.38*** 3.20*** 
 (21.58) (15.26) (11.13) (13.12) (9.65) (6.90) (8.07) (6.87) (6.32) (6.15) (5.16) (5.02) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.22*** -3.92*** -0.31* 0.69*** 1.79*** 1.19*** 1.66*** 4.21*** 1.25*** 1.75*** 5.20*** 1.03** 
 (-12.23) (-8.54) (-1.90) (5.03) (3.04) (5.34) (7.14) (4.44) (3.48) (5.83) (3.79) (2.43) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.34*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.09 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (-14.81) (-10.03) (-17.29) (-5.25) (-3.29) (-13.77) (-4.23) (-1.48) (-3.97) (0.09) (-0.15) (1.34) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.40** 0.98 -0.36 0.07 0.03 -0.74** 0.48 1.21 0.70 0.86** 3.62* 1.71*** 
 (1.98) (1.07) (-1.11) (0.33) (0.03) (-2.26) (1.49) (0.88) (1.36) (2.10) (1.95) (2.79) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.49*** 1.64** -3.67*** 1.53*** 1.81*** -3.58*** 0.87*** 2.31** -1.07*** 0.20 2.81 -0.05 
 (9.81) (2.42) (-15.70) (10.13) (2.67) (-15.34) (3.28) (2.09) (-2.68) (0.51) (1.53) (-0.11) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.02 0.27 0.11 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 0.24 0.70 0.17 0.30* 0.85 0.16 
 (-0.13) (0.38) (0.29) (-0.68) (-0.07) (0.06) (1.59) (0.90) (0.88) (1.66) (1.01) (0.81) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.30*** -0.27*** 1.42** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.40** -0.27* -0.38* -0.36 -0.83* -1.50* -2.95** 
 (-2.60) (-3.12) (2.03) (-2.58) (-3.02) (2.01) (-1.77) (-1.80) (-0.60) (-1.76) (-1.87) (-2.01) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0111 0.0286 0.0131 0.0207    0.0391 0.0176 0.0268 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0110 0.0283 0.0128 0.0204 . . . 0.0388 0.0172 0.0265 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-8: Profitability – HHI by zone (one-digit SIC) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.78*** 11.98*** 3.88*** 2.34*** 7.71*** 2.48*** 2.27*** 7.15*** 3.44*** 2.04*** 6.15*** 3.08*** 
 (21.45) (15.14) (11.43) (13.15) (9.67) (7.18) (7.92) (6.75) (6.17) (5.93) (4.97) (4.84) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.19*** -3.98*** -0.09 0.81*** 1.92*** 1.54*** 1.62*** 4.08*** 1.16*** 1.71*** 5.09*** 0.97** 
 (-11.66) (-8.50) (-0.56) (5.74) (3.18) (6.79) (6.93) (4.28) (3.19) (5.72) (3.71) (2.29) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.34*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.09 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.04 0.18 
 (-15.00) (-10.02) (-17.67) (-5.37) (-3.32) (-13.88) (-4.29) (-1.52) (-3.95) (0.18) (-0.11) (1.43) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.50 -2.83 6.39*** 2.19*** 2.49 7.79*** -2.25* -6.00 -6.37*** -6.36*** -17.47*** -9.46*** 
 (0.98) (-1.48) (5.42) (4.22) (1.28) (6.49) (-1.91) (-1.49) (-2.68) (-3.04) (-2.71) (-2.87) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.69*** 2.11*** -3.83*** 1.56*** 1.83*** -3.92*** 1.05*** 2.78*** -0.82** 0.45 3.79** 0.42 
 (14.81) (4.21) (-21.43) (13.88) (3.67) (-22.08) (4.45) (2.83) (-2.20) (1.17) (2.06) (0.82) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.30 0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.25 0.72 0.18 0.30* 0.88 0.17 
 (-0.04) (0.43) (0.21) (-0.74) (-0.08) (-0.08) (1.62) (0.93) (0.94) (1.69) (1.03) (0.89) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.27*** 1.42** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.40** -0.26* -0.38* -0.37 -0.83* -1.50* -2.95** 
 (-2.60) (-3.11) (2.03) (-2.57) (-3.02) (2.01) (-1.76) (-1.80) (-0.60) (-1.76) (-1.87) (-2.01) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0117 0.0288 0.0131 0.0216    0.0394 0.0176 0.0270 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0116 0.0285 0.0128 0.0213    0.0390 0.0172 0.0267 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-9: Profitability – HHI by zone (two-digit SIC) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.79*** 11.97*** 3.82*** 2.36*** 7.72*** 2.47*** 2.30*** 7.28*** 3.47*** 2.08*** 6.37*** 3.14*** 
 (21.52) (15.15) (11.23) (13.26) (9.69) (7.15) (8.01) (6.87) (6.22) (6.05) (5.13) (4.93) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.16*** -3.95*** -0.31* 0.79*** 1.85*** 1.19*** 1.67*** 4.29*** 1.23*** 1.73*** 5.10*** 0.99** 
 (-11.48) (-8.37) (-1.88) (5.64) (3.05) (5.24) (7.15) (4.49) (3.42) (5.77) (3.72) (2.35) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.15*** 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (-15.03) (-10.07) (-17.29) (-5.35) (-3.31) (-13.73) (-4.39) (-1.58) (-4.08) (0.08) (-0.16) (1.34) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.59** -1.07 0.20 1.07*** 0.65 0.51 0.29 2.21 -1.02 -0.24 3.72 -0.65 
 (2.14) (-0.91) (0.40) (3.89) (0.55) (1.02) (0.56) (1.16) (-1.19) (-0.31) (1.23) (-0.61) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.64*** 2.19*** -3.86*** 1.48*** 1.78*** -3.97*** 1.03*** 2.65*** -0.78** 0.41 3.47* 0.37 
 (14.34) (4.36) (-21.10) (13.07) (3.55) (-21.82) (4.35) (2.68) (-2.11) (1.07) (1.89) (0.73) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.30 0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.00 0.25 0.70 0.18 0.30* 0.86 0.17 
 (-0.06) (0.43) (0.25) (-0.72) (-0.07) (-0.01) (1.61) (0.91) (0.94) (1.68) (1.02) (0.88) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.27*** 1.42** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.40** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.82* -1.49* -2.94** 
 (-2.59) (-3.13) (2.03) (-2.56) (-3.01) (2.01) (-1.76) (-1.77) (-0.60) (-1.75) (-1.88) (-2.00) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0111 0.0288 0.0131 0.0207    0.0390 0.0175 0.0266 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0110 0.0285 0.0128 0.0203    0.0387 0.0172 0.0263 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-10: Profitability – HHI by zone (three-digit SIC) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.77*** 12.01*** 3.81*** 2.33*** 7.70*** 2.47*** 2.29*** 7.21*** 3.49*** 2.09*** 6.29*** 3.16*** 
 (21.43) (15.18) (11.25) (13.11) (9.66) (7.15) (8.00) (6.82) (6.28) (6.07) (5.08) (4.97) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.18*** -3.89*** -0.44** 0.73*** 1.82*** 1.03*** 1.66*** 4.22*** 1.24*** 1.73*** 5.12*** 0.99** 
 (-11.77) (-8.40) (-2.44) (5.27) (3.07) (4.36) (7.14) (4.45) (3.46) (5.76) (3.73) (2.34) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.35*** -0.26*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.21*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.15*** 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (-15.00) (-10.10) (-16.89) (-5.36) (-3.32) (-13.43) (-4.39) (-1.57) (-4.08) (0.08) (-0.16) (1.34) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.21 -0.13 -1.06 0.29** 0.23 -1.03 -0.06 -0.13 -0.15 -0.09 -0.12 0.21 
 (1.56) (-0.24) (-1.50) (1.97) (0.43) (-1.47) (-0.52) (-0.29) (-0.50) (-0.83) (-0.27) (1.02) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.62*** 2.15*** -3.54*** 1.47*** 1.76*** -3.64*** 1.06*** 2.81*** -0.81** 0.41 3.66** 0.32 
 (13.55) (4.10) (-12.94) (12.28) (3.36) (-13.43) (4.46) (2.84) (-2.18) (1.07) (1.99) (0.62) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.30 0.11 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.25 0.71 0.18 0.30* 0.88 0.17 
 (-0.05) (0.42) (0.30) (-0.69) (-0.07) (0.04) (1.61) (0.92) (0.92) (1.68) (1.03) (0.87) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.27*** 1.42** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.40** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.82* -1.48* -2.94** 
 (-2.60) (-3.11) (2.03) (-2.57) (-3.03) (2.01) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-0.59) (-1.75) (-1.87) (-2.00) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0113 0.0287 0.0131 0.0209    0.0390 0.0175 0.0266 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0112 0.0284 0.0128 0.0205    0.0387 0.0171 0.0263 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-11: Profitability – HHI by zone (four-digit SIC) 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.76*** 12.04*** 3.93*** 2.32*** 7.73*** 2.60*** 2.29*** 7.20*** 3.49*** 2.09*** 6.29*** 3.16*** 
 (21.38) (15.21) (11.58) (13.02) (9.69) (7.51) (8.00) (6.82) (6.28) (6.07) (5.09) (4.97) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.17*** -3.97*** -0.66*** 0.74*** 1.72*** 0.77*** 1.66*** 4.21*** 1.23*** 1.73*** 5.13*** 0.99** 
 (-11.67) (-8.59) (-3.26) (5.35) (2.91) (2.94) (7.15) (4.44) (3.44) (5.76) (3.73) (2.35) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.13*** -0.34*** -0.25*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.20*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (-15.05) (-9.98) (-15.17) (-5.45) (-3.21) (-12.15) (-4.39) (-1.56) (-4.07) (0.08) (-0.16) (1.34) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.26* -0.85 -2.89*** 0.34** -0.56 -2.85*** -0.00 -0.31 -0.39 -0.02 0.27 0.25 
 (1.86) (-1.52) (-2.68) (2.23) (-1.03) (-2.67) (-0.03) (-0.62) (-1.04) (-0.15) (0.53) (1.20) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.57*** 2.51*** -2.52*** 1.40*** 2.08*** -2.62*** 1.05*** 2.89*** -0.73* 0.40 3.59** 0.29 
 (12.03) (4.44) (-4.72) (10.59) (3.73) (-4.97) (4.39) (2.90) (-1.91) (1.05) (1.97) (0.58) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.01 0.31 0.14 -0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.25 0.72 0.18 0.30* 0.87 0.17 
 (-0.06) (0.44) (0.37) (-0.70) (-0.06) (0.13) (1.61) (0.93) (0.93) (1.68) (1.03) (0.87) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.28*** 1.40** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.38** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.82* -1.48* -2.94** 
 (-2.60) (-3.12) (2.01) (-2.57) (-3.03) (1.99) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-0.59) (-1.75) (-1.87) (-2.00) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0129 0.0287 0.0131 0.0224    0.0390 0.0175 0.0266 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0128 0.0284 0.0128 0.0221    0.0387 0.0171 0.0263 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A3.4 Profitability model – minimum efficient scale (MES) 
Table A3-12: Profitability – MES [at the 75th percentile] 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.76*** 11.91*** 3.70*** 2.32*** 7.55*** 2.28*** 2.29*** 7.16*** 3.53*** 2.11*** 6.32*** 3.20*** 
 (21.36) (15.07) (10.91) (13.01) (9.48) (6.61) (8.02) (6.79) (6.35) (6.14) (5.12) (5.03) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.22*** -3.82*** -0.19 0.68*** 1.88*** 1.37*** 1.65*** 4.20*** 1.25*** 1.75*** 5.18*** 1.04** 
 (-12.18) (-8.29) (-1.13) (4.90) (3.18) (6.14) (7.11) (4.43) (3.49) (5.82) (3.75) (2.45) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.34*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.21*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.07 0.17 
 (-14.82) (-10.02) (-17.43) (-5.24) (-3.23) (-13.68) (-4.31) (-1.61) (-3.98) (0.09) (-0.18) (1.37) 
LAGGED_HHI -0.35 -3.19*** -2.83*** -0.66** -4.13*** -3.25*** 0.42 -0.27 0.49 0.93** 3.57** 1.91*** 
 (-1.28) (-2.64) (-4.70) (-2.36) (-3.41) (-5.32) (1.22) (-0.18) (0.86) (2.30) (1.97) (3.17) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 2.09*** 4.50*** -2.43*** 2.13*** 4.72*** -2.28*** 0.97*** 3.06** -0.95* 0.29 3.01 0.38 
 (9.21) (4.50) (-5.38) (9.38) (4.72) (-4.99) (3.02) (2.11) (-1.84) (0.62) (1.26) (0.60) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.05 0.29 0.24 -0.13 -0.04 0.16 0.24 0.70 0.18 0.30* 0.85 0.16 
 (-0.32) (0.41) (0.65) (-0.87) (-0.05) (0.43) (1.56) (0.91) (0.91) (1.66) (1.01) (0.83) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.26*** 1.41** -0.30** -0.28*** 1.39** -0.26* -0.37* -0.36 -0.83* -1.49* -2.95** 
 (-2.59) (-3.08) (2.02) (-2.56) (-3.00) (2.01) (-1.76) (-1.78) (-0.60) (-1.75) (-1.84) (-2.00) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0086 0.0028 0.0130 0.0291 0.0133 0.0229    0.0392 0.0176 0.0270 
Adjusted R2 0.0086 0.0027 0.0129 0.0288 0.0130 0.0226    0.0389 0.0172 0.0267 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-13: Profitability – MES [at the 50th percentile] and HHI [omitted] 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.77*** 12.01*** 3.82*** 2.33*** 7.70*** 2.46*** 2.29*** 7.21*** 3.50*** 2.09*** 6.29*** 3.16*** 
 (21.43) (15.18) (11.24) (13.12) (9.66) (7.12) (8.00) (6.83) (6.29) (6.07) (5.08) (4.96) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.20*** -3.87*** -0.33** 0.70*** 1.79*** 1.14*** 1.66*** 4.22*** 1.24*** 1.73*** 5.12*** 0.99** 
 (-12.06) (-8.44) (-1.99) (5.07) (3.05) (5.14) (7.15) (4.46) (3.47) (5.76) (3.73) (2.34) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.15*** 0.01 -0.06 0.17 
 (-14.96) (-10.12) (-17.29) (-5.27) (-3.30) (-13.72) (-4.39) (-1.58) (-4.08) (0.08) (-0.16) (1.34) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.69*** 2.12*** -3.85*** 1.56*** 1.82*** -3.93*** 1.05*** 2.78*** -0.84** 0.40 3.65** 0.34 
 (14.80) (4.23) (-21.49) (13.85) (3.66) (-22.12) (4.44) (2.82) (-2.26) (1.04) (1.98) (0.67) 
INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.00 0.30 0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.00 0.25 0.71 0.18 0.30* 0.88 0.17 
 (-0.03) (0.42) (0.26) (-0.66) (-0.07) (-0.00) (1.61) (0.92) (0.92) (1.68) (1.03) (0.87) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.29*** -0.27*** 1.42** -0.30** -0.29*** 1.40** -0.26* -0.38* -0.36 -0.82* -1.48* -2.94** 
 (-2.60) (-3.11) (2.03) (-2.57) (-3.03) (2.01) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-0.60) (-1.75) (-1.87) (-2.00) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0027 0.0111 0.0286 0.0131 0.0207    0.0390 0.0175 0.0266 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0026 0.0110 0.0283 0.0128 0.0203    0.0387 0.0172 0.0263 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A3.5 Profitability model – industry growth 
Table A3-14: Profitability – lagged industry growth 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.73*** 11.68*** 3.52*** 2.22*** 7.21*** 2.08*** 2.22*** 6.80*** 3.61*** 2.09*** 6.20*** 3.41*** 
 (19.99) (13.85) (9.27) (11.67) (8.42) (5.38) (7.56) (6.25) (5.92) (5.96) (4.83) (4.89) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.11*** -3.52*** -0.10 0.66*** 1.62*** 1.26*** 1.68*** 4.19*** 1.26*** 1.81*** 5.59*** 1.05** 
 (-10.86) (-7.43) (-0.60) (4.68) (2.70) (5.53) (7.14) (4.34) (3.43) (5.87) (3.88) (2.41) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.36*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.14*** -0.22*** -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.00 -0.03 0.17 
 (-14.22) (-9.91) (-16.55) (-5.37) (-4.06) (-13.48) (-4.81) (-2.81) (-4.60) (-0.01) (-0.08) (1.31) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.50** -1.13 -3.69*** 0.25 -1.88* -4.00*** 0.50 0.02 0.19 0.72* 3.14* 1.70*** 
 (2.14) (-1.09) (-7.13) (1.06) (-1.81) (-7.69) (1.59) (0.01) (0.35) (1.88) (1.76) (2.96) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.37*** 2.36*** -1.67*** 1.46*** 2.75*** -1.50*** 0.82*** 2.32** -1.01** -0.03 2.06 -0.31 
 (7.35) (2.84) (-4.67) (7.89) (3.32) (-4.17) (2.95) (1.98) (-2.38) (-0.08) (1.09) (-0.58) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -1.02** -1.46 -0.59 -1.10** -1.75 -0.66 -0.72 -1.26 -0.36 -0.38 -0.82 -0.12 
 (-2.03) (-1.41) (-0.94) (-2.18) (-1.62) (-1.09) (-1.64) (-1.38) (-0.92) (-0.96) (-1.00) (-0.35) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.37** -0.32*** 1.57 -0.38** -0.36*** 1.54 -0.28* -0.42** -0.63 -0.80* -1.46* -3.18** 
 (-2.18) (-2.77) (1.50) (-2.18) (-2.87) (1.48) (-1.84) (-2.07) (-1.18) (-1.73) (-1.83) (-2.07) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,206 69,275 71,206 71,206 69,275 71,206 71,206 69,275 71,206 71,206 69,275 71,206 
R2 0.0075 0.0023 0.0121 0.0271 0.0123 0.0219    0.0369 0.0163 0.0267 
Adjusted R2 0.0074 0.0022 0.0120 0.0267 0.0120 0.0215    0.0366 0.0160 0.0264 
Number of firms       10,099 10,008 10,099 10,099 10,008 10,099 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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Table A3-15: Profitability – industry growth [omitted] 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.75*** 12.16*** 4.11*** 2.33*** 7.85*** 2.72*** 2.25*** 7.16*** 3.48*** 2.04*** 6.02*** 3.15*** 
 (22.09) (16.21) (12.92) (13.65) (10.45) (8.42) (8.01) (6.99) (6.58) (6.10) (4.99) (5.22) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.22*** -3.84*** -0.20 0.70*** 1.95*** 1.37*** 1.63*** 4.00*** 1.26*** 1.70*** 4.59*** 1.03** 
 (-12.34) (-8.47) (-1.26) (5.18) (3.37) (6.26) (7.15) (4.28) (3.61) (5.88) (3.46) (2.52) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.33*** -0.26*** -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.20*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.16 0.17 
 (-15.01) (-9.82) (-17.27) (-5.55) (-3.00) (-13.51) (-4.47) (-1.58) (-4.05) (0.07) (-0.42) (1.41) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.32* -1.61** -2.21*** 0.27 -1.76** -2.30*** 0.09 -1.57** -0.06 0.04 -1.29 0.35 
 (1.88) (-2.15) (-6.91) (1.56) (-2.37) (-7.23) (0.53) (-1.96) (-0.24) (0.20) (-1.45) (1.29) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.52*** 3.22*** -2.76*** 1.37*** 2.84*** -2.85*** 1.00*** 3.79*** -0.77** 0.51 4.95*** 0.37 
 (10.56) (5.18) (-11.71) (9.63) (4.60) (-12.16) (4.28) (3.84) (-2.08) (1.41) (2.83) (0.75) 
ASSET_SALES_RATIO -0.30*** -0.29*** 1.46** -0.31** -0.31*** 1.44** -0.27* -0.39* -0.26 -0.83* -1.44* -2.47* 
 (-2.59) (-3.05) (2.06) (-2.56) (-2.97) (2.04) (-1.76) (-1.77) (-0.46) (-1.84) (-1.93) (-1.89) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 79,298 77,180 79,298 79,298 77,180 79,298 79,298 77,180 79,298 79,298 77,180 79,298 
R2 0.0082 0.0029 0.0122 0.0282 0.0133 0.0217    0.0389 0.0177 0.0262 
Adjusted R2 0.0082 0.0028 0.0121 0.0279 0.0129 0.0214    0.0386 0.0173 0.0259 
Number of firms       10,703 10,610 10,703 10,703 10,610 10,703 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A3.6 Profitability model – absolute assets 
Table A3-16: Profitability – absolute assets 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 3.78*** 11.96*** 3.72*** 2.33*** 7.60*** 2.31*** 2.30*** 7.25*** 3.55*** 2.11*** 6.41*** 3.22*** 
 (21.46) (15.13) (10.95) (13.09) (9.53) (6.68) (8.06) (6.86) (6.40) (6.15) (5.19) (5.08) 
EURO_MEMBER -1.20*** -3.93*** -0.34** 0.71*** 1.81*** 1.20*** 1.65*** 4.17*** 1.21*** 1.74*** 5.15*** 1.00** 
 (-12.00) (-8.52) (-2.05) (5.13) (3.07) (5.40) (7.10) (4.39) (3.39) (5.80) (3.76) (2.38) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.12*** -0.35*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.10 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.05 0.17 
 (-14.87) (-10.12) (-17.60) (-5.18) (-3.24) (-13.83) (-4.27) (-1.57) (-4.09) (0.10) (-0.13) (1.38) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.40* -1.39 -3.74*** 0.06 -2.43** -4.15*** 0.60* 0.21 0.48 0.99** 3.88** 2.10*** 
 (1.69) (-1.34) (-7.11) (0.24) (-2.35) (-7.80) (1.87) (0.16) (0.89) (2.48) (2.20) (3.58) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.43*** 3.11*** -1.38*** 1.51*** 3.44*** -1.22*** 0.77*** 2.73** -1.01** 0.11 2.50 -0.26 
 (7.79) (3.83) (-3.81) (8.26) (4.24) (-3.36) (2.82) (2.38) (-2.40) (0.28) (1.39) (-0.51) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH -0.02 0.34 0.21 -0.10 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.71 0.17 0.30* 0.85 0.15 
 (-0.13) (0.48) (0.57) (-0.68) (0.03) (0.36) (1.58) (0.92) (0.90) (1.66) (1.00) (0.81) 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS -0.04*** 0.20*** 0.37*** -0.04*** 0.20*** 0.37*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.02** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
 (-13.02) (11.59) (15.66) (-12.96) (11.31) (15.36) (1.39) (4.76) (4.89) (2.21) (3.31) (3.34) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 76,012 73,991 76,012 
R2 0.0081 0.0029 0.0162 0.0286 0.0134 0.0260    0.0390 0.0176 0.0261 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.0028 0.0161 0.0283 0.0131 0.0257    0.0387 0.0172 0.0258 
Number of firms       10,552 10,456 10,552 10,552 10,456 10,552 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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A3.7 Profitability model – solvency ratio 
Table A3-17: Profitability – solvency ratio 
Model type OLS OLS with t PANEL with RE Panel with FE 
Profitability measure ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS ROA ROE ROS 
EU_MEMBER 4.13*** 12.02*** 4.04*** 2.47*** 7.61*** 2.42*** 2.15*** 7.02*** 3.19*** 1.52*** 4.87*** 2.58*** 
 (24.18) (15.24) (11.82) (14.46) (9.56) (6.97) (8.06) (6.73) (6.01) (4.83) (4.02) (4.25) 
EURO_MEMBER -0.84*** -3.74*** 0.20 1.50*** 2.21*** 2.15*** 2.07*** 5.16*** 1.56*** 1.76*** 5.19*** 1.04** 
 (-8.64) (-8.03) (1.20) (10.93) (3.59) (9.61) (9.04) (5.32) (4.42) (5.98) (3.71) (2.51) 
GDP_PER_CAPITA -0.14*** -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.21*** -0.05*** -0.08 -0.12*** 0.02 0.03 0.19 
 (-17.88) (-10.07) (-18.51) (-5.67) (-3.29) (-13.53) (-3.21) (-1.20) (-3.36) (0.26) (0.08) (1.55) 
LAGGED_HHI 0.10 -1.56 -4.23*** -0.29 -2.66** -4.69*** 0.59* -0.02 0.57 1.23*** 4.16** 2.40*** 
 (0.43) (-1.51) (-8.16) (-1.30) (-2.57) (-8.92) (1.90) (-0.01) (1.10) (3.21) (2.35) (4.19) 
MINIMUM_EFFICIENT_SCALE 1.70*** 3.09*** -1.20*** 1.76*** 3.46*** -1.06*** 1.06*** 3.30*** -0.76* 0.26 2.64 -0.18 
 (9.62) (3.77) (-3.37) (10.06) (4.24) (-2.95) (4.04) (2.85) (-1.87) (0.72) (1.48) (-0.35) 
LAGGED_INDUSTRY_GROWTH 0.08 0.37 0.32 -0.00 0.06 0.23 0.35* 0.91 0.29 0.41* 1.13 0.27 
 (0.63) (0.52) (0.83) (-0.01) (0.08) (0.61) (1.81) (1.09) (1.28) (1.77) (1.17) (1.21) 
ABSOLUTE_ASSETS -0.16** -0.24*** 1.54** -0.16** -0.24*** 1.52** -0.26 -0.31 -0.40 -1.03** -1.75** -3.16** 
 (-2.34) (-2.87) (2.11) (-2.26) (-2.76) (2.09) (-1.38) (-1.26) (-0.59) (-2.11) (-2.22) (-2.14) 
SOLVENCY_RATIO 0.11*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.04** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.44*** 0.18*** 
 (41.66) (1.57) (24.12) (43.27) (2.52) (24.75) (28.50) (8.01) (24.53) (25.58) (9.45) (23.26) 
Time (t) dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75,826 73,988 75,826 75,826 73,988 75,826 75,826 73,988 75,826 75,826 73,988 75,826 
R2 0.0505 0.0028 0.0280 0.0738 0.0134 0.0385    0.0913 0.0272 0.0556 
Adjusted R2 0.0504 0.0027 0.0279 0.0734 0.0130 0.0382    0.0910 0.0269 0.0553 
Number of firms       10,540 10,455 10,540 10,540 10,455 10,540 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectfully 
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